A Cut Above and Below

Notes regarding Scythed Chariots

A little over three decades ago, in an article titled “The Scythed Chariot Under The Microscope,” a gentleman by the name of Darrell Smith offered readers a compilation of “descriptions from the best known conflicts in which scythed chariots were used and their performance was documented.” His research was published in Issue 163 of Slingshot. The comparatively short list contained eight entries, starting with Cunaxa (401 BC) and ending with Chaeronea (86 BC). 

Drawing inspiration from this educational and engaging September 1992 piece and finding myself rather preoccupied with scythed chariots as a result of recent experiments and experiences with refighting Gaugamela on a non-traditional tabletop, I thought I would revisit Darrell’s interesting work. Rather than focus on “the best known conflicts,” I thought I would open up the category to the less-than-well-known battles. I would include contests where scythed chariots were present, but were not otherwise mentioned in the contemporary or later ancient narratives. Additionally, I would format my “history” by starting with the most recent engagement or example. Instead of simply transcribing Darrell’s summary descriptions, I would try to limit myself to the provision of a link or links, so that readers interested in a particular battle or battles could launch their own investigation(s), if they were so inclined. For this first half of a two-part project (I imagine that there will be a third part, but I have no idea as of this typing, what I will do for the conclusion), some additional comments, remarks, or questions would be made or posed as I drafted this work-in-progress or rewritable reverse chronology. Thinking it would be appropriate, if perhaps bordering on the subjective, to provide a statement about the overall effectiveness of and or role played by these vehicles in the selected battle, I decided to include a “final word” as well.  

Towards a More Complete Record 

> Zela - 47 BC

Typing “scythed chariot wargames” or “wargaming with scythed chariots” into a commonly used search engine did not return a lot of useful results. This was a little disappointing but not completely unexpected. However, I did find this site: https://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/miscellanea/chariots/scythedchariots.html. The collection of material was very interesting as well as useful. For ease of reference, I am transcribing the relevant sentences here: “They were also used by Mithridates’ son Pharances II at the Battle of Zela in 47 BC. Disconcerted at first, Caesar’s legionaries soon halted the attack with a barrage of missiles in what is the last reliable account of the scythed chariot in battle.” The source for this was Aulus Hirtius, On the Alexandrian War, LXXV.2. Zela was also mentioned in a discussion thread in a sub-forum on The Society of Ancients website. On 17 June of 2019, the late great Patrick Waterson opined that at Zela, “the scythed chariots were used as an anti-infantry weapon, but also enjoyed the support of considerable numbers of friendly cavalry.” Please also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Zela_(47_BC).

Assessment: Scythed chariots were present and featured, but I am not sure if their role was a prominent one. They did not secure a victory; they did not greatly assist their side in this engagement. 

> Orchomenus - 85 BC

Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Orchomenus. This contest was one of the three cited by Patrick Waterson in the aforementioned discussion thread. As at Zela, the Roman forces were outnumbered with respect to the cavalry arm. The ancient narrative can be found in Plutarch’s Sulla, 26.

Assessment: Evidently, the scythed chariots were defeated by improvised field works and pila volleys. The surviving horse teams and vehicles wrought havoc on the supporting phalanx. This strikes me as strange, as I would have thought that an army containing a contingent of scythed chariots would have at least some training in how to deal with the vehicles if or when the battle plan “went sideways.” 

> Chaeronea - 86 BC

Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chaeronea_(86_BC). While not usually regarded as a definitive source, the Wikipedia summary for this battle and the one taking place a year later, appear very similar - to me anyway. I imagine that a careful reading of the relevant sections of Sulla would address this concern and confusion. 

Assessment: Again, the scythed chariots (60 in number, according to Darrell’s list) are wrecked by concealed field fortifications or barriers, and apparently, the enemy phalanx is not so much disordered by the rampaging scythed chariots as it is dismembered in intense hand-to-hand fighting.

> Amnias - 89 BC

Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_River_Amnias#:~:text=The%20Battle%20of%20the%20River,Pontus%20was%20victorious. For a more engaging and wargamer-friendly treatment of this historical battle, see the excellent report by Richard Andrews in the May/June 2017 issue of Slingshot (Number 312). If I read this educational and entertaining material correctly, then it appears that the scythed chariots were not deployed in the front line, but were positioned as a kind of central reserve. 

Assessment: They were used effectively in the engagement, which helped to secure a win for the Pontic army. Interestingly, as mentioned above, it appears that these vehicles were used in a support role as opposed to a screening “initial wave” or “disordering attack” role. Graphic, if not nightmare-inducing evidence of their effectiveness was found in a 27 August of 2013 discussion thread contribution by Patrick Waterson, who provided an excerpt from Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 18. 

> Magnesia - 190 BC

I would think that this battle should be familiar - if only in name - to the vast majority of wargamers with an interest in the ancient period(s). Instead of suggesting a link to Wikipedia or other sites (do feel free to do your own search for “Magnesia wargame” or “battle of Magnesia” however), I will simply and strongly recommend Professor Philip Sabin’s LOST BATTLES - Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World. The accomplished academic provides his analysis of the existing ancient narratives and additional comments about this well known contest on pages 197-200. 

Assessment: The Seleucid scythed chariots were positioned on the left wing of the army of Antiochus, and were effectively as well as rather quickly countered and defeated by the cavalry and light troops under Eumenes, an ally of Rome. The subsequent rout of the scythed chariots essentially eliminated the entire Seleucid left wing and in so doing, exposed the center.  

> Apollonia - 220 BC

This is the name of the battle recorded on Darrell’s foundational list. Mention was made of a 220 BC engagement involving the “rebel satrap Molon” by Dr. Silvannen Gerrard in Episode 109 of THE ANCIENTS Podcast - Scythed Chariots, which aired on 14 July of 2021. (Dr. Gerrard was a professor at the University of Manchester at that time, and she holding forth with Tristan Hughes, the host of this excellent podcast.) According to Darrell, “the scythed chariots impact proved ineffective against the phalanx.” Unfortunately, Dr. Gerrard did not provide any additional details aside from mentioning an apparently important figure by the name of Molon. An internet search resulted in this find: http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_apollonia.html#google_vignette. It appears that while the scythed chariots were indeed present, they did not feature strongly in a battle that was decided in a particular sector of the battlefield. 

Assessment: There is conflicting information, so I think I will have to categorize this battle as TBD, meaning “to be determined.” At the risk of “ruining the story” for the reader, based on what I have read, it seems fairly certain that the scythed chariots employed by Molon were not “battle deciders” on this occasion. 

> Elephant Victory - 273 BC

For this single example, I have elected to transcribe the summary provided by Darrell Smith. The gentleman wrote: “A Galatian army including eighty scythed chariots faced a Seleucid army with elephants. The Galatian chariots and cavalry were routed by light troops and elephants. The rest of the Galatian army was carried away when the fleeing troops and chariots broke through their ranks.” Acknowledging that I have opted to organize my “history” from most recent to earliest instead of in the usual progressive timeline manner, I still think it is interesting to note that Galatians are not included in Professor Sabin’s sentence at the top of page 26 of his excellent and thought-provoking book. The gentleman scholar explained: “However, we should certainly have a special subtype for the infamous scythed chariot, which was used sporadically by Persian, Seleucid and Pontic forces, with hardly any success.” A brief survey of my small collection of rulebooks informed that scythed chariot units could be a part of Late Achaemenid, Later Seleucid, Pontic, and Galatian armies. So, why were the Galatians left out of the mix? How did they come to have scythed chariots anyway? Did they win them in battle or steal them from an enemy depot under the noses of some sleepy guards? Were there any differences between the scythed chariots in the Galatian army of 273 BC and the ones deployed at Zela in 47 BC? What about when compared to earlier or original models? 

