RAPHIA: 

A REAPPRAISAL

With regard to the battlefield’s size and appearance, I set up my 10.5 feet by 3.75 feet table and then covered it with a simple light brown (i.e., desert-colored) sheet. A similar minimalist approach to preparing the model landscape for a miniature reconstruction of the well known 217 BC/BCE contest between the large army of Antiochus III (the Great) and equally large army of Ptolemy IV has been used by many other more accomplished as well as traditional historical wargamers. In researching this Hellenistic engagement, I made a note of Simon Miller’s comments about the alleged nature of the ground at Raphia. In a post to his well-known-in-the wargaming-community blog, dated 26 April 2016, the accomplished rule writer and conductor of some simply spectacular demonstration/participation games at a fair number of wargaming shows explained: “I have plans to make the terrain more arid . . . since the site of the battle was probably covered in sand and scrub.” He continued, relating that the prolific Jeff Jonas had told him “there were limestone outcrops and cacti” present on the otherwise comparatively flat and featureless plain. Anyway, the terrain “problem” solved, I turned my attention to the depiction of the formations and troops that would do battle on a 39.37 square-foot tabletop. 

With regard to the representation of armies, I employed my usual (or unusual) method of fabricating two-dimensional color counters. I have been wargaming this way since 1992, approximately. Evidently and unofficially, I was a foreign exchange student, then graduate, and finally an advocate (mostly silent) of what could be called “The Perkins School.” (In the March 1980 issue of Slingshot, then subtitled as the ‘Official Journal of the Society of Ancients,’ a fellow by the name of Jon Perkins offered readers a one-page summary describing the benefits of playing at ancient or medieval war with cardboard armies. In addition to touting the advantages of “fighting with a movable coloured battle-plan,” the gentleman noted the probable “disgust of conventional wargamers,” in response to this method, as well as “the heresy” this economical and functional approach represented.) With regard to developing the following orders of battle, I relied on a variety of sources. Among these were the army lists found on the Meshwesh site (please see https://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/home), the online translation of the narrative account of Raphia written by Polybius (please see Chapters 63-5 and 79-86 at https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/5*.html, though one would not be wasting time by reading Chapters 66-78 as well), and the excellent work completed by other historical wargamers for their respective interpretations of what Professor Philip Sabin has called “one of the largest ever ancient battles.” (Please see page 157 of LOST BATTLES - Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World.) Without further preamble, let me begin with the right wing of the Seleucid host. The following represents just a fraction of the work-in-progress order of battle. Initially, I thought I would include this comprehensive yet amateur interpretation within the body of this post. Noting the word count total (1,651!), seeing how many electronic pages it occupied, and recalling one or two comments/objections to the potentially “boring” details contained within orders of battle by previous readers, I decided to shift the complete catalog of commands, troop types, and numbers to Appendix A. 

THE SELEUCID RIGHT

COMMAND 1

03 units of Knights; Antiochus III (the Great) attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Antiochus (the Great) will confer a +2 melee modifier to the unit of Knights he is riding with.
2. [Optional] The units of Knights in this command have a +1 melee modifier due to their veteran status, due to their being the bodyguard for the king. 
3. This command is demoralized when it has lost 08 points. 
4. Antiochus (the Great) may assume command and control over any other “division” in his army if he is within 8 MUs and declares this to be the case.
5. If Antiochus is killed, the point value of his destroyed unit/stand is 08 points.

COMMAND 2

03 units of Elite Cavalry; Antipater is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Antipater has a +1 melee modifier.
2. This command is demoralized when it has lost 08 points.
3. Elite Cavalry is not a troop type offered on the referenced Seleucid army list. I borrowed this type from an appendix in my PDF copy of the rules, figuring that Antipater would not lead more Knights. This substitution was done a few times when putting together both orders of battle. 

COMMAND 3

04 units of Elephants; Philip is riding one of these pachyderms

04 units of Skirmishers; Eurylochus is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Philip is in charge and provides a +1 melee modifier.
2. To reflect the reported superiority of the Seleucid war elephants, these animals have a +1 melee modifier when facing off against Ptolemaic elephants.
3. This command is demoralized when it has lost 10 points.

