Explanatory Note:

For a change of pace, the following effort is not one of the armful of articles that have been submitted to Slingshot by this solo wargamer/writer over the past few years. As will become evident rather quickly, this “research” was inspired by an article found in that long-running publication. 

As this piece was not written for consideration by the editor of that well known and well regarded journal, I did not have to worry about the mechanics and nuances of British-English versus American-English. However, and as always, any lazy or silly mistakes that made it through the fairly rigorous editing process (i.e., five or six proof readings) are entirely mine. 

ARGENTORATUM:

INTERPRETATIONS & ITERATIONS

It would be interesting, I think, and well worth the time, to compare and contrast the two-page set of guidelines or instructions found in Issue 23 of Slingshot, The Journal of the Society of Ancients, with the nine-page analysis and examination that was published in Issue 321. The shorter submission was written by Phil Barker, an instantly recognizable if not iconic name in the wargaming community, and was titled “Reconstructing the Battle of Strasbourg.” The second submission or treatment, with the title “Argentoratum, AD 357,” was produced by the late Patrick Waterson, an admired, respected, and erudite member of the smaller in number, but illustrious and worldwide Society of Ancients community. [1] In order to complete this comparison/contrast, I would need to purchase “The Golden Years of Slingshot, 1965-2015,” which would, according to the currency exchange rates as of December 01, 2020, require an outlay or investment of roughly 55 US dollars. Let us round this up to 60 US dollars for postage and shipping, an amount that I am, as of this typing, not inclined to pay. Even without a copy of what might be labeled the “Barker Brief”or “Strasbourg Summary” in front of me, it seems possible to attempt a tentative comparison and contrast of these two submissions. 

 

In terms of general or obvious similarities, both gentlemen tackled the same historic engagement, and both articles were published in the same magazine or journal. Based on an article Mr. Barker (it feels disrespectful as well as odd to refer to him as Phil; it’s like being on a first name basis with a celebrity, an important government representative or even a religious official) submitted to Issue 12 of Miniature Wargames, it appears that both writers consulted or studied the narrative account provided by Ammianus Marcellinus. [2] This is where the comparison ends. Due to it being limited or condensed to just two pages, I cannot be certain that Mr. Barker discussed the specific stages of the battle.  

Looking at the numerous differences between these two articles, let me start with Patrick’s division of the engagement into five distinct phases. (I feel more comfortable using his first name, as we had what might be described as a “working relationship” when I was an active and  contributing member of The Society.) Patrick examines these segments of the historical contest, supporting his analysis and “arguments” with the sections of the narrative account supplied by  Ammianus. The material from this ancient author is reinforced by the writing of three others. In the bibliography, Patrick provides links for Orations, by Flavius Julianus, Funeral Orations for Julian, from Libanius, and Book II of New History, by Zosimus. Due respect to Mr. Barker, but my guess is that he probably did not refer to these additional narratives. He did, however, provide instructions for recreating the battle. I do not think this was the engine that powered Patrick’s work. While Patrick did supply a few ideas for “enlivening” what was in his words, “a Roman walkover,” I have a hunch that Mr. Barker explained how an early edition of the WRG Ancients rules could be used for refighting the battle. The substantial difference in length between the two pieces has already been mentioned. I rather doubt that, but again, I could be mistaken, “Reconstructing the Battle of Strasbourg” included any maps. I would also guess that this set of instructions in Issue 23 of Slingshot did not contain any pictures. The engaging and excellent—in my opinion—piece written by Patrick is certainly colorful. There are three photographs of 28 mm miniature Late Romans, all supplied by another well known name in the ancient wargaming community, Simon MacDowall. There are three full-color maps of the contest, showing deployment, mid-point, and conclusion of the battle. There are two wargamer-friendly “force structure” tables as well. While I cannot confidently comment on the possible differences existing in each article with respect to numbers, organization and deployment, my hunch is that each author would respectfully disagree with his counterpart. Finally, I cannot help but wonder what Mr. Barker would say about Patrick’s argument or conclusion, based on reading between the lines of Ammianus, that there were something like 80 carroballistae on the Roman side of the field on that fateful and evidently rather warm day in late summer of 357 AD. The inferred presence of quite a few pieces of Roman field artillery or “mobile missile platforms” (MMPs?) on this ancient battlefield was something not mentioned in other examinations, whether these were academic, “academic,” or conducted by experienced historical miniature wargamers. 