Assessment: At the risk of being called indecisive or noncommittal, this particular engagement is a bit challenging to categorize. It appears that the scythed chariots did not really have a chance to be deployed or launched against the enemy. It appears to be more of a case of horses being panicked by elephants (which is another topic entirely, and a worthy one at that), or maybe more of a case of troop types not being at all used to seeing elephants, of having to face elephants in a battle setting. I respectfully defer to others with more expertise and knowledge regarding this particular engagement. 

> Name to be Confirmed - 285 BC

During the engaging conversation between Tristan and Dr. Gerrard, the good professor mentioned something about a “run-up to Sehestica in 285 BC.” [The spelling provided in the automated transcript is very probably incorrect.] This engagement involved Demetrius, so I conducted a brief search for a translation of Plutarch. In The Life of Demetrius, 28.3, I believe that I found the relevant passage. One of the deployed armies contained 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 75 elephants, while the other had a strength of 64,000 infantry, 10,500 horse, 400 elephants, and 120 chariots. Chapters 29 and 30 provide some details regarding the battle and its outcome, but there is nothing mentioned about scythed chariots. This is a bit frustrating, for as I explained at the beginning of this “essay,” I find myself rather preoccupied by these ancient contraptions of late. Anyway, please see Chapters 28-30 at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Demetrius*.html#48. 

Assessment: Given that there is no description of the participation of the scythed chariots in this to-be-identified battle, it seems justifiable to place it in the “they did not feature prominently in the engagement” column. The figurative file on this contest will remain open. I hope to find the time to do more digging; I hope that I will be able to recover better information. 

> Ipsus - 301 BC

It seems that a bit of an intermission might be in order here, so I will recommend to the reader (those hardy souls who have persevered to this point anyway) the following two links or sites. First, there is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ipsus. Second, and much more colorful as well as inspirational, there is https://bigredbat.blogspot.com/search/label/Ipsus.

Assessment: Another source of frustration, unfortunately. Dr. Silvannen Gerrard comments, according to the transcript of the podcast, “We have no idea what they (the scythed chariots) were doing at the battle, whether they were even used, because our battle description isn’t very good.” She continues, “It’s only in Plutarch, and there are problems with it. And our traditional reconstructions of that battle don’t include scythed chariots.” In the introduction to this present project, I set out that I wanted to include battles at which scythed chariots were present, even if it appears that they did not play a very important role in the battle. The ancient source material does have scythed chariots present at Ipsus, so the battle is being included. As with other engagements, however, the lack of evidence and details suggest that these psychological weapons of war were not employed to great or any real effect. Again, I defer to those who might have more information.

> Gaugamela - 331 BC

It is my guess that this battle should be familiar to most every ancients wargamer. If not, then at the risk of self-promotion or of attempting to generate more traffic for my rather anemic solo wargaming blog, might I recommend taking a look at the numerous sources provided in Chapter 5 of the recent post titled Three Tours of “the Camel’s House”? If the invitation is declined, then might I recommend the following site: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gaugamela. The material provided in https://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/miscellanea/chariots/scythedchariots.html is also quite good. 

Assessment: While the 2004 movie treatment of the life Alexander certainly paints a spectacular picture of what the field of Gaugamela might have looked like on that fateful day, and the potential of the scythed chariots is certainly driven home (no “clever” word play intended), the historical record is quite clear and does not favor King Darius III. His reported 200 scythed chariots were not effective in this contest of tactical acumen, wills, or of military styles. 

> Dascyleum - 399 BC

At the risk of stating the obvious, the farther back in history one goes, the more opportunity there is for a difference of opinion or for various interpretations to be made. For example, Darrell provided this Greek name and definitive date. His summary explains that a “foraging group of hoplite infantry was surprised by a small force of scythed chariots and Persian cavalry.” The battle did not go well for the heavy infantry. In his excellent 2009 Slingshot article, “Xenophon’s Chariot,” Jim Webster devoted a few paragraphs to this ancient contest of arms. The learned gentleman cited a passage from Hellenica iv 1.17, explaining that the isolated action took place within the campaign years of 396 and 394 BC. He further identified one Pharnabazus as the Persian satrap who knew what he was doing when it came to employing scythed chariots correctly on the battlefield. This action was also mentioned in the podcast featuring Dr. Gerrard. The professor dated the battle or encounter to 395 BC. 

Assessment: To quote Jim: “This is one of the few occasions where scythed chariots seem to have succeeded.” The respected member of The Society and prolific contributor to Slingshot continued, questioning the quality of this success. In the event, the defending infantry were not in a proper formation. Further, there is some doubt that the foraging troops were, in fact, hoplites. They may have been peltasts and consequently, not as resilient or solid when forming up into line. If I may add a remark or two as well. This situation seems like an outlier in the broader but still limited history of scythed chariots in battle. According to the ancient source material, there were only two of the vehicles present. Typically, battles would feature 60 or more of the vehicles. Reportedly, in some contests, both armies had scythed chariots. Anyway, as I read and reread the source material describing this battle, I could not help but think that it would probably make an excellent skirmish-level wargame. The chariots could be represented on a 1:1 basis, and the cavalry and infantry could be modeled on a 1:10 or even a 1:5 ratio. If the right rules could be found or developed by an individual or club, I think this would make an excellent and perhaps even award-winning participation game at a convention or show. 

> Cunaxa - 401 BC

Please see https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Cunaxa and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cunaxa. Professor Philip Sabin also dissects this battle on pages 107-110 of his very-much-worth-your-while book. 

Assessment: According to Darrell’s summary description, “During the charge, most of the chariot drivers bailed out early, which resulted in their chariots careening all over the battlefield.” Professor Sabin remarks, and succinctly, “the scythed chariots proved typically ineffectual.” So, taking Magnesia, Gaugamela and this battle into account, it appears that large numbers of scythed chariots do not automatically lead to success. Admittedly, a simplification of the subject, but a point to be considered, I think. 

> Pteria - 547 BC

For whatever reason or reasons, this engagement was not included on Darrell’s original list. This is the name and date provided in an article written by Richard Lloyd (“The Dreaded Scythed Thing!” - September 1982 Slingshot) as well as in the compilation found on the internet. Again, please see https://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/miscellanea/chariots/scythedchariots.html. According to Richard, the scythed chariots “demolished the Lydian Cavalry left, and Egyptian Infantry centre, in an orgy of bloodshed, thus winning themselves a place in the Persian arsenal for ever after . . .” This interpretation is not reinforced by the online material, however. It appears that camels may have had more to do with the disordering and destruction of the Lydian cavalry. In the conversation between Tristan Hughes and Dr. Silvannen Gerrard, the professor gives a calendar date of 547 or 546 BC, but of more interest to me, she referred to the battle as Sardis, not Pteria. A third option with regard to a name or title was provided by Patrick Waterson. In a lively Society of Ancients sub-forum discussion between this gentleman (no longer with us, unfortunately) and Jim Webster, which took place in late February of 2017, Patrick referenced the battle of Thymbra. (Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Thymbra.) While we can debate and discuss the name and year, I think we can, perhaps, all agree on the impact that the scythed chariots had when employed on this particular battlefield. 

Assessment: Turning again to the excellent article written by Richard Lloyd for assistance here, the gentleman stated: “In fact in five hundred years of use the only significant success of the weapon was when it was employed for the first time, by Cyrus against the Lydians at Pteria in 547 BC.” Including the word “significant” is key to this “argument.” What about the occasion when that pair of scythed chariots caught those foraging Greek infantry? What about the engagement at Amnias in 89BC? Should not these be categorized as successes as well? Adopting a different approach, looking at this from another perspective, is it reasonable to suggest that the Elephant Battle in 273 BC and Magnesia in 190 BC are also examples of what scythed chariots could do? 