COMMAND 4

05 units of Raiders; Hippolochus is embedded with one of these units

02 units of Light Foot, 02 stands of Bow Levy, and 01 stand of Light Spear; Byttacus is attached to a unit of Light Foot

Notes:

1. The units under Byttacus form a single line next to the Silver Shields (i.e., Command 5). The units under Hippolochus are deployed to the right of Byttacus. 
2. Technically, the secured army list did not allow for certain troop types to be used. For this interpretation of Raphia, I gave myself license to incorporate other troop types. 
3. Hippolochus is in overall command and provides a +1 melee modifier.
4. This command is demoralized when it has lost 14 points.

Remarks regarding The Seleucid Right Wing:

1. This formation has a strength of 24 stands.
2. This formation has a combined point value of 82.

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How It Played

An intentionally plain-looking reconstruction of Raphia was set up in the latter third of May. The general as well as simple appearance of my tabletop before any command dice were thrown is shown in Figure 1. The frontage of the “model” Ptolemaic army stretched for a little more than 7.5 feet. Roughly 14 inches of this footprint was occupied by the elephants and skirmishers on the left wing, where the light troops were interspersed with the pachyderms instead of screening the animals. Across the flat and featureless tabletop, the Seleucid army under Antiochus III (the Great) deployed in a line measuring approximately 8 feet long. In contrast to the Ptolemaic elephants, the reportedly larger and more frightening Seleucid animals were screened by skirmishers.

With regard to the structure of this report, I should like to try and emulate the summary provided by John Boehm in “Rematch At Raphia - Part 1.” (This engaging report was published in the May 1981 issue of Slingshot.) With that goal in mind, I will officially start this account when the first close combat takes place. For subsequent turns, I think succinct descriptions (ahem . . .) of what happened in each sector should suffice.

Given the flat ground and given that both sides had cavalry on their respective wings, it was not a complete surprise to see that the first clashes of the day took place here on the second turn. The battle did not start well for the Ptolemaic cause and went especially poorly for the cavalry command of Polycrates, as a unit of his Javelin Cavalry evaporated moments after making contact with the a unit of troopers in the command of Antipater. Fortunately, the rest of the Ptolemaic regiments secured ‘fall back’ results. Unfortunately, this bloody nose resulted in the surviving units becoming demoralized. (In any future melees, they would suffer a negative modifier.) Way over on the other flank, the cavalry of Themison and Echecrates collided. In this initial melee, the unit led by Themison was forced back. The right-most unit of the Ptolemaic formation yielded some ground as well. 

As for other sectors and formations, well, Antiochus was pushing his Knights so that they could wheel and turn into Ptolemy’s left. Sensing this, Ptolemy ordered his own Knights to move - and quickly - over to support the far left. The infantry contingents and elephant formations on both sides were rather slow in getting started. This was due to a combination of poor command dice and both leaders thinking that the wings needed to be developed or resolved before the phalanxes would move forward to engage. 

On the third turn, the cavalry formation led by Antipater attacked the unit commanded by Polycrates and overwhelmed it. For all intents and purposes, the Ptolemaic horse on this far flank was no more. The surviving unit elected to turn and move, as rapidly as possible, away from Antipater’s men and the threatening column of Knights under Antiochus III. Seeing this development, Ptolemy halted his progress and ordered his elephants and Royal Guard to hold in place. In the center of the flat and featureless plain, the opposing phalanxes continued their measured advance forward. Due to their comparatively slow rate of movement, a general melee between these large bodies of pikemen would not take place for two or three more turns. In the mean time, over on the Ptolemaic right, the cavalry under Echecrates had scored a local victory against the cavalry under Themison. This local contest was only just beginning, however. The opposing formations of elephants had yet to make contact, and the commands of Phoxidas and Dionysius had not charged or been charged by the enemy line. 