In the wargamer-friendly information provided in the diagrams, speculative orders of battle, and summary explanation found on page 206 of Warfare in the Classical World, there is no mention of carroballistae. Similarly, no mention or reference could be found in a paper authored by Adam Glen Hough in The Graduate History Review: Vol 2 (2010). [3] In his refight of the battle using his Vis Bellica rules, Robert Avery permits the Romans one unit of light artillery, though the rationale behind this decision is not explained. [4] Simon MacDowall might be viewed as an expert on this engagement as he reports, at Legio Wargames.com, having “played the scenario, or versions of it, many times.” [5] Interestingly, in the order of battle using his Comitatus rules, he offers the following option for the Auxilia Palatina contingent: “Up to 2 of these may be crossbowmen to represent the possibility that the Balistarii, Julian had with him prior to the battle were crossbow armed. Another alternative is to have them as artillery.” [6] It was not until about a week or so into this developing project that I typed “Battle of Strasbourg” into an Internet search engine. As one might expect, I was directed to the Wikipedia entry. There was no mention or reference to carroballistae found here either. [7] If “Reconstructing the Battle of Strasbourg” is determined to be the earliest evidence of the clash between Caesar Julian and  King Chnodomar provided by a historical wargamer or earnest student of ancient military history, then the Osprey book “Strasbourg AD 357: The Victory That Saved Gaul,” written by Raffaele D’Amato and Andrea Frediani, might be the most recent work offered on the battle. [8] While it might be interesting to see how this team of authors approaches and or tackles the subject matter, I am rather skeptical that their research will turn up anything new or significant. But again, I concede that I may be mistaken. 

In his excellent article, Patrick contends that the Roman carroballistae:

. . . would have been shooting downslope, the elevation provided by the cart 

        would have been accentuated by the downslope view, allowing them to engage 

        the Alemannic formations over the heads of the Romans. Shooting into packed 

        masses of Alemannic infantry from above, most of the missiles would have 

        struck heads. They would also have struck hard at Alemanni morale. 

In his interpretation of the contest, Patrick has the Romans on a gentle hill or slope. Julian’s outnumbered formations have a slight advantage then, against the roiling mass of barbarians.

The diagrams of the action in Warfare show a low hill of several elevation lines behind the main Roman line of battle. Phrased more succinctly, the majority of Roman troops are positioned on level ground, on the same ground as the more numerous but less professional Alemanni warriors. An opposite view is taken by Mssrs. Barker and MacDowall, as well as by Adam Hough. In his “ancient” article which appeared in Miniature Wargames 12, Phil Barker refers to the Germans “making for the high ground and rough terrain.” Apparently, that is where they stayed until rested and then attacked by the Romans. For Simon MacDowall’s scenario, his table has the barbarians waiting on a gentle hill or ridge (it runs the length of his 6 by 4-foot model battlefield) composed of three elevation lines. In his academic paper, Adam Hough informs:

The tactical preparations made by Chnodomar were entirely negated by Julian’s 

patience and ability to hold his units in formation. Severus’ legion did not fall 

        prey to the ambush on the left flank, and Chnodomar lost the advantage of the 

        hill (bold type is my format change) be being forced to charge Julian at a 

        distance, rather than from short range, as was Alamanni custom.