Comments

Reviewing the entries in this work-in-progress and again, rewritable chronology, I counted 13 - a baker’s dozen. It appears quite clear that in 3 of these contests, scythed chariots played a pivotal role. These sums could be adjusted to 12 and 2, if the action involving Pharnabazus is judged to be an outlier due to the very small number of scythed chariots present and involved. If the original numbers are accepted, then simple division informs that scythed chariots were successful (I want to try and refrain from qualifying that word) about 23 percent of the time. If the second set of numbers are used, then that same application of basic math translates into a 16 percent rate of success. Very approximately then, it could be suggested that, when deployed on the tabletop, the side having miniature models of scythed chariots in their order of battle should be victorious in 1 out of every 5 attempts, in 1 out of every 5 wargames. 

Looking over the lists in my small collection of rulebooks, I noted again that there are just a handful of armies that I can arrange on a tabletop that could have scythed chariots in their ranks. Accepting that these several forces can engage in historical battle with a variety of opponents, would I be all that interested in spending the points on these vehicles or taking the time to build these models/units knowing that these scary-looking contraptions would likely cause me more problems than not, that this army was more likely to be defeated than emerge victorious in whatever the scenario it was that was being played?   

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A General Assessment using the “Edwards Rubric”

In the September 1993 issue (Number 169) of Slingshot, in a short piece titled “Chaos out of Order: Scythed chariots and elephants in wargames,” a gentleman by the name of Stephen Edwards explained or proposed (argued seems too strong a term) the following: “on the ancient battlefield, scythed chariots had seven essential characteristics.” He lamented, based on his experience and observations however, that, “wargame rules generally fail to reproduce any of these.” Accepting that the following “essential characteristics” are approximately 30 years old, I still thought it might be interesting to see how my small collection of rulebooks scored in this narrow assessment. Following, please see the transcription of the original text. I have not made any grammar or spelling corrections from British English to American English. Instead of a proper formatting of footnotes, I have included Stephen’s additional material in brackets after the relevant characteristic. 

1. They were always placed ahead of the main battleline to begin the engagement.
2. They were always deployed at wide intervals, rather than in compact masses.
3. Their purpose was not to destroy enemy units, but to break up their formation so that they became vulnerable to other troops behind the chariots.
4. They could only launch one charge. [Footnote 1 - There is not a single historical instance of scythed chariots launching a second charge. Furthermore, no-one seems to have expected them to; at Magnesia (190 BC) “Antiochus placed scythed-bearing chariots in the space between the armies to begin the battle with orders to retire after the first onset” (Appian Syrian War VI 32)]
5. There were ineffective unless charging at full speed. [Footnote 2 - “These chariots are most effective after they have been driven for some distance and have got up the impetus to break through a line; a short start makes them feeble and ineffectual” (Plutarch Sulla 18).]
6. They could do little damage to light troops, but were very vulnerable to light troops themselves.
7. If driven back they “considerably impair the order of the rest of the army, who are afraid of the scythes of their own side”. [Footnote 3 - Appian Syrian War VI 33.]

The rulebooks chosen for this examination were: Armati - 2nd Edition, Art de la Guerre (ADLG) - 3rd Edition, Hail Caesar, IMPETVS (2008 Edition), Tactica II, To The Strongest! (Version 1.1 and updates), and TRIUMPH!

A variety of different approaches to this survey and related assessment were attempted in a number of previous drafts. As per usual or because this is a part of my writing “process” apparently, none of them proved satisfactory. Taking a couple of days to rethink how this second part of the current project might be accomplished without boring the reader, overwhelming the reader, or inflicting undue levels of frustration, stress and worry on my aging person, I decided on a general rather than a very specific and “fine details” approach. I hope this “looser” or “more relaxed format” will become evident as the reader proceeds. I also hope that this choice will encourage if not generate other assessments, as I only have experience with around a quarter of the 28 sets of rules listed in a poll launched by Imperial Dave (aka Dave Hollin - now the sitting and very capable as well as competent Editor of Slingshot) on a Society of Ancients sub-forum in late December of 2019. As it has been five years, nearly six now, this catalog is very probably larger. 

Let me begin this subjective evaluation by suggesting a combination of the first two “essential characteristics” listed by Stephen. It seems reasonable that deployment and depiction should go together. That premise accepted, I could find no express rule in any of the books surveyed wherein the prospective player-general was instructed that he had to position any and all of his scythed chariot models, stands, or units forward of his main line of battle. Adhering to the second characteristic was also a bit challenging, as most of the rules considered did not have an approximate unit scale for scythed chariots. It seems that this issue or potential problem area (i.e., matching representative unit with ground scale) was addressed in the abstract. For example, in the Armati - 2nd Edition rules, Section 4.1.6 explained that, “Scythed Chariots were independent units; could move without assigning control points to them, and again, must operate separated from other units; i.e., there must be at least a fraction of an inch between its base and any friendly unit bases.” This “battlefield isolation” was repeated in both ADLG and IMPETVS, where scythed chariots were prohibited from forming groups with any other troop types. In other rulesets, it appeared that scythed chariots could be assigned to divisions or commands. If I understand the TRIUMPH! rules on this particular point, there is no need for a physical model of scythed chariots on the tabletop. The owning player-general simply has to “indicate or mark one or two stands of close order enemy foot” as targets/targeted formations. 

In the course of researching this idea (always enjoyable), I stumbled across an article by the Charles Grant. “The Chariot In The Wargame” appeared in the 1980 Memorial Issue of Slingshot (Number 92). [The piece was originally published in the November 1978 issue of Military Modeling.] In the section of this engaging article labeled “Representation and base size,” Mr. Grant did some math (or maths) with a set of current or popular rules in which 1 chariot model represented 8 actual vehicles and the ground scale was 1 inch to 10 paces, with a pace being the rough equivalent of 30 actual inches. Without transcribing most of the paragraph and incorporating the two explanatory diagrams, the suggestion of this well known and well regarded figure in the hobby was perhaps a closer approximation of the footprint occupied by a line of chariots, be they light, heavy, or scythed. This more realistic ground and model scale effect or impression would be achieved by increasing the width of the base or tray on which the model was mounted. In the example this well remembered gentleman provided, a chariot model on a 40mm wide stand was positioned on a base that had a tabletop frontage of 8 inches. This led me to wonder if a similar application or adjustment might be used with other sets of rules. For example, in the Armati - 2nd Edition rules, depending on the figure scale and Unit Size Scheme selected, chariot stands can have a frontage of: 40mm, 80mm, 60mm, or 120mm. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest or at least experiment with the idea of adjusting these frontages to the following measurements: 120mm, 240mm, 180mm, or 360mm. On a somewhat related note, recent email exchanges with the resident Tactica II advocate and expert Simon Watson have informed that there is a draft rule under consideration for deploying scythed chariot screens in the same way that elephant screens are deployed and used in these rules. This modification would certainly meet the “wide intervals” requirement spelled out in the Second Essential Characteristic. 

Given the historical accounts that we ancient wargamers have, and given the classification of scythed chariots (they are usually impetuous, expendable, or something similar), it seems unnecessary to remind player-generals that these contraptions should be positioned forward of cavalry and infantry in the main line. However, there is that notable exception of Amnias (89 BC) and the questions surrounding Ipsus (301 BC), so it would not be without historical precedent if some daring Pontic player-general opted to deploy his model scythed chariots in the second line or even as an army reserve. 

In stark contrast to the complete lack of direction about where to place scythed chariots on the tabletop, all of the rulebooks I looked at were in agreement about the purpose and use of scythed chariots. To conserve space and save me a little of the wear and tear associated with typing (that is another interesting albeit unrelated topic, the design and layout of the keyboard and how impractical it is), I will cite evidence from just 4 of the 7 rulesets under review.

 

Armati - 2nd Edition) From Section 4.1.6: “Scythed chariots were used to disrupt an opponent’s line prior to the melee contact of the opposing lines.” 

Hail Caesar) From the top of page 97: “These are the values used for the rather unusual Persian and later [sic] Seleucid scythed chariots driven directly at the enemy in the hope of scattering his ranks and sowing disorder.” 

