GAUGAMELA AGAIN

On the left side of page 5 in the Tactica II rulebook, the second bullet point of Section 2.11.1 (Abilities of the General) reads: “An Attached General improves the Melee ability of that unit (sec. 7.4.2), and modifies Control Tests (sec. 8.0) it may take with a +1 Modifier. For scenario play, a General’s abilities may vary.” 

As suggested by the title of this post, the decision was made to revisit the 331 BC battle between Alexander and King Darius III, a contest which featured a comparatively large Macedonian army fighting against a reportedly huge host of Persians. (This would be my fourth staging of Gaugamela within a period of several weeks.) As intimated by the first sentence, my plan revolved around employing the Tactica II rules for this solo project. With regard to a starting point, I thought I would focus on the last sentence of the excerpt, the eight words entertaining “scenario play” and referencing a “general’s abilities.” 

From all that I have read, it seems safe - if not obvious - to state that Alexander was in command of the army, but was especially involved with how the historical engagement developed on the Macedonian right wing. The aged veteran Parmenio was tasked with holding down the left wing. With regard to the center, I have come across a couple of names, but have not discovered any central or accepted “in charge” figure for this section of the Macedonian line. Shifting to the other side of the battlefield or tabletop, I noted that Bessos (spelling will vary) was in command of the Persian left, while Mazaios (spelling will also vary) was in command of the Persian right. King Dareios III (again, spelling will vary) was in overall command of the larger if not reportedly massive army, and was the local officer in charge of the Persian center. How should these various personalities be represented in miniature? What abilities should they have? Would it be acceptable or reasonable, at least within the spirit of the Tactica II rules, to depict each as an army general? The following represents my current thinking, my work-in-progress answers to those questions.

Starting with the last question: Yes, I think it would be perfectly fine to categorize each personality as an army general. Alexander and King Darius would be in overall command of their respective armies, obviously, while the others would be subordinates, but of varying abilities and talents, etc. Ideally, King Darius should be riding a splendid four-horse chariot, something suitable for the king of a very large and wealthy empire. Alexander should be astride his faithful warhorse, even if the noble animal was somewhat worse for campaign wear and tear at this point. Anyway, here is how I am going to represent these five historical figures on my typically nontraditional wargames table:

Alexander - a “Follow Me!” Exceptional General; Control Test modifier of +2, Melee dice +5, and a value of 25 figures toward command or army breakpoint.

Parmenio - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +2, and a value of 10 figures toward command or army breakpoint. 

King Darius III - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +2, and a value of 30 figures if fleeing or 50 figures if killed toward command or army breakpoint.

Bessus - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +3, and a value of 9 figures toward command or army breakpoint.

Mazaeus - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +3, and a value of 11 figures toward command or army breakpoint.

Notes:

1. The Control Test modifier is the simple addition of a 1 or 2 to the score rolled on 2d6. The melee dice addition is the number of d6 that the commander can add to the total number of dice rolled by a friendly unit when it is engaged in close combat. Of course, participating in a melee poses a certain degree of risk to the general. 
2. The qualification regarding the application of leader value in number of figures to command or army breakpoint is because I am thinking about treating each army as a combination of three smaller commands. Furthermore, instead of counting all of the “massed unit figures” in a broken command against the determined break point of the army, I am thinking of adapting a scenario rule wherein two commands need to be broken before the battle can be said to be lost. The additional qualification here would be for the battlefield condition of King Darius. It seems reasonable to suggest that if he meets his end on the tabletop, then it is “game over” for the Persians. If, however, he simply rides away or is forced to flee, then it seems a fairly safe bet that his command will collapse. 

Having offered a few subjective ideas concerning the representation of the known leaders present on that fateful day in 331 BC, I should now like to turn to a consideration of just a portion of the respective orders of battle. For my starting and ending point, I have chosen the central command or sector of the Persian host. 