A careful study of the Ammianus narrative by this wargamer-writer did not yield a definite resolution to this apparent disagreement. The ancient author does refer, in XVI.12.19, to “a hill of gentle slope, covered with grain already ripe, and not far distant from the banks of the Rhine,” but this is the only reference to this particular terrain feature in his account. In Section 141 of the Funeral Oration offered by Libanius, there is another mention of the hill. In this passage, the baggage train guards, “left on the top of the hill,” join the general and evidently rather desperate engagement. Estimating that the camp of Julian might have been a mile or more from the Roman line of battle, I am inclined to “follow” the Warfare diagrams which show a majority of the Romans deployed on level ground. On the other hand, the map included with the Wikipedia description has a certain appeal. In this representation of the battlefield, there is high ground, but its orientation does not appear to favor either side. The direction of this slope runs diagonally, from the far right of the barbarian position to the far right of the Roman line. In his consideration of the engagement, Jonathan Webb comments of the various interpretations of the location of the hill or gentle slope and concludes, “Regardless of which side held this terrain, it does not appear to have significantly affected the battle.” [9] At this time (very early morning of December 02, 2020), I have not decided how or even if I will model this gentle slope on my table top. It was much easier to make a decision about the rough terrain on the Alemanni right.

In his brief description found in Section 140, Libanius informs that Chondomar and his subordinate kings and chieftains “had strengthened their own right wing with a reserve which they concealed behind an elevated water-course, overgrown with reeds, that country being marshy, that concealed them sitting down.” This planned ambush did not succeed, however. Somehow, the Romans advancing on the far left of the line saw this barbarian reserve and, ironically, surprised the warriors into either launching a premature attack or forced them to yield the concealing and rough terrain. The narrative provided by Ammianus supports, generally, this version of events. In XVI.12.23 there is mention made of “secret and puzzling ambuscades.” In XVI.12.26, the Romans on the left, under the direct command of Severus, stop short of springing the ambush, stop short and deploy in front of “trenches filled with (Alemanni) soldiers.” Then, in XVI.12.37, it turns out that the German warriors did launch a premature charge and were “driven back by the force of a left wing marching in close formation.” As with previous sub topics, there is a variety of opinions on this “surprise attack” and the terrain from which it was launched.

The Warfare maps show a line of concealed trenches, just within a wooded area, running nearly perpendicular to the barbarian formations on the far right. Curiously, these trenches are not occupied. A similar depiction is offered in Robert Avery’s Vis Bellica scenario, which leads me to believe that the Warfare information may have been used while preparing his version of the contest. For his Comitatus model of the battle, Simon MacDowall decorates a small fraction of his tabletop with woods (i.e., rough terrain) but notes: “As the Romans suspected the ambush I suggest that there is no point in trying to hide a possible deployment by the Alamanni in the woods.” In the Wikipedia version, there appear to be around 2,000 German warriors positioned in the forest on the far right of Chondomar’s line. These troops are not as condensed or solidly formed as the warrior contingents drawn up in the open. Interestingly, there is no indication of trenches, a water-course, or any other feature that might assist in hiding an ambush. The academic though non-wargamer, at least I guess that he is not, Adam Hough describes the Alamanni right as resting on a canal, and that the ambushing force was “hidden by reeds and carefully constructed ditches.” Turning to the article prepared by Patrick Waterson, it was found that approximately 5,000 Alemanni warriors were placed in ambush, in a stream bed, that ran at an angle to the main line formed by the rest of Chnodomar’s tribal levies and warbands. If only to break up an otherwise featureless and plain-looking table, it seems that some sort of terrain feature or combination of features will have to be positioned on the far right of the barbarian line. Perhaps this feature or combination of features will extend towards the center of this short-edge of the table? Perhaps this feature, whatever final form it takes, will extend all the way to, or brush up against, the Roman left? 