Tactica II) From page 46, Section 10.6.3: “These were the ancient battlefield version of guided missiles, or perhaps, “fire and forget” missiles. Their purpose was to instill terror and wreck enemy formations.”

To The Strongest!) From page 23 of Version 1.1: “Scythed chariots were sturdily constructed terror weapons, festooned with blades and scythes.” 

Just as I combined Characteristics 1 and 2, it seems to me that one could justifiably combine Characteristics 4 and 5. Before I lose myself in the subjectivity of this part of my survey/assessment, however, I want to raise a possible flag regarding the “one charge limit.” Returning to the descriptions and interpretations of Pteria (Sardis or Thymbra) in 547/546 BC, it seems that scythed chariots attacked the wing of Lydian cavalry and then attacked the center of Egyptian infantry. If this was one fluid motion or connected action, then fine. But it appears to me that there might have been a progression or sequence to it. So there seems to have been another example of historical precedence at this inaugural appearance of the scythed chariot. Although the skirmish involving Pharnabazus could be or should be marked with an asterisk, it seems to me that the pair of scythed chariots on this small field probably executed a number of attacks/charges, as their enemy was foraging and then tried to reform. Anyway. 

In the seven rulebooks consulted, scythed chariots had varying degrees of potential to inflict damage on targeted enemy formations, but the one thing they all had in common was their vulnerability. In Armati, ADLG, and To The Strongest Rules!, scythed chariots have a single unit breakpoint or cohesion point. In the Hail Caesar and TRIUMPH! rules, they are removed after a single turn of melee. The Tactica II rules offer a variation on this theme. In the right column of page 46, under ‘Broken Scythed Chariots,’ it reads:

Because Scythed charioteers may have bailed out prior to contact (or perhaps 

contained few, if any, fighting crew) a Scythed Chariot unit is removed 

automatically at the conclusion of its first Massed unit Melee; this may take 

several turns. Thus, even if a Scythed Chariot unit wins its Melee and Breaks its 

opponent, it is removed immediately when that Melee is concluded. 

The relevant paragraph or sub-section in the IMPETVS rules was also interesting and curious. At the top of page 11, bullet point little C explained: “They are never Disordered and preserve their impetus bonus (7.4) even if they take losses . . . They are automatically destroyed immediately after the first turn of the melee if they do not eliminate the enemy.” Given the historical record, it seems unusual that scythed chariots would never become disordered, and if their target is eliminated, it appears that the victorious scythed chariots can carry on, are free to engage another enemy unit. 

With regard to the “ineffective unless charging at full speed” Characteristic, the scythed chariots in the TRIUMPH! rules can be ignored, as they are not modeled as a physical part of the deployed miniature army. (For additional information on how this troop type is treated in these rules, please see the appropriate entry or listing at https://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/battleCard/summary.) In most of the other sets, a movement rate is given in either centimeters, inches, or boxes, and often these vehicles are compared to heavy cavalry in terms of wheeling ability and movement allowance. In my opinion, Simon Miller’s To The Strongest! rules earn top marks on this specific point, as on page 24, the description of the troop type contains the following: 

To charge successfully, scythed chariots needed to build up momentum. When 

charging two boxes, they may play a bonus to-hit card, as described under 

multiple to-hits, and thus may be able to require their target to make two saves. 

When they are charging only into an adjacent box, or striking back in response to 

a charge against them, they play only a single to-hit card. 

Using this procedure as a basis, it seems simple enough to craft a house rule for the other sets. Essentially, in order to secure impetus or the possibility of gaining impetus, a unit of scythed chariots would have to move half or more of its movement allowance. If it moves less than half or is charged by the enemy, then it loses any claim to impetus in the subsequent melee round. 

Based on my reading and review of the TRIUMPH! Battle Card, a player-general with scythed chariots does not have to worry at all about the attention or interference of enemy light troops. As reported above, the only enemy units that can be targeted or “marked” are close order infantry. (The evidence of Pteria and Magnesia excepted, perhaps.) Looking over the other rulebooks, I noted in To The Strongest! that, “They could be countered buy missile-armed light infantry, or by the target unit opening ranks to let them pass harmlessly through.” This second countermeasure is found in the information provided on page 104 of the Hail Caesar rules. Drilled infantry can open ranks on a roll of 4-6 with a d6. The scythed chariots are removed if this happens. Interestingly, Hail Caesar allows scythed chariots to attack phalanxes frontally, albeit without the usual charge bonus. Other rules, such as Armati - 2nd Edition, do not allow this to happen. In Section 7.5.1a of the Armati rules, “Scythed Chariots fight only with their Special FV (fighting value) against Skirmishers, Light Infantry, and Light-Heavy Infantry.” Furthermore, “Scythed Chariots lose their Charge Impetus against all opponents when also in Melee against enemy Light Troops.” Back over on the top of page 11 of the IMPETVS rules, it was found that, “They do not get their impetus bonus against Light Infantry. If they contact enemy Skirmishers they do not disperse them but pass through them, receive fire from Short range, and Disorder the Skirmishers.” Page 15 of the ADLG rules informs, “Unlike other units which have a melee factor of 0 in the first round against scythed chariots, LI (light infantry), LH (light horse), LMI (light-medium infantry), WWg (war wagons) and elephants retain their basic factor and their abilities against scythed chariots.”  

The historical examples of Thymbra (547 BC), of Magnesia (190 BC), and of those poor Galatian warriors in 273 BC graphically if not horrifically illustrate what can happen, what does happen when scythed chariots are routed, when their frightened teams of horses - one or two of the animals wounded perhaps - are turned around and gallop out of control into friendly ranks.

Armati and its cousin Tactica II, ADLG, Hail Caesar, in addition to IMPETVS, have fairly straight forward and universal rules for units that are broken and rout. There is no differentiation provided for scythed chariots. I think that Simon Miller is on to something very good (or very bad, if you happen to be the one commanding the scythed chariots) with the ‘Rampages’ procedure and associated paths provided on page 52 of his innovative and popular rules. Returning to ADLG and IMPETVS, I think it makes more sense or would be closer to historical accuracy, if the scythed chariots in these rules were treated to an adaption of the rules provided for ‘Elephant Rampage’ in the former book, and ‘Panicked Elephants after receiving fire’ in the latter set. Modifications to scythed chariots in IMPETVS would likely require an adjustment to parts of bullet point little C at the top of page 11 as well. Perhaps disordered scythed chariots could receive a partial impetus advantage or bonus? Based on what I have read, it seems that a disordered or frightened scythed chariot unit is more dangerous than one that is neither disordered nor frightened. Taking another look at Armati, Tactica II and Hail Caesar, increasing the rout path or “radius of potential damage” might be worth an experiment or two.  

________________________________________

Progress, Not Perfection . . . And Possibilities

Various pieces of what might be called ‘the scythed chariot historical puzzle’ were found in the earlier and excellent work done by a number of contributors to Slingshot. Additional pieces were discovered while searching the internet or listening to a podcast from July of 2021. A few more pieces were recovered in a key word/phrase search of The Society of Ancients discussion forums. I acknowledge and greatly appreciate the efforts of this collection of knowledgeable and experienced individuals: the authors, the wargamers, and the scholars. I believe I have made a fairly decent attempt at putting together this puzzle, or - if I may change the analogy - in building something from the materials that they so generously if unwittingly provided. However, I do not think the puzzle or structure is quite finished yet. As the label of this section suggests, there is more progress to be made. Perfection is not the goal. And, as I indicated in the text body of this “preoccupation” post, I invite - indeed I welcome - corrections and clarifications.  

As my survey of rulesets was limited to those I had in my collection, I would hope that this post generates additional reviews of how other rulebooks depict and handle scythed chariots on the tabletop. Here again, I invite and would very much welcome seeing additional amendments or modifications. Ideally, I would like to work toward some kind of scythed chariot consensus. 