Orders of Battle: A Partial Interpretation

Reviewing the Battle Pack information and deployment map provided on pages 15-17 of the November 2004 issue of Slingshot, I translated the descriptions and DBM language into the Persian (Late) army list language of Tactica II. The following list illustrates how I intend to model the Persian center at Gaugamela:

>1,000 Greek mercenaries [on the right of the line or position]

21 Greek mercenaries - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / PH (Hoplites) FV 5-6, Vet, Spears

> 1,000 “Apple-Bearer” Foot Guards [next to, on the left of the Greeks]

21 Guard Infantry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / PH FV 5-6, Vet, Spears & Bows

>1,000 Kinsmen cavalry [next to the Guards]

21 Heavy Cavalry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / HC FV 5-6, Vet, Lances

>1,000 Greek mercenaries [on the left of the Kinsmen horse]

21 Greek mercenaries - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / PH (Hoplites) FV 5-6, Vet, Spears

>1,000 Indian cavalry [next to the Greek mercenaries]

21 Heavy Cavalry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / HC FV 4-6, MG, Javelins

>1,000 Karian deportees [on the left of the Indians]

21 Infantry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / FT FV 4-6, MG, Spears

>1,000 Mardian archers [the unit on the left end of this comparatively short line]

21 Archers - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / LI FV 3-6, Vet, Bows

>50 Scythed Chariots [evidently placed as a screen for the Indian cavalry and Karian infantry]

03 scythed chariot models in a single rank / (Impetus) FV 5-6, MG, Blades and etc.

>15 Elephants [reportedly, a part of that Scythed Chariot screen]

01 elephant model / (Impetus) FV 5-6, MG, Various

Notes:

1. An approximate and representative figure scale of 1:50 was established for this project. This “working scale” falls in the middle of the approximate figure scale provided in Section 1.1 of the rules. Admittedly and technically, the tabletop strength of my units is very slightly more than the reported strength given in the Battle Pack information. The deployment of the various units in 3 ranks of 7 is also somewhat unusual, but it worked rather well for my intention and purpose. 
2. For the scythed chariots, I thought an approximate scale of 1:16-17 might work. This representation would be very close to the base/stand used to depict the elephants in the army of Darius.
3. Solo-wargamer’s license was used to adjust the unit characteristics in some cases. For example, the army list on page L8 defines Persian Guard HC as being EL (elite) and being armed with javelins, as are almost all formations of heavy cavalry. Studying the description found within the Battle Pack, I decided to downgrade these troopers to Vet (veteran) and replace their javelins with xystons or lances, even though these weapons do not confer any special melee advantage under the rules. 
4. Choosing functionality over form, these 9 units, King Darius III and the division commander (or marker) were made out of colored cardstock. Seeking to maximize the available playing surface, the various formations were drawn (on computer) in 15mm scale and then reduced by 25 percent. Consequently, a traditional stand of 15mm Greek mercenaries, arranged in 3 ranks of 7, that would have normally have a footprint of 7 centimeters by 4.5 centimeters, presented as a two-dimensional formation measuring 5.25 centimeters by 3.37 centimeters. The footprint of the Persian center command then, was approximately 42 centimeters or around 17 inches. 
5. Simple math informed that there were 147 massed unit figures in this command. At the “established” scale, these units represented approximately 7,350 men, which was 350 more than the total strength of 7,000 listed in the Battle Pack material. If I opt to adhere to the army breakpoint rule(s) as written, then this command will quit the field when the equivalent of 73 figures (50 percent) are destroyed/routed.
6. The screen of scythed chariots and packet of pachyderms was not included in the above calculations. The loss of either of these units will not impact the determined breakpoint for this command. 

A similar approach and rather enjoyable process was followed for the Persian right and left wings as well as for the contingents comprising the Macedonian army. 

Setting the Table

Referencing the wealth of wargamer-friendly information contained within the Gaugamela Battle Pack, I deployed the functional as well as rather simple version of the Persian right wing on my tabletop. The Syrians and Mesopotamian “regiments” were on the far right of the line, almost touching the edge of the table. The Albanians and Sacesians formed the left “bookend” of this contingent or wing. A screen of Kappadokian and Armenian troopers was arranged in front of the Syrians and their neighbors. A few squadrons of scythed chariots were positioned on the left of this much shorter line. In terms of numbers, the Persian right under Mazaios contained 15 units deployed in 4 divisions. With regard to its footprint, this wing occupied 37 inches of the tabletop. Four of these 15 units were light cavalry; the rest were battle or line cavalry. In terms of massed unit figures, the Persian left wing added up to 289. Instead of adhering to the 50 percent loss provision detailed in the spiral-bound rulebook, I revised this “percentage tipping point” to 35. The cavalry under the command and control of Mazaios would quit the field when the equivalent of 101 massed unit figures had been destroyed. 