In the next turn, the opposing phalanxes continued their careful approaches. On the Seleucid side of the field, the large contingent of Arabs and other tribes was slightly forward of their neighbors. This brought them to within spitting distance of the Greek mercenaries under Phoxidas. Farther to the right of these hoplite-like infantry, the cavalry of Echecrates succeeded in killing Themison along with another third of his horsemen. This small command was now demoralized. While half of the Ptolemaic elephants were knocked out by enemy skirmishers, a counterattack witnessed the destruction of a different unit of skirmishers as well as the routing of some of the elephants under the direction of Myicus. The result was a second demoralized Seleucid command. Shifting attention way over to where Antiochus III was still leading his Knights, things were going much better for the Seleucids. The remnants of Polycrates’ cavalry elected to run away rather than face far superior numbers and quality of enemy horse. The left flank of Ptolemy IV had not been completely turned, however. The smaller elephants and accompanying skirmishers were giving Hippolochus and his foot soldiers a difficult time. Ptolemy IV used this distraction to withdraw his Knights so that they were nearer to the Royal Guard. These Elite Foot had started to wheel left in order to present a better front against the expected arrival of a fair number of Seleucid cavalry.    

Both Antipater and his royal commander continued their advance against the left-rear of the Ptolemaic line as the sixth turn unfolded. The combined strength of their formations could not be brought to bear on any enemy unit(s), however. Ptolemy used this time to straighten the lines of his Royal Guard infantry and make sure that his very outnumbered cavalry were ready for a hard if not impossible fight. In the meantime, the troops under Cnopias and Hippolochus continued to inflict losses on each other. Both contingents were on the verge of becoming demoralized. The center of the tabletop finally saw or felt and heard the impressive weight of opposing phalanxes make contact. This was, as might be imagined, a back and forth affair, which saw men fall dead or wounded, but witnessed no destruction of units. The exception to this was the contest between the Greek mercenaries of Phoxidas and the Arab formations. Using their supporting archers with some effect, the Arabs managed to hurt the mercenaries and push forward on their own right. The experienced Greeks quickly returned the favor or damage, routing ten percent of the enemy forces. The Ptolemaics enjoyed more success on their far right. Here, the cavalry under Echecrates dispatched the rest of Themison’s troopers who had been hobbled by the loss of their commander. Myicus was toppled this turn as well, when a squadron of elephants he was with was attacked from the front, flank, and rear. The loss of a number of skirmishers saw the command of Menedemus become demoralized. 

The contest between the various contingents of the opposing phalanxes continued in Turn 7. The Silver Shields seemed to be gaining an advantage against the Libyans and their neighbors, but it was difficult to tell in all the pushing, shoving, confusion, and growing cloud of dust. On the right side of this giant struggle, as diagrammed in Figure 3, the Arabs and other tribes had finally been driven to demoralization after having frustrated the Egyptians as well as caused some problems for Phoxidas. In fact, due to some additional volleys of arrows from the integrated bowmen, and due to some fairly abysmal die rolling, the Greek mercenaries soon found themselves in a demoralized state. The rest of the Ptolemaic right wing was doing better, however. The only problem was securing sufficient command pips to really squeeze the enemy flank. Echecrates got himself tied up with some enemy elephants and Dionysius was unable to rout any of the light infantry still facing his division. On the other side of the field, it was quite a different story. Antiochus III formed a line with his excellent cavalry and then waited for Antipater to do the same. The king would have liked to have those 60 elephants arranged to strike as well, but the officer in charge of these animals was not able to move the pachyderms into position. Elsewhere in this sector, there was a melee between units led by Byttacus and Socrates. The result was a draw. Ptolemy IV maintained his static line of Knights and Elite Infantry, waiting for the expected attack by his counterpart. 