Reviewing the historical record, there were a small number of engagements where scythed chariots were present. To the extent that it is possible for an individual or a group to refight these historical battles, how should the presence and or participation of those scythed chariots be handled? A demonstration would simply show interested onlookers and passersby what happened; the staging would mirror the available historical account(s). To be certain, this approach is educational and can also look very pretty, but it cannot be all that engaging or enjoyable, especially if you happen to be commanding the Galatians in 273 BC. If the refight is played as a wargame, then how is the balance between history, fun, and playability achieved as well as maintained? A similar set of questions could be asked it is just a friendly game on a club night or Saturday afternoon, and features 15mm or 28mm Late Achaemenids, Later Seleucids, Pontics, or Galatians on one side of the 4 by 6-foot or larger playing surface. The question or questions become a little more challenging to answer if ahistorical encounters are considered. I recall reading a line from a reply made by Patrick Waterson in a discussion thread, wherein the encyclopedic and prone to debate gentleman commented about the morale issue, about the difference between troops being trained to deal with scythed chariots and those who had not been so trained. To a certain extent, this binary can be seen in the historical record. However, let us say that the friendly game, employing whatever set of rules the two friends decide upon, features Later Seleucids and Carolingian Franks, or maybe Late Achaemenid Persians and Vikings. What would be the most agreeable and balanced way to depict and handle scythed chariots in these counterfactual examples?  

GAUGAMELA AGAIN

On the left side of page 5 in the Tactica II rulebook, the second bullet point of Section 2.11.1 (Abilities of the General) reads: “An Attached General improves the Melee ability of that unit (sec. 7.4.2), and modifies Control Tests (sec. 8.0) it may take with a +1 Modifier. For scenario play, a General’s abilities may vary.” 

As suggested by the title of this post, the decision was made to revisit the 331 BC battle between Alexander and King Darius III, a contest which featured a comparatively large Macedonian army fighting against a reportedly huge host of Persians. (This would be my fourth staging of Gaugamela within a period of several weeks.) As intimated by the first sentence, my plan revolved around employing the Tactica II rules for this solo project. With regard to a starting point, I thought I would focus on the last sentence of the excerpt, the eight words entertaining “scenario play” and referencing a “general’s abilities.” 

From all that I have read, it seems safe - if not obvious - to state that Alexander was in command of the army, but was especially involved with how the historical engagement developed on the Macedonian right wing. The aged veteran Parmenio was tasked with holding down the left wing. With regard to the center, I have come across a couple of names, but have not discovered any central or accepted “in charge” figure for this section of the Macedonian line. Shifting to the other side of the battlefield or tabletop, I noted that Bessos (spelling will vary) was in command of the Persian left, while Mazaios (spelling will also vary) was in command of the Persian right. King Dareios III (again, spelling will vary) was in overall command of the larger if not reportedly massive army, and was the local officer in charge of the Persian center. How should these various personalities be represented in miniature? What abilities should they have? Would it be acceptable or reasonable, at least within the spirit of the Tactica II rules, to depict each as an army general? The following represents my current thinking, my work-in-progress answers to those questions.

Starting with the last question: Yes, I think it would be perfectly fine to categorize each personality as an army general. Alexander and King Darius would be in overall command of their respective armies, obviously, while the others would be subordinates, but of varying abilities and talents, etc. Ideally, King Darius should be riding a splendid four-horse chariot, something suitable for the king of a very large and wealthy empire. Alexander should be astride his faithful warhorse, even if the noble animal was somewhat worse for campaign wear and tear at this point. Anyway, here is how I am going to represent these five historical figures on my typically nontraditional wargames table:

Alexander - a “Follow Me!” Exceptional General; Control Test modifier of +2, Melee dice +5, and a value of 25 figures toward command or army breakpoint.

Parmenio - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +2, and a value of 10 figures toward command or army breakpoint. 

King Darius III - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +2, and a value of 30 figures if fleeing or 50 figures if killed toward command or army breakpoint.

Bessus - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +3, and a value of 9 figures toward command or army breakpoint.

Mazaeus - Control Test modifier of +1, Melee dice +3, and a value of 11 figures toward command or army breakpoint.

Notes:

1. The Control Test modifier is the simple addition of a 1 or 2 to the score rolled on 2d6. The melee dice addition is the number of d6 that the commander can add to the total number of dice rolled by a friendly unit when it is engaged in close combat. Of course, participating in a melee poses a certain degree of risk to the general. 
2. The qualification regarding the application of leader value in number of figures to command or army breakpoint is because I am thinking about treating each army as a combination of three smaller commands. Furthermore, instead of counting all of the “massed unit figures” in a broken command against the determined break point of the army, I am thinking of adapting a scenario rule wherein two commands need to be broken before the battle can be said to be lost. The additional qualification here would be for the battlefield condition of King Darius. It seems reasonable to suggest that if he meets his end on the tabletop, then it is “game over” for the Persians. If, however, he simply rides away or is forced to flee, then it seems a fairly safe bet that his command will collapse. 

Having offered a few subjective ideas concerning the representation of the known leaders present on that fateful day in 331 BC, I should now like to turn to a consideration of just a portion of the respective orders of battle. For my starting and ending point, I have chosen the central command or sector of the Persian host. 

Orders of Battle: A Partial Interpretation

Reviewing the Battle Pack information and deployment map provided on pages 15-17 of the November 2004 issue of Slingshot, I translated the descriptions and DBM language into the Persian (Late) army list language of Tactica II. The following list illustrates how I intend to model the Persian center at Gaugamela:

>1,000 Greek mercenaries [on the right of the line or position]

21 Greek mercenaries - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / PH (Hoplites) FV 5-6, Vet, Spears

> 1,000 “Apple-Bearer” Foot Guards [next to, on the left of the Greeks]

21 Guard Infantry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / PH FV 5-6, Vet, Spears & Bows

>1,000 Kinsmen cavalry [next to the Guards]

21 Heavy Cavalry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / HC FV 5-6, Vet, Lances

>1,000 Greek mercenaries [on the left of the Kinsmen horse]

21 Greek mercenaries - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / PH (Hoplites) FV 5-6, Vet, Spears

>1,000 Indian cavalry [next to the Greek mercenaries]

21 Heavy Cavalry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / HC FV 4-6, MG, Javelins

>1,000 Karian deportees [on the left of the Indians]

21 Infantry - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / FT FV 4-6, MG, Spears

>1,000 Mardian archers [the unit on the left end of this comparatively short line]

21 Archers - arranged in 3 ranks of 7 / LI FV 3-6, Vet, Bows

>50 Scythed Chariots [evidently placed as a screen for the Indian cavalry and Karian infantry]

03 scythed chariot models in a single rank / (Impetus) FV 5-6, MG, Blades and etc.

>15 Elephants [reportedly, a part of that Scythed Chariot screen]

01 elephant model / (Impetus) FV 5-6, MG, Various

Notes:

1. An approximate and representative figure scale of 1:50 was established for this project. This “working scale” falls in the middle of the approximate figure scale provided in Section 1.1 of the rules. Admittedly and technically, the tabletop strength of my units is very slightly more than the reported strength given in the Battle Pack information. The deployment of the various units in 3 ranks of 7 is also somewhat unusual, but it worked rather well for my intention and purpose. 
2. For the scythed chariots, I thought an approximate scale of 1:16-17 might work. This representation would be very close to the base/stand used to depict the elephants in the army of Darius.
3. Solo-wargamer’s license was used to adjust the unit characteristics in some cases. For example, the army list on page L8 defines Persian Guard HC as being EL (elite) and being armed with javelins, as are almost all formations of heavy cavalry. Studying the description found within the Battle Pack, I decided to downgrade these troopers to Vet (veteran) and replace their javelins with xystons or lances, even though these weapons do not confer any special melee advantage under the rules. 
4. Choosing functionality over form, these 9 units, King Darius III and the division commander (or marker) were made out of colored cardstock. Seeking to maximize the available playing surface, the various formations were drawn (on computer) in 15mm scale and then reduced by 25 percent. Consequently, a traditional stand of 15mm Greek mercenaries, arranged in 3 ranks of 7, that would have normally have a footprint of 7 centimeters by 4.5 centimeters, presented as a two-dimensional formation measuring 5.25 centimeters by 3.37 centimeters. The footprint of the Persian center command then, was approximately 42 centimeters or around 17 inches. 
5. Simple math informed that there were 147 massed unit figures in this command. At the “established” scale, these units represented approximately 7,350 men, which was 350 more than the total strength of 7,000 listed in the Battle Pack material. If I opt to adhere to the army breakpoint rule(s) as written, then this command will quit the field when the equivalent of 73 figures (50 percent) are destroyed/routed.
6. The screen of scythed chariots and packet of pachyderms was not included in the above calculations. The loss of either of these units will not impact the determined breakpoint for this command. 