As explained in the previous section, there were 7 units in the Persian center command. Five of these were infantry. There were also a few chariots and an even smaller number of elephants deployed as a screen. This blend of foot and horse stood on about 17.5 inches of the tabletop. Their combined strength added up to 147 massed unit figures. For this comparatively small command, I employed the army breakpoint rule as written, and so, the men fighting under the immediate supervision of King Darius III would run away when 73 massed unit figures had been lost. 

The Persian left wing consisted of a screen component and a rather large main body or line. The advance screen consisted of 3 units of cavalry and 2 groups of scythed chariots. The main line was formed by 16 units of cavalry and 2 units of infantry, and was under the overall control of Bessos. This frontage of this wing stretched for approximately 53 inches. Its combined strength was 441 massed unit figures. For the sake of consistency, 

I applied the same percentage loss selected for the right wing to this larger formation. Therefore, when 154 massed unit figures had been lost, this command would withdraw from the battlefield.

Moving to the other side of the arid and flat terrain, Parmenio’s command occupied 25 inches of the tabletop. His left-most unit was about 16 inches in from the table edge. This aged and veteran officer had 162 massed unit figures in his contingent, spread across 9 units in 3 divisions. The Macedonian left wing would be undone if/when the equivalent of 81 massed unit figures had been destroyed or routed. 

The Macedonian center presented 14 units in 3 divisions. The majority of its troops were positioned as a supporting line or as a barrier if any Persian cavalry managed to get around the flanks and into the rear area(s). The frontage of the phalanx was about 14 inches. The footprint of the second line was 27.5 inches. The phalanx and its neighbors would be broken if/when they suffered 210 massed unit figure casualties. 

Alexander’s wing was built out of 4 divisions. There were 13 massed units in addition to  almost half as many groups of skirmishers. The frontage of this wing stretched for 42 inches. The strength of this command added up to 266 massed unit figures, so Alexander’s men would falter, lose heart, and then depart when 133 losses had been accumulated. 

How it Played

Having spilled quite a bit of electronic ink in my last post wherein I attempted to describe three refights of Gaugamela, I thought I would try something a little different with this report. Following, please see three diagrams or maps of my Tactica II interpretation. These “snapshots” of the status of certain parts of the tabletop at the end of specific turns should provide a sufficient as well as simpler visual record of what had happened or what was happening. 

A Critical Survey upon the Completion of Turn Seven

A careful count of the strength of the Persian left wing informed that there were 13 units of cavalry present in this sector of the tabletop. As for the enemy, they had just 4 units of foot, 5 if one included the other formation of light infantry or peltasts that was hurrying over to help shore up what remained of the Macedonian right. If one also chose to include the Companions in this sector total, then 3 more units could be added to the Macedonian numbers. However, the veteran cavalry troops of Alexander - who was no longer on the board - were in fairly poor shape. One unit was disordered, having recently executed a complex move. Another was engaged with a unit of Persian light infantry and had not secured impetus, and had not performed at all well in the first round of melee. The smallest formation of Companions had suffered quite a few losses during previous stages of the contest. In fact, if two more figures were killed, then the Fates Test rule would kick in, and passing this morale check was always a low probability. The other units of Companions would take their Fates Tests when 5 and 3 figures, respectively, had been defeated by enemy action. As stated or typed above, these veteran cavalry were in fairly poor shape. Shifting the figurative magnifying glass of subjective analysis and consideration onto the Persian cavalry formations, it was noted that light casualties had been taken by 6 units; 2 other units were on the verge of breaking (i.e., having to take their own Fates Test); the unit of light cavalry was disordered, and another unit of heavy cavalry had reached its breaking point but had passed its Fates Test. It was possible then, for this severely damaged unit to participate in one more round of melee before dissolving. In terms of actual losses, the Persian left wing had seen 4 units rout off the field. These cavalry “regiments” added up to 84 massed unit figures. The determined morale tipping point of this largish command was 154 massed unit figures. By comparison, the Macedonian right had lost 2 units of skirmishers (a formation can only evade so much before attention must be given to other, more capable units); 3 units of cavalry, and 2 units of foot. These casualties added up to 76 massed unit figures. The determined break point for the Macedonian right was 133 massed unit figures. A unit of mercenary hoplites was in trouble, and its two neighbors were under threat of attack from multiple directions, even though the movement of the various Persian cavalry units was rather glacial when it came to finding space, wheeling, and lining up their approach. In summary, it seemed that the advantage in this sector of the model battlefield was securely held by Bessos and his numerous cavalry formations. 