Shifting my attention to the combined concerns of numbers involved, the types of units present, their deployment as well as respective frontages and depths, the disagreement between various interpretations was more pronounced. For example, Patrick explains that, “Ammianus provides only sketchy details for each side’s order of battle.” A reported 35,000 barbarians were present, and Julian’s small army numbered some 13,000, with “only a few contingents distinguished.” Taking the other side, Simon MacDowall offers a similar number for Julian’s army, but informs that “many of his (Julian’s) actual units are known.” With regard to the Alamanni, the tendency of Romans to inflate enemy numbers was noted, so the overall total of barbarians on the actual field may have been closer to 20,000. 

The information found on page 206 of Warfare in the Classical World is, again, wargamer-friendly and, I would remark, readily transferrable to any number of wargame rules for the ancient period. Unlike any other visual representation of the battle, the barbarian infantry are illustrated by small wedge-shaped symbols, which matches the description given by Ammianus in XVI.12.20. There are asterisks next to the Infantry and Cavalry breakdowns, however, noting that the “information about some units’ strength and disposition is incomplete and so speculative.” This speculation is continued on the Wikipedia page, though there does appear to be more thought and research put into the composition of the opposing forces. One of the attractive aspects of this communal effort is that names of possible sub-commanders of the Alemanni are identified. There is also the interesting possibility of a contingent of Burgundian troops being present. On the Roman side, names for the handful of legions that were present are suggested. The supporting auxiliary formations of archers are also indicated. 

The suggested deployment of Julian’s army, as indicated in the full-color map included with the Wikipedia description, seems fairly traditional, if not quintessentially Roman. Slight variations of this interpretation are presented in Simon MacDowall’s model, Robert Avery’s adaptation, the first diagram of the Warfare explanation, and in the estimation offered in the paper written by Adam Hough. In stark contrast, Patrick Waterson argues for a different deployment. Based on his close reading of the source material, especially the narrative provided by Ammianus, his Roman position consists of a main line and a couple of supporting formations. On the Roman right, Patrick places a reserve formation of auxiliaries and legionaries, with the legion infantry positioned on the right or outer flank of the auxiliaries. In Patrick’s version of the historical battle, the Roman center appears dangerously thin, being manned by just three legions, or an estimated total of 4,800 heavy infantry. 

Finally and briefly, the Warfare information indicates that the “German cavalry dismounted at the insistence of the infantry who feared abandonment.” This adjustment was taken to heart by Robert Avery in his Vis Bellica scenario. In his Comitatus scenario, Simon MacDowall gives the barbarian commander/player the option of dismounting his cavalry force. In my opinion, Patrick effectively refutes these interpretations, citing or referencing Sections 21 and 22, 24, 36 and 37 of Ammianus, Book XVI, Chapter 12. 

In the ‘Tips and Tactics’ section of his Strasbourg scenario, Simon MacDowall writes: “This is a fairly simple and straight forward game.” He continues, explaining that he “has played this scenario, or versions of it many times.” While I can see how most wargames featuring Romans and barbarians could be categorized as “simple and straight forward,” the variety of interpretations concerning terrain and troops leads me to believe that a miniature reconstruction of this particular battle may not be so direct and easy. Unlike the accomplished author and well-known wargamer, I have not had the pleasure of refighting this engagement on my tabletop. Drawing inspiration from Patrick’s article, I thought I might address this discrepancy. To be certain, I do not intend to compete with or attempt to surpass Simon MacDowall in this specific regard. However, I do think it might prove educational, engaging, and entertaining to stage five  refights of the contest between Julian and Chnodomar using five different sets of rules. In effect, I would be staging a mini-Battle Day. [10] My amateur effort would be different on a number of levels. For example, and in no particular order of significance, I would be playing all of these wargames solo. Given this approach, the project would necessarily be long-term. Indeed, I estimate that it would take at least five months, if I averaged one game per month, or perhaps half a year to complete the handful of tabletop battles. These wargames would be set up and played using no painted and based miniature figures whatsoever. 