A similar approach and rather enjoyable process was followed for the Persian right and left wings as well as for the contingents comprising the Macedonian army. 

Setting the Table

Referencing the wealth of wargamer-friendly information contained within the Gaugamela Battle Pack, I deployed the functional as well as rather simple version of the Persian right wing on my tabletop. The Syrians and Mesopotamian “regiments” were on the far right of the line, almost touching the edge of the table. The Albanians and Sacesians formed the left “bookend” of this contingent or wing. A screen of Kappadokian and Armenian troopers was arranged in front of the Syrians and their neighbors. A few squadrons of scythed chariots were positioned on the left of this much shorter line. In terms of numbers, the Persian right under Mazaios contained 15 units deployed in 4 divisions. With regard to its footprint, this wing occupied 37 inches of the tabletop. Four of these 15 units were light cavalry; the rest were battle or line cavalry. In terms of massed unit figures, the Persian left wing added up to 289. Instead of adhering to the 50 percent loss provision detailed in the spiral-bound rulebook, I revised this “percentage tipping point” to 35. The cavalry under the command and control of Mazaios would quit the field when the equivalent of 101 massed unit figures had been destroyed. 

As explained in the previous section, there were 7 units in the Persian center command. Five of these were infantry. There were also a few chariots and an even smaller number of elephants deployed as a screen. This blend of foot and horse stood on about 17.5 inches of the tabletop. Their combined strength added up to 147 massed unit figures. For this comparatively small command, I employed the army breakpoint rule as written, and so, the men fighting under the immediate supervision of King Darius III would run away when 73 massed unit figures had been lost. 

The Persian left wing consisted of a screen component and a rather large main body or line. The advance screen consisted of 3 units of cavalry and 2 groups of scythed chariots. The main line was formed by 16 units of cavalry and 2 units of infantry, and was under the overall control of Bessos. This frontage of this wing stretched for approximately 53 inches. Its combined strength was 441 massed unit figures. For the sake of consistency, 

I applied the same percentage loss selected for the right wing to this larger formation. Therefore, when 154 massed unit figures had been lost, this command would withdraw from the battlefield.

Moving to the other side of the arid and flat terrain, Parmenio’s command occupied 25 inches of the tabletop. His left-most unit was about 16 inches in from the table edge. This aged and veteran officer had 162 massed unit figures in his contingent, spread across 9 units in 3 divisions. The Macedonian left wing would be undone if/when the equivalent of 81 massed unit figures had been destroyed or routed. 

The Macedonian center presented 14 units in 3 divisions. The majority of its troops were positioned as a supporting line or as a barrier if any Persian cavalry managed to get around the flanks and into the rear area(s). The frontage of the phalanx was about 14 inches. The footprint of the second line was 27.5 inches. The phalanx and its neighbors would be broken if/when they suffered 210 massed unit figure casualties. 

Alexander’s wing was built out of 4 divisions. There were 13 massed units in addition to  almost half as many groups of skirmishers. The frontage of this wing stretched for 42 inches. The strength of this command added up to 266 massed unit figures, so Alexander’s men would falter, lose heart, and then depart when 133 losses had been accumulated. 

How it Played

Having spilled quite a bit of electronic ink in my last post wherein I attempted to describe three refights of Gaugamela, I thought I would try something a little different with this report. Following, please see three diagrams or maps of my Tactica II interpretation. These “snapshots” of the status of certain parts of the tabletop at the end of specific turns should provide a sufficient as well as simpler visual record of what had happened or what was happening. 

A Critical Survey upon the Completion of Turn Seven

A careful count of the strength of the Persian left wing informed that there were 13 units of cavalry present in this sector of the tabletop. As for the enemy, they had just 4 units of foot, 5 if one included the other formation of light infantry or peltasts that was hurrying over to help shore up what remained of the Macedonian right. If one also chose to include the Companions in this sector total, then 3 more units could be added to the Macedonian numbers. However, the veteran cavalry troops of Alexander - who was no longer on the board - were in fairly poor shape. One unit was disordered, having recently executed a complex move. Another was engaged with a unit of Persian light infantry and had not secured impetus, and had not performed at all well in the first round of melee. The smallest formation of Companions had suffered quite a few losses during previous stages of the contest. In fact, if two more figures were killed, then the Fates Test rule would kick in, and passing this morale check was always a low probability. The other units of Companions would take their Fates Tests when 5 and 3 figures, respectively, had been defeated by enemy action. As stated or typed above, these veteran cavalry were in fairly poor shape. Shifting the figurative magnifying glass of subjective analysis and consideration onto the Persian cavalry formations, it was noted that light casualties had been taken by 6 units; 2 other units were on the verge of breaking (i.e., having to take their own Fates Test); the unit of light cavalry was disordered, and another unit of heavy cavalry had reached its breaking point but had passed its Fates Test. It was possible then, for this severely damaged unit to participate in one more round of melee before dissolving. In terms of actual losses, the Persian left wing had seen 4 units rout off the field. These cavalry “regiments” added up to 84 massed unit figures. The determined morale tipping point of this largish command was 154 massed unit figures. By comparison, the Macedonian right had lost 2 units of skirmishers (a formation can only evade so much before attention must be given to other, more capable units); 3 units of cavalry, and 2 units of foot. These casualties added up to 76 massed unit figures. The determined break point for the Macedonian right was 133 massed unit figures. A unit of mercenary hoplites was in trouble, and its two neighbors were under threat of attack from multiple directions, even though the movement of the various Persian cavalry units was rather glacial when it came to finding space, wheeling, and lining up their approach. In summary, it seemed that the advantage in this sector of the model battlefield was securely held by Bessos and his numerous cavalry formations. 

Moving over to the other side of the tabletop, the Macedonians appeared to be in as much trouble, if not more. Parmenio had 3 units of allied hoplites and a unit of skirmishers remaining from his original command. One unit of hoplites was disordered but had dodged a “scythed chariot bullet” when the decorated-with-blades vehicles failed to gain impetus against the unformed heavy infantry. The skirmishers had withdrawn in the face of enemy pressure to the temporary safety afforded by the orderly hoplite formations. Even so, this handful of infantry was facing 13 units of enemy horse. Seven of these formations, under the direction of Mazaios, were following in the wake of the scythed chariot squadron and bearing down on the rather exposed left and left-rear of Parmenio’s position. The units of Sakai light cavlary had taken some losses, but were able to scamper away from the stubborn enemy hoplites. Weakened units of Tapurian and Albanian cavalry hovered around the right flank of these hoplites and again, quite a large number of enemy cavalry was making its way (eventually) into the rear area(s) of Parmenio’s position. With regard to losses, 50 massed unit figures had been destroyed or routed on the Macedonian side. Parmenio’s command had a morale tipping point of 81 massed unit figures. The Persians had lost 21 massed unit figures, approximately one-fifth of their allotment of 101 massed unit figures. On review, the situation looked desperate. The situation also looked like it was essentially decided. 