Moving over to the other side of the tabletop, the Macedonians appeared to be in as much trouble, if not more. Parmenio had 3 units of allied hoplites and a unit of skirmishers remaining from his original command. One unit of hoplites was disordered but had dodged a “scythed chariot bullet” when the decorated-with-blades vehicles failed to gain impetus against the unformed heavy infantry. The skirmishers had withdrawn in the face of enemy pressure to the temporary safety afforded by the orderly hoplite formations. Even so, this handful of infantry was facing 13 units of enemy horse. Seven of these formations, under the direction of Mazaios, were following in the wake of the scythed chariot squadron and bearing down on the rather exposed left and left-rear of Parmenio’s position. The units of Sakai light cavlary had taken some losses, but were able to scamper away from the stubborn enemy hoplites. Weakened units of Tapurian and Albanian cavalry hovered around the right flank of these hoplites and again, quite a large number of enemy cavalry was making its way (eventually) into the rear area(s) of Parmenio’s position. With regard to losses, 50 massed unit figures had been destroyed or routed on the Macedonian side. Parmenio’s command had a morale tipping point of 81 massed unit figures. The Persians had lost 21 massed unit figures, approximately one-fifth of their allotment of 101 massed unit figures. On review, the situation looked desperate. The situation also looked like it was essentially decided. 

Turning from the left and right flanks to a consideration of the center of the model battlefield, it appeared that the Macedonians were faring much better in this location. While the 5 units of the phalanx, co-commanded by Krateros (Craterus) and Koinos (Coenus), had been charged by some scythed chariots and then a packet of pachyderms and its echelon formation had been disrupted, the annoying chariots had eventually been dispatched. The battle with the elephants continued, but free portions of the phalanx were able to resume their advance and a couple of battalions had engaged the enemy. Though belonging to the right wing command, the Hypaspists had joined in this central struggle by engaging some Persian light infantry and some comparatively poor quality cavalry. The dice gods had other plans apparently, as the initial melee rounds saw the Hypaspists receive a bloody nose as well as a black eye. Perhaps the only bright spot for the Macedonians in this sector of the table was the flight of King Darius III. With a number of enemy units moving towards his location, the royal person was pressured by his advisors and bodyguard to make a rapid exit. Darius mounted a horse (conveniently and readily held in reserve) and made a dash for relative safety. His running away resulted in a penalty of 30 massed unit figures against the morale of the Persian center. As the serious fighting had just begun, and as the determined point of collapse for this small command was 73 massed unit figures, there was still time. The Persian center remained unbroken.

Taking another long - if again subjective - look at the status of the tabletop, the thinking was that a Persian victory was likely if not inevitable. The Macedonian flanks were, for all intents and purposes, gone or in the process of being enveloped and exterminated. Alexander had left himself exposed in the chaos of the center-right and had been captured by a local Persian unit of cavalry whose commander had been paying more attention. To be certain, the flight of King Darius would have ripple effects, but it appeared that the Persian center could “entertain” the Macedonian phalanx long enough for the situations on the right and left to be resolved. In some regards, this abbreviated action reminded me a little of the 216 BC contest at Cannae. The Persians, it could be suggested, like the Carthaginians, had succeeded on the flanks and were getting ready to pressure the infantry of the Macedonian center from the right, left, and rear. The Macedonians, it could be reasonably argued, were going to push their way through the Persian center. But this extended action would leave them tired as well as with additional losses which would not help their case when assailed by numerous formations of enemy horse. Also, there was the “small” matter of the Macedonians having lost their charismatic, very competent, and foolishly courageous commander.  

Commentary & Critique

The following paragraph appeared at the end of Chapter 4 of Three Tours of “the Camel’s House”:

Along that same general line, I wonder if anyone or if any group has attempted to 

refight Gaugamela using Tactica II? I see that the appropriate army lists are 

included in the spiral-bound rulebook. I wonder what an interpretation of the 

entire engagement might look like with these rules? I would be interested in 

reading about how others have approached or thought about approaching 

Gaugamela with Tactica II. In fact, I find myself rather tempted by the idea. 

Such a project might make a nice addition to the fractional effort posted in 

February of 2020.