Turn 8 saw the collapse of the Ptolemaic right wing as well as the dissolution of the Seleucid left. It was the end of Echecrates, as the enemy elephants were able to pivot against the horsemen. Supported by Lysimachus, the Ptolemaic troopers were caught in a front-flank vise and cut down. All over this sector, demoralized formations struggled with demoralized formations. Those units that were not given orders started to look for a quick exit from the confused melees. The contingent led by Aspasianus was much reduced in strength after tussling with some Greek mercenaries who also had low morale. The Arabs suffered even more losses, and were now at half of their original strength. In sum, this sector of the tabletop was littered with the detritus of several hard fought melees. This sector was awash with dead, wounded, stragglers, and the occasional frightened elephant. This sector contained nothing but broken commands. Aside from the rare occasion when a pike unit was undone by enemy pressure, the center remained a contest of pushing, shoving, and skewering between multiple ranks of pikemen. The Silver Shields inflicted a little damage on the Libyans, and the Egyptians suffered some more losses. A lopsided combat roll saw the first unit of Seleucid phalangites fall into the dirt and or sand. With the perhaps notable exception of the death of Byttacus, and subsequent demoralization of his shared command, the Seleucid right wing remained in rather good shape. All of the cavalry under Antipater and Antiochus III were still on the field, and the elephants of Philip were being cajoled into a new line (of a sorts) before making a move against Ptolemy IV and his guard infantry or towards the exposed flank of his phalanx. 

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A growing level of fatigue as well as a detectable amount of disengagement necessitated a 24-hour break from processing the many melees between the opposing phalanx units in addition to other tabletop concerns. Somewhat refreshed, a survey of the “model” battlefield at the start of the holiday weekend (Memorial Day) resulted in the decision not to play any more turns. 

It seemed abundantly clear that Antiochus III had done great work on the Ptolemaic left, even though he had yet to engage any enemy himself or commit any of his Knights to action. In fact, his formation was two moves away from the current position of Ptolemy IV and his bodyguard. If the enemy king decided to make a stand, it seemed very likely that his regiment would be overwhelmed. Then again, Ptolemy IV might abandon his Royal Guard infantry and seek safety as well as more time by retreating to the rear of his phalanx. Antipater’s cavalry would follow Antiochus and these units would probably engage the enemy Royal Guard. Given their better movement rate, it seemed probable that the infantry would be flanked while threatened frontally. The disorganized elephants under Philip were another formation to consider, though these animals were at least five moves/turns away from having any impact on what was taking place between the phalanxes. In summary, despite the demoralization of the troops under Hippolochus, the Seleucid right was strong and in the right place to create two or three serious problems for Ptolemy IV and his army. 

Shifting focus to the other side of the tabletop, well, it appeared that this sector was a non-issue. Neither army had any useful troops remaining on this flank. Initially, the Ptolemaics had done well, but then the damage began to accumulate and the morale of various units and formations, both enemy and friendly, started to waver and then crumble. 

Moving a little to the right (or left, depending on the perspective), a decent number of Egyptian pike units were unengaged, so these could, theoretically, wheel to their left and put more pressure on the engaged Seleucid pikemen. As with Philip’s elephants though, this movement would take time, and it was questionable how much effect or impact this additional pressure would have if Ptolemy IV had been cut down by the cavalry of Antiochus, or if some of the cavalry of Antiochus and Antipater had been able to find their way into the left-rear of the Macedonian phalanx. If the previous rounds of combat were any indication, it appeared that three or four more turns of melee between the opposing ranks of phalangites would not have seen any major developments. The probability was that there would have been more pushing and shoving, with each side gaining a bit of ground here and there, and then moved off of that same small patch of dirt by a slightly better die roll. 

In terms of position, it appeared that the Seleucids held the advantage. Their cavalry and elephants controlled the Ptolemaic left and were threatening the enemy formation that remained as a blocking force as well as the left side of the phalanx. While the left end of the Seleucid phalanx was having some trouble against the Egyptians - now free of attention from Arabs and other tribal units - the Silver Shields were proving essentially irresistible against the Libyans and a portion of the smaller phalanx. In terms of numbers, Ptolemy IV had 164 points on the tabletop. The vast majority of these (135) were represented by the occupied phalanx. For the Seleucids, Antiochus III had 130 points. While the majority of this strength was also represented by a large number of pikemen, this more dashing and military-minded ruler also had a handful of mobile and powerful cavalry. He also had the slow-moving weight of 60 elephants. Reviewing the situation on the flanks and acknowledging the difference in points, one could argue for an inconclusive result. However, I am the opinion that a very slight advantage - I do not want to type “win” - should be awarded to Antiochus III and his Seleucids. 