Turning from the left and right flanks to a consideration of the center of the model battlefield, it appeared that the Macedonians were faring much better in this location. While the 5 units of the phalanx, co-commanded by Krateros (Craterus) and Koinos (Coenus), had been charged by some scythed chariots and then a packet of pachyderms and its echelon formation had been disrupted, the annoying chariots had eventually been dispatched. The battle with the elephants continued, but free portions of the phalanx were able to resume their advance and a couple of battalions had engaged the enemy. Though belonging to the right wing command, the Hypaspists had joined in this central struggle by engaging some Persian light infantry and some comparatively poor quality cavalry. The dice gods had other plans apparently, as the initial melee rounds saw the Hypaspists receive a bloody nose as well as a black eye. Perhaps the only bright spot for the Macedonians in this sector of the table was the flight of King Darius III. With a number of enemy units moving towards his location, the royal person was pressured by his advisors and bodyguard to make a rapid exit. Darius mounted a horse (conveniently and readily held in reserve) and made a dash for relative safety. His running away resulted in a penalty of 30 massed unit figures against the morale of the Persian center. As the serious fighting had just begun, and as the determined point of collapse for this small command was 73 massed unit figures, there was still time. The Persian center remained unbroken.

Taking another long - if again subjective - look at the status of the tabletop, the thinking was that a Persian victory was likely if not inevitable. The Macedonian flanks were, for all intents and purposes, gone or in the process of being enveloped and exterminated. Alexander had left himself exposed in the chaos of the center-right and had been captured by a local Persian unit of cavalry whose commander had been paying more attention. To be certain, the flight of King Darius would have ripple effects, but it appeared that the Persian center could “entertain” the Macedonian phalanx long enough for the situations on the right and left to be resolved. In some regards, this abbreviated action reminded me a little of the 216 BC contest at Cannae. The Persians, it could be suggested, like the Carthaginians, had succeeded on the flanks and were getting ready to pressure the infantry of the Macedonian center from the right, left, and rear. The Macedonians, it could be reasonably argued, were going to push their way through the Persian center. But this extended action would leave them tired as well as with additional losses which would not help their case when assailed by numerous formations of enemy horse. Also, there was the “small” matter of the Macedonians having lost their charismatic, very competent, and foolishly courageous commander.  

Commentary & Critique

The following paragraph appeared at the end of Chapter 4 of Three Tours of “the Camel’s House”:

Along that same general line, I wonder if anyone or if any group has attempted to 

refight Gaugamela using Tactica II? I see that the appropriate army lists are 

included in the spiral-bound rulebook. I wonder what an interpretation of the 

entire engagement might look like with these rules? I would be interested in 

reading about how others have approached or thought about approaching 

Gaugamela with Tactica II. In fact, I find myself rather tempted by the idea. 

Such a project might make a nice addition to the fractional effort posted in 

February of 2020.

Even though it has only been a matter of days (as of this typing) since that admittedly but necessarily long post “went live,” I find myself in a position, ironically enough, where I can answer the questions I posed as well as offer some ideas and additional remarks.

Taking the sentences of this end of Chapter 4 paragraph in order . . . According to the two respondents in the Tactica Forum (the exchange transpired on 01 July; please see https://groups.io/g/Tactica if interested in joining this small but dedicated group), a fellow by the name of Doug was not aware if the historical battle had been wargamed with these specific rules, but both he and and another gentleman named Jacob were certain that quite a few figures would be needed, once the strength of the Persian host had been agreed upon. Doug also made the very good suggestion regarding the development of a scenario rule for the probable flight of King Darius when/if any Macedonian/Greek unit approached to within striking or perceived threat distance. The army lists contained within the spiral-bound rule book were quite useful. The orders of battle I employed were a combination of these lists and again, the wealth of information provided in the Gaugamela Battle Pack (please see https://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/42-battle-day-2004-gaugamela-331-bc.) 

Having recently completed seven turns of a solo wargame wherein Gaugamela was refought, I have a pretty good if also subjective idea about what the historical battle looks like when using these rules as well as how it plays. In brief overview, although my staging was focused on the functional more than the aesthetic and was non-traditional as opposed to traditional, I think the refight was rather historical, at least in the Featherstone sense of “realistically portraying the terrain of the battlefield and the troops that were present.” (Please see the bottom of page 10 in Battle Notes for Wargamers.) Regrettably, I have not been able to find any posts or reports of a Tactica II refight of Gaugamela. It appears that Doug is correct. It appears that the size and scale of this historical battle has prohibited many an interested Tactica II player-general from making the attempt, or even considering such a mega-game. Then again, it could simply be a case of not bothering to communicate the presumed group effort to the wider community of ancient wargamers. No judgment here. Often the setting up, playing of the battle and then chatting about it over a beverage or a meal after the tabletop has been cleared is enough. Speaking of making the attempt, I drew inspiration from my own concluding paragraph and rushed into production a solo-refight of the 331 BC battle of Gaugamela using the Tactica II rules. Subjectively speaking, the preceding report does make a nice addition to that fractional effort made several years ago. Here’s hoping that this admittedly slap-dash narrative will generate a few comments and perhaps even constructive criticism. If nothing else, at least the invitation to read and remark and the link to my blog will be around for quite some time. (That is the assumption anyway.) Right, that is enough musing about the future and the small chance of some unborn ancients wargamer stumbling upon this particular post via their implanted neural link in or around the year 2082. Let me return to the present or, technically, the very recent past. 

Over the course of seven turns of solo play, the historical record was not repeated or reinforced; it was rewritten. Based on the objective evidence and subjective assessments, a Persian victory was declared. I will not attempt to qualify the nature of that victory, however. My reluctance to do so should not prevent interested readers from weighing in with their own comments, remarks and thoughts. This seems an appropriate moment to review the overall as well as unofficial record of Gaugamela as played on a tabletop. Looking over the results from the First Battle Day, I counted 13 wargames played with 9 sets of rules. In this baker’s dozen worth of refights, the Macedonians won 8 and lost 5. From what I was able to discover, Alexander perished in several of the contests. King Darius was not very far behind in this particular regard. My record with Gaugamela now stands at 2 wins a piece, so it could be said that the updated but still unofficial record is 10-7 in favor of the Macedonians. 

Anyway, returning, if only for a few minutes to the Featherstone reference: The second part of this “founding father’s” common sense approach reads: “To refight any historical battle realistically, the troops accurately represent the original forces.” As I explained above, my primary source was the Gaugamela Battle Pack. The gentleman or gentlemen who assembled this excellent document explained that the 1964 Marsden text was “broadly followed” with regard to troop types and numbers. It would be foolish of me to think that more expert players of Tactica II (and there are many) would completely accept my decisions about and interpretations of the various formations on both sides. As I provided details of how I depicted the center of the Persian line, this seems worth another, albeit brief, look. Following the Battle Pack information, my “model” Persian center sector contained approximately 7,000 troops. These were a mix of infantry and cavalry. There was also a screen of scythed chariots as well as a handful of elephants. While reviewing some material found online, I noted that one modern author argued for a strength of 12,000 for the Persian center. Furthermore, in the accompanying deployment diagram in which his interpretation was explained, it appears that I may have an incorrect arrangement of units in this narrow sector. I acknowledge that this may indeed be the case. That stipulation aside, the deployment and reported strength of the Persian center that was used appeared to work rather well in this latest refight. Again, the definitive results for the contest in the center are not available because the wargame was halted, and the experiment was deemed a success or qualified success. 