When I can, when the opportunity presents itself, I like to proceed or work in alphabetical order.  The rulebooks that will be employed in this admittedly rather ambitious project are the following: ARMATI 2nd Edition; Hail Caesar; IMPETVS; L’Art de la Guerre or ADLG, and To The Strongest! Each report will follow a similar format and will include a brief critique and evaluation. When all five wargames have been played, I think I will draft a final critique and evaluation, wherein I compare and contrast (briefly) the selected rulesets and perhaps even rank them, though this kind of assessment would be entirely and obviously subjective. 

Post Script:

My original position of being disinclined to find the required amount of funds and send them over the Atlantic so that I could secure a compilation of hundreds of electronic copies of Slingshot weakened as December progressed and then essentially evaporated by the middle of the month. (Given this impressive display of will power, it is probably a good thing that I never started collecting and painting actual miniatures. I can easily picture having a lead mountain the approximate height of the second story window to the immediate right of my writing/typing desk.) Unfortunately, there was a problem with the purchased memory stick which arrived in early January of 2021. This concern was communicated, and a replacement device was soon on its way, courtesy of the excellent customer/member service “department” personnel. Anyway. As I now had access to Issue 23 of this reputable publication, I was able to do a proper comparison/contrast of Barker and Waterson. By complete accident, I stumbled across an article by James Manto in Issue 216 (please see “Slouching Toward Strasbourg: The Battle of Argentoratum (357 AD) Refought” on pages 20-22). As this report directly concerned my current interests, I decided to conduct a brief examination of this “new” material as well.

The demonstration put on my Mr. Barker and, one presumes, his colleagues, took place on March 15 of 1969 at the A.G.M. or Annual General Meeting. To quote, in full, the fifth paragraph of the brief summary: “Strasbourg was selected because it was fought between 35,000 barbarians on the one hand and 13,000 Romans under the Caesar Julian on the other. It thus gives great opportunities to bring out the relative value of discipline and numbers”. With regard to numbers, both authors are in agreement. However, deployments and terrain highlight the differences between the two interpretations. 

Mr. Barker arranges the German infantry in a massed and very deep formation on a steep ridge. Patrick is in agreement about the depth of the barbarian units, but he places the Roman forces on a ridge or at least slightly elevated position. In his view, the Germans have to attack uphill, whereas Mr. Barker has the screaming hordes charging downhill - with, one estimates, quite a bit of impetus. As to the location of Chnodomar, Mr. Barker stations the king on the left of the German deployment, among the light cavalry and supporting light infantry. In Patrick’s version of the historical battle, Chnodomar is with his “elite globus”, which is positioned as a reserve behind the very deep main line of warriors. 

In Mr. Barker’s demonstration, which was a fairly decisive Roman victory and including at least a few ballistae models, the attending players were “satisfied that they had achieved a realistic portrayal”. In fact, they “thought it more realistic than the real battle”. Patrick cannot report the same evidence, for he did not actually wargame the battle. However, his assumption is that any refight might run the risk of being one-sided or worse, boring, as the “historical contest was a Roman walkover with a few exciting moments”. 

As mentioned above, it was by accident that I happened to stumble upon “Slouching Toward Strasbourg . . .”. One afternoon or evening, I was skimming through the contents of the new memory stick, just seeing what was there, and I discovered, fortunately, the engaging article/report by James Manto. (Going back to the provided Index, I typed Argentoratum then Strasbourg in the search window. Curiously, the submission written by James did not appear.) 

The provided orders of battle seemed more in tune with Patrick’s research and were more detailed than the broad statements made in Mr. Barker’s summary. For his reconstruction, James did include two units or models of carroballistae. Evidently and obviously, Argentoratum has been studied before, as James informs that Perry Gray wrote an article for SAGA magazine about the engagement, or at least about the Roman forces that were present. 