Even though it has only been a matter of days (as of this typing) since that admittedly but necessarily long post “went live,” I find myself in a position, ironically enough, where I can answer the questions I posed as well as offer some ideas and additional remarks.

Taking the sentences of this end of Chapter 4 paragraph in order . . . According to the two respondents in the Tactica Forum (the exchange transpired on 01 July; please see https://groups.io/g/Tactica if interested in joining this small but dedicated group), a fellow by the name of Doug was not aware if the historical battle had been wargamed with these specific rules, but both he and and another gentleman named Jacob were certain that quite a few figures would be needed, once the strength of the Persian host had been agreed upon. Doug also made the very good suggestion regarding the development of a scenario rule for the probable flight of King Darius when/if any Macedonian/Greek unit approached to within striking or perceived threat distance. The army lists contained within the spiral-bound rule book were quite useful. The orders of battle I employed were a combination of these lists and again, the wealth of information provided in the Gaugamela Battle Pack (please see https://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/42-battle-day-2004-gaugamela-331-bc.) 

Having recently completed seven turns of a solo wargame wherein Gaugamela was refought, I have a pretty good if also subjective idea about what the historical battle looks like when using these rules as well as how it plays. In brief overview, although my staging was focused on the functional more than the aesthetic and was non-traditional as opposed to traditional, I think the refight was rather historical, at least in the Featherstone sense of “realistically portraying the terrain of the battlefield and the troops that were present.” (Please see the bottom of page 10 in Battle Notes for Wargamers.) Regrettably, I have not been able to find any posts or reports of a Tactica II refight of Gaugamela. It appears that Doug is correct. It appears that the size and scale of this historical battle has prohibited many an interested Tactica II player-general from making the attempt, or even considering such a mega-game. Then again, it could simply be a case of not bothering to communicate the presumed group effort to the wider community of ancient wargamers. No judgment here. Often the setting up, playing of the battle and then chatting about it over a beverage or a meal after the tabletop has been cleared is enough. Speaking of making the attempt, I drew inspiration from my own concluding paragraph and rushed into production a solo-refight of the 331 BC battle of Gaugamela using the Tactica II rules. Subjectively speaking, the preceding report does make a nice addition to that fractional effort made several years ago. Here’s hoping that this admittedly slap-dash narrative will generate a few comments and perhaps even constructive criticism. If nothing else, at least the invitation to read and remark and the link to my blog will be around for quite some time. (That is the assumption anyway.) Right, that is enough musing about the future and the small chance of some unborn ancients wargamer stumbling upon this particular post via their implanted neural link in or around the year 2082. Let me return to the present or, technically, the very recent past. 

Over the course of seven turns of solo play, the historical record was not repeated or reinforced; it was rewritten. Based on the objective evidence and subjective assessments, a Persian victory was declared. I will not attempt to qualify the nature of that victory, however. My reluctance to do so should not prevent interested readers from weighing in with their own comments, remarks and thoughts. This seems an appropriate moment to review the overall as well as unofficial record of Gaugamela as played on a tabletop. Looking over the results from the First Battle Day, I counted 13 wargames played with 9 sets of rules. In this baker’s dozen worth of refights, the Macedonians won 8 and lost 5. From what I was able to discover, Alexander perished in several of the contests. King Darius was not very far behind in this particular regard. My record with Gaugamela now stands at 2 wins a piece, so it could be said that the updated but still unofficial record is 10-7 in favor of the Macedonians. 

Anyway, returning, if only for a few minutes to the Featherstone reference: The second part of this “founding father’s” common sense approach reads: “To refight any historical battle realistically, the troops accurately represent the original forces.” As I explained above, my primary source was the Gaugamela Battle Pack. The gentleman or gentlemen who assembled this excellent document explained that the 1964 Marsden text was “broadly followed” with regard to troop types and numbers. It would be foolish of me to think that more expert players of Tactica II (and there are many) would completely accept my decisions about and interpretations of the various formations on both sides. As I provided details of how I depicted the center of the Persian line, this seems worth another, albeit brief, look. Following the Battle Pack information, my “model” Persian center sector contained approximately 7,000 troops. These were a mix of infantry and cavalry. There was also a screen of scythed chariots as well as a handful of elephants. While reviewing some material found online, I noted that one modern author argued for a strength of 12,000 for the Persian center. Furthermore, in the accompanying deployment diagram in which his interpretation was explained, it appears that I may have an incorrect arrangement of units in this narrow sector. I acknowledge that this may indeed be the case. That stipulation aside, the deployment and reported strength of the Persian center that was used appeared to work rather well in this latest refight. Again, the definitive results for the contest in the center are not available because the wargame was halted, and the experiment was deemed a success or qualified success. 