As an extension to the second half of the “Featherstone equation” for refighting historical battles realistically, I considered researching the approximate cost of wargaming Gaugamela in miniature. Initially, I thought about comparing 6mm to 15mm to 25/28mm. Then, instead of trying to determine the approximate investment needed to model both armies in their entirety, I thought that focusing on the reported 8,000 Bactrian cavalry of the Persian left wing would be sufficient. Obviously, 6mm figures cost less than 15mm, and 15mm miniatures cost less than 25/28mm figures. The model to real man ratio or scale also has to be considered. Here again, 6mm miniatures have an advantage. I think it would be possible, and at a reasonable cost, to establish/employ a 1:10 figure scale for a 6mm depiction of these 8,000 Bactrian cavalry. Eight hundred 6mm figures would require about 20-25 packages I think, if I understand the Baccus catalog correctly. This unusual figure scale would not be as feasible when using the larger scale miniatures. That is, unless one had very deep pockets, a very large room dedicated to wargaming, and a small team of above average to expert painters standing by. I toyed with the idea of figuring out the approximate cost of a WoFun version of these 8,000 Bactrians, but, after reading several negative opinions/reviews of these comparatively inexpensive, two-dimensional, pre-painted and ready-to-use figurines, I thought I would save myself the potential trouble. Interestingly and related to that topic, I have read several comments and blog posts wherein the following statement or a variation of it was made: “Wargaming is a broad church.” Though not a religious person (I do find the history of it rather fascinating, however), I accept this premise without reservation. Comparing wargaming to religion is appropriate, but also fraught with the long and problematic history of that too often divisive, intensely personal, but also universal topic. In fact, I imagine that it would not be that difficult to dedicate an entire post to the subject. (I would not be surprised to find that it has already been done, and by several respected and well-established bloggers in the past decade.) Anyway. 

Returning to and refocusing on the recently “completed” refight, I found that I could not replicate, exactly, the deployment - at least the one generally accepted by modern scholars - used by Alexander. I think I had it generally right though, or was very close to an approximation of it. However, I did not have light troops or skirmishers at a 45 degree angle one way and then a 45 degree angle another way. Reviewing the turn record notes and other fragments that were typed during the handful of turns completed, in the role of Alexander, I did not shift my angle of attack to the right, trying to stretch out the already long Persian line. I found myself playing a more passive role, reacting to the numbers that I was facing and trying to coordinate the attacks that I thought would do the most damage in the shortest amount of time. On further reflection, it appears that this was, at least in this particular case, wishful thinking. 

Changing uniforms into any one of the Persian commanders, I found myself almost hamstrung by having so many units as well as the slow speed by which cavalry formations were able to wheel. These related objections aside, I took a measure of comfort in being able to throw units into and against the enemy, knowing that I could lose more men or miniature models, at least to a point. I also understood that tying down enemy formations would afford me the time and opportunity to move other units into positions from which I could engage the occupied enemy from a flank or even from behind. 

Shifting gears again (I apologize to the reader for the lack of any real structure in this final section), I thought I would conclude this follow up to Three Tours of “the Camel’s House” with some brief comments about what I liked and what I had some trouble with when refighting Gaugamela with Tactica II. 

As always, the process of research and the related “work” of drafting, developing and producing the orders of battle was quite enjoyable. I believe that I have remarked in several previous posts that I like this aspect of wargaming as much or perhaps even a little more than playing the intended wargame. Somewhat odd, I grant. But I suppose I could be placed in a sub-camp similar to that occupied by hobbyists who enjoy painting and collecting more than gaming. I liked the way my finished model battlefield looked, even if it was nowhere near to being a traditional historical miniatures wargame. Had I taken a few pictures of the effort, or had a like-minded individual seen the “finished” table in person, I do not think that it would have taken more than a couple of guesses for prospective viewers or that visitor to figure out that I was refighting Gaugamela. Having some experience with Tactica II (not a lot - I am nowhere near the 1,000 hour mark - but a brief survey of my blog returned several posts wherein I have “wrestled” with the rules and the design philosophy behind them), I think the wargame went smoothly, or smoothly enough. Then again, this may be the result of scheduling one turn every day or every couple of days. By this measured approach, I could be sure to correctly complete each of the eight sub-phases in a game turn. In conjunction with the above, I also liked the fact that I could consult with other Tactica II players on the dedicated Forum for these rules. It was through this exchange, albeit not that well attended for some reason - one would think that Gaugamela would have elicited more interest, but . . . - that the aforementioned Doug suggested some kind of scenario rule for Darius and his possible flight from the battlefield and the effects or impact that would have on his army.  Without going into too much detail, I drafted a scenario rule that required King Darius to take a modified Fates Test when any Macedonian unit advanced within a certain distance. As briefly reported above, this did occur during the refight and, just like he did historically, King Darius jumped on that provided horse and got the heck out of Gaugamela. By no means is this scenario rule perfect, but it works or worked. I am of the opinion that further tinkering can always be done. 

In the first draft of this final section, I typed approximately 900 words wherein I discussed my issues with or reservations about certain aspects and procedures of the Tactica II rules. On further reflection, it seems rather particular of me or “bad form” to revise these and then copy and paste them here. I will simply refer the appreciated reader to Tactica II: Testing & Tinkering, which was posted on June 19, 2021. This admission aside and on further review, I decided to copy and paste just two bullet points of that first draft here, as I think that any worthwhile discussion of Gaugamela would have to cover the Persian scythed chariots and the significant role of Alexander. Without further introduction then . . .

> The refight being Gaugamela, of course there were scythed chariots present. I read and reviewed the rule sections pertaining to these vehicles and believe I was able to grasp how they work or perform on a tabletop, but even so . . . For example, I would have thought that skirmishers were more effective against these potentially deadly vehicles. (Perhaps this is another point where my questions about evading and maybe even about the sequence of missile fire applies?) My main concern or curiosity occurred in the approximate center of the table when a unit of scythed chariots met 2 units of the Macedonian phalanx. The chariots did not secure impetus and were bested as well as damaged beyond their unit breakpoint in the ensuing melees. However, as fortune (or Fortune) would have it, the scythed chariots passed the Fates Test by rolling a 12 on 2d6. In the next melee round, even though their original strength was much reduced, the scythed chariots were able to fight with all of their dice. After taking more losses in one melee area (the Macedonians controlled the direction of fighting), the scythed chariots had to take another Fates Test and, against very large odds, rolled another 12. This result impressed me as rather unlikely and perhaps even a bit “gamey.” To be certain, I am no expert on how scythed chariots performed in ancient warfare, but is not the general consensus something along the lines of these vehicles being “one shot weapons”? Does not the historical record indicate that these chariots were generally a poor investment if not poor performers? I guess I just have trouble picturing a driver urging a team of horses to run into a veritable wall of pike points. I also have a bit of trouble imagining the melee between two such bodies as lasting for more than a few minutes. 

> During the movement phase of one turn of the recently staged refight, Alexander was caught out in the open by a unit of Persian cavalry. These troopers were able to wheel slightly (not a complex move) and then move straight into and over Alexander’s playing piece. I admit that this “complaint” may be an attempt to excuse my inattention to Alexander’s situation, but it seems to me that army generals should have at least a chance to escape or evade enemy units as they close in. I am not trying to complicate the rules as they exist, I am just voicing an opinion. If the player-general in charge does make a mistake, then he can make a last-ditch effort to save an exposed general by rolling a d6 or perhaps 2 of them and consulting an improvised table. 

This Tactica II refight, along with the other recent experiments conducted and experiences had wargaming this historical battle, proved quite satisfying. However, despite a couple of mentions in the previous post, I cannot see myself making yet another trip to this ancient plain within the next few months, or even the next twelve. While it appears that I may have reached a limit with regard to refighting Gaugamela (in my own atypical fashion) and reporting on it (in a more traditional manner), I still have a great interest in reading about it. Ideally, I should like to discover a report, one produced by a small but capable group or written by a couple of friends, wherein the description and details of how Gaugamela was staged with Tactica II were provided. To be perfectly honest, I would really like to see two or three new reports about how Tactica II handled Gaugamela. However, as I opined previously, given the size and scale of the historical battle, and given the comparatively small membership of the dedicated forum, something tells me that I am in for rather a long and potentially disappointing wait.