In terms of the terrain, due to logistics and trunk space, James opted to ignore the question of which side had the advantage of being on a ridge or low rise; he did keep the large wooded area on the German right/Roman left, however. With respect to deployment, James arranged the Romans in two lines. The legions were in the second line. This placement is quite different from the positions advocated or suggested by Patrick. Like Mr. Barker, James had Chnodomar over on the far left, commanding his few thousand horsemen supported by light troops. 

Over the course of a weekend, James was able to umpire/play three refights of Argentoratum employing his own rules, Legion and Empire. Over the course of this weekend (in early 2001 or late 2000), history was reversed twice. The Germans won on Saturday morning, lost on Saturday afternoon, and forced the Romans to concede on Sunday morning. Like the player-generals in March of 1969, the participants in the games staged by James had an enjoyable experience. 

James concluded his article/report with a few paragraphs on possible revisions to the tabletop refight of Argentoratum. There was talk of dismounting the barbarian cavalry, tinkering with leadership values, toying with terrain, and swapping out the Roman mobile “field artillery” for a unit or two of men armed with crossbows. 

While I will admit to a history of tinkering with established and accepted sets of rules, I think, for the sake of this planned project, that I will try to keep the variables to a minimum. Again, the overall idea is to use Patrick’s article as a foundation and see what I can or might build with five different rulebooks. 

NOTES

1. Patrick Waterson passed away in January of 2020. At the risk of embellishing or overstating, in my estimation, he was a pillar in The Society of Ancients. He was also an encyclopedic force to be reckoned with in its electronic forums as well as in the Guardroom pages of its signature and long-running publication. The Editorial of the March/April 2020 issue of Slingshot was, in essence, an obituary, though one formatted for members of The Society. In the July/August 2020 issue of Slingshot, Professor Phil Sabin offered a written memorial to Patrick titled “Honour and Loss.”   
2. Please see “The Sharp End in AD360,”on pages 13 and 14 of Miniature Wargames, Issue 12. From an advertisement for the ‘National Wargames Championship’ found on page 18, I am guessing that this issue appeared in late 1983 or perhaps early 1984. (I could not help but notice the price. In the UK, the magazine cost 75p. The cost in this country, some 3,000 miles across The Atlantic Ocean, was $3.50.) My guess is that Issue 23 of Slingshot appeared in the post in late 1969 or early 1970. The following link will take the interested reader to the relevant book, chapter, and starting section of the fairly wargamer-friendly narrative written by Ammianus: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0082%3Abook%3D16%3Achapter%3D12%3Asection%3D19
3. Please see “Julian and the Decision to Fight: Strasbourg, 357.” Here is the link to an abstract of the article which will also take the interested reader to the complete paper: https://www.historyoftheancientworld.com/2010/12/julian-and-the-decision-to-fight-strasbourg-357/.
4. Please see https://www.vislardica.com/vb-sc-argentoratum.
5. Please see http://legio-wargames.com/strasbourg/4542978511.
6. On studying Mr. MacDowall’s scenario notes, I wondered if there might be some confusion over the meaning over the word “ballistari.” Could Patrick have interpreted or translated it one way and Mr. MacDowall another? A quick Internet search turned up this interesting page or site: lukeuedasarson.com/Balistarii.html.
7. Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Strasbourg. (Sidebar: In the November 23, 2020 issue of The New Yorker, Louis Menand offered an interesting and thought-provoking article titled “WHAT DO YOU KNOW? Wikipedia, “Jeopardy!,” and the fate of the fact.” I honestly had no idea that Wikipedia would celebrate 20 years on January 15 of 2021. 
8. The publication date for this title, Number 336 in the Osprey Campaign Series, was May 30, 2019. Securing a copy would cost me around 20 US dollars. 
9. Please see www.theartofbattle.com/battle-of-strasbourg-357.
10. For a general overview of this annual event, please see http://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day. For a more detailed look at how Battle Day works, please see http://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/175-battleday-2019-report and http://soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/161-soa-battleday-2018-report.