As an extension to the second half of the “Featherstone equation” for refighting historical battles realistically, I considered researching the approximate cost of wargaming Gaugamela in miniature. Initially, I thought about comparing 6mm to 15mm to 25/28mm. Then, instead of trying to determine the approximate investment needed to model both armies in their entirety, I thought that focusing on the reported 8,000 Bactrian cavalry of the Persian left wing would be sufficient. Obviously, 6mm figures cost less than 15mm, and 15mm miniatures cost less than 25/28mm figures. The model to real man ratio or scale also has to be considered. Here again, 6mm miniatures have an advantage. I think it would be possible, and at a reasonable cost, to establish/employ a 1:10 figure scale for a 6mm depiction of these 8,000 Bactrian cavalry. Eight hundred 6mm figures would require about 20-25 packages I think, if I understand the Baccus catalog correctly. This unusual figure scale would not be as feasible when using the larger scale miniatures. That is, unless one had very deep pockets, a very large room dedicated to wargaming, and a small team of above average to expert painters standing by. I toyed with the idea of figuring out the approximate cost of a WoFun version of these 8,000 Bactrians, but, after reading several negative opinions/reviews of these comparatively inexpensive, two-dimensional, pre-painted and ready-to-use figurines, I thought I would save myself the potential trouble. Interestingly and related to that topic, I have read several comments and blog posts wherein the following statement or a variation of it was made: “Wargaming is a broad church.” Though not a religious person (I do find the history of it rather fascinating, however), I accept this premise without reservation. Comparing wargaming to religion is appropriate, but also fraught with the long and problematic history of that too often divisive, intensely personal, but also universal topic. In fact, I imagine that it would not be that difficult to dedicate an entire post to the subject. (I would not be surprised to find that it has already been done, and by several respected and well-established bloggers in the past decade.) Anyway. 

Returning to and refocusing on the recently “completed” refight, I found that I could not replicate, exactly, the deployment - at least the one generally accepted by modern scholars - used by Alexander. I think I had it generally right though, or was very close to an approximation of it. However, I did not have light troops or skirmishers at a 45 degree angle one way and then a 45 degree angle another way. Reviewing the turn record notes and other fragments that were typed during the handful of turns completed, in the role of Alexander, I did not shift my angle of attack to the right, trying to stretch out the already long Persian line. I found myself playing a more passive role, reacting to the numbers that I was facing and trying to coordinate the attacks that I thought would do the most damage in the shortest amount of time. On further reflection, it appears that this was, at least in this particular case, wishful thinking. 

Changing uniforms into any one of the Persian commanders, I found myself almost hamstrung by having so many units as well as the slow speed by which cavalry formations were able to wheel. These related objections aside, I took a measure of comfort in being able to throw units into and against the enemy, knowing that I could lose more men or miniature models, at least to a point. I also understood that tying down enemy formations would afford me the time and opportunity to move other units into positions from which I could engage the occupied enemy from a flank or even from behind. 

Shifting gears again (I apologize to the reader for the lack of any real structure in this final section), I thought I would conclude this follow up to Three Tours of “the Camel’s House” with some brief comments about what I liked and what I had some trouble with when refighting Gaugamela with Tactica II. 

As always, the process of research and the related “work” of drafting, developing and producing the orders of battle was quite enjoyable. I believe that I have remarked in several previous posts that I like this aspect of wargaming as much or perhaps even a little more than playing the intended wargame. Somewhat odd, I grant. But I suppose I could be placed in a sub-camp similar to that occupied by hobbyists who enjoy painting and collecting more than gaming. I liked the way my finished model battlefield looked, even if it was nowhere near to being a traditional historical miniatures wargame. Had I taken a few pictures of the effort, or had a like-minded individual seen the “finished” table in person, I do not think that it would have taken more than a couple of guesses for prospective viewers or that visitor to figure out that I was refighting Gaugamela. Having some experience with Tactica II (not a lot - I am nowhere near the 1,000 hour mark - but a brief survey of my blog returned several posts wherein I have “wrestled” with the rules and the design philosophy behind them), I think the wargame went smoothly, or smoothly enough. Then again, this may be the result of scheduling one turn every day or every couple of days. By this measured approach, I could be sure to correctly complete each of the eight sub-phases in a game turn. In conjunction with the above, I also liked the fact that I could consult with other Tactica II players on the dedicated Forum for these rules. It was through this exchange, albeit not that well attended for some reason - one would think that Gaugamela would have elicited more interest, but . . . - that the aforementioned Doug suggested some kind of scenario rule for Darius and his possible flight from the battlefield and the effects or impact that would have on his army.  Without going into too much detail, I drafted a scenario rule that required King Darius to take a modified Fates Test when any Macedonian unit advanced within a certain distance. As briefly reported above, this did occur during the refight and, just like he did historically, King Darius jumped on that provided horse and got the heck out of Gaugamela. By no means is this scenario rule perfect, but it works or worked. I am of the opinion that further tinkering can always be done. 

In the first draft of this final section, I typed approximately 900 words wherein I discussed my issues with or reservations about certain aspects and procedures of the Tactica II rules. On further reflection, it seems rather particular of me or “bad form” to revise these and then copy and paste them here. I will simply refer the appreciated reader to Tactica II: Testing & Tinkering, which was posted on June 19, 2021. This admission aside and on further review, I decided to copy and paste just two bullet points of that first draft here, as I think that any worthwhile discussion of Gaugamela would have to cover the Persian scythed chariots and the significant role of Alexander. Without further introduction then . . .

> The refight being Gaugamela, of course there were scythed chariots present. I read and reviewed the rule sections pertaining to these vehicles and believe I was able to grasp how they work or perform on a tabletop, but even so . . . For example, I would have thought that skirmishers were more effective against these potentially deadly vehicles. (Perhaps this is another point where my questions about evading and maybe even about the sequence of missile fire applies?) My main concern or curiosity occurred in the approximate center of the table when a unit of scythed chariots met 2 units of the Macedonian phalanx. The chariots did not secure impetus and were bested as well as damaged beyond their unit breakpoint in the ensuing melees. However, as fortune (or Fortune) would have it, the scythed chariots passed the Fates Test by rolling a 12 on 2d6. In the next melee round, even though their original strength was much reduced, the scythed chariots were able to fight with all of their dice. After taking more losses in one melee area (the Macedonians controlled the direction of fighting), the scythed chariots had to take another Fates Test and, against very large odds, rolled another 12. This result impressed me as rather unlikely and perhaps even a bit “gamey.” To be certain, I am no expert on how scythed chariots performed in ancient warfare, but is not the general consensus something along the lines of these vehicles being “one shot weapons”? Does not the historical record indicate that these chariots were generally a poor investment if not poor performers? I guess I just have trouble picturing a driver urging a team of horses to run into a veritable wall of pike points. I also have a bit of trouble imagining the melee between two such bodies as lasting for more than a few minutes. 

> During the movement phase of one turn of the recently staged refight, Alexander was caught out in the open by a unit of Persian cavalry. These troopers were able to wheel slightly (not a complex move) and then move straight into and over Alexander’s playing piece. I admit that this “complaint” may be an attempt to excuse my inattention to Alexander’s situation, but it seems to me that army generals should have at least a chance to escape or evade enemy units as they close in. I am not trying to complicate the rules as they exist, I am just voicing an opinion. If the player-general in charge does make a mistake, then he can make a last-ditch effort to save an exposed general by rolling a d6 or perhaps 2 of them and consulting an improvised table. 

This Tactica II refight, along with the other recent experiments conducted and experiences had wargaming this historical battle, proved quite satisfying. However, despite a couple of mentions in the previous post, I cannot see myself making yet another trip to this ancient plain within the next few months, or even the next twelve. While it appears that I may have reached a limit with regard to refighting Gaugamela (in my own atypical fashion) and reporting on it (in a more traditional manner), I still have a great interest in reading about it. Ideally, I should like to discover a report, one produced by a small but capable group or written by a couple of friends, wherein the description and details of how Gaugamela was staged with Tactica II were provided. To be perfectly honest, I would really like to see two or three new reports about how Tactica II handled Gaugamela. However, as I opined previously, given the size and scale of the historical battle, and given the comparatively small membership of the dedicated forum, something tells me that I am in for rather a long and potentially disappointing wait.