Remarks

Given the format or approach of this blog and lacking the discretionary funds needed for an effective PR department, I cannot imagine that this post will attract more than 100 readers/visitors. Of that estimated as well as likely inflated number, I would be very surprised to find critical remarks from three or four individuals about how I chose to model the landscape of Raphia. If the topic is deployment and representation of troop types, however, I am rather more certain that as many as 30 readers, or perhaps even more, might question my choices. I would be as surprised to see that five of these readers took the time to type a comment or two. Anyway, for this interpretation of Raphia, I tried to mirror the historical deployment as described in the ancient narrative. This was not a “true” representation however, as I did not have those Seleucid cavalry on the right wing “at an angle.” To make up for the difference in army frontages, I interspersed skirmishers with elephants on one wing, while in the other army I placed skirmishers as a physical screen to their elephants.

With regard to the depiction of each army, I think I did fairly well in using the rules and available army lists. To be certain, preparing and placing a total of 169 stands with a combined value of 532 points on a tabletop is something of a departure from the guidelines presented in the GRAND TRIUMPH! rules. Typically, the larger scenarios only involve armies worth 144 points each, so 288 points - perhaps as many as 300 - would be the calculated total for a big battle with these rules. My version of Raphia featured almost double that number of points. On the dedicated YouTube channel for these rules, I have watched the refights of Hastings and Hattin. These were impressive for a number of reasons. (Readers are encouraged to check them out, to watch at least 10 or 15 minutes of each.) Both reconstructions were achieved with the “normal” number of points. I have also had the pleasure of observing another GRAND TRIUMPH! historical battle at a convention - Romans versus Pyrrhus, where miniature armies of roughly the same points value were employed. It occurs to me that those individuals who have more experience with these rules might be able to put together a more traditional refight of Raphia while adhering to the parameters of GRAND TRIUMPH! I would certainly watch/study this video. If I knew Raphia with GRAND TRIUMPH! was going to be presented at a local convention/show, I certainly would mark that date in my calendar. 

My attempt to refight Raphia did not result in a repeat of history. Antiochus III did not chase after his counterpart, and the Ptolemaic phalanx did not get the better of the Seleucid phalanx. In my reconstruction, Ptolemy IV was not victorious. However, there were some similarities. The Seleucid right wing more than handled the Ptolemaic left wing; the Ptolemaic right wing dealt with the Seleucid left wing, and the Ptolemaic phalanx appeared to be holding its own against the enemy phalanx. As might be expected, there were also some differences. On the Ptolemaic side of the tabletop, Polycrates and Echecrates met their figurative deaths. The mercenaries under Phoxidas were sorely tested. The African elephants on the left wing were not frightened by the more numerous Indian elephants arranged against them. In fact, these African elephants spent most of this refight engaged with the formation commanded by Hippolochus. Philip spent most of his time trying to herd his elephants. (Word play unavoidable, but appropriate.) The Seleucid left was destroyed, eventually. In terms of officer losses, in addition to those leaders who routed away with their troops, Byttacus was the only commander on the Seleucid right to fall in action. In some regards then, I guess it could be remarked that there was a historical feel to this attempt. On further reflection, I did wonder about how much time it was taking Antiochus and his subordinates to get involved against the Ptolemaic left and left-rear. I also wondered about Philip and why he had so much trouble directing his pachyderms. Shifting to the contest between the phalanxes, I suppose that this had some historical feel, but it was somewhat problematic to express or expand the very local victories to a larger concern. 

At times, I found it a little odd that a successful melee by a deep phalanx would open up the leading stand/unit to being overlapped. I have never been in a phalanx formation, and I have never faced a similar kind of enemy. However, my guess is that - in those spare moments when I was not completely frozen in fear - I would have been focused on what was happening to my front. I do not think I would have risked looking, let alone pivoting, to my left or right. 

Blending the issue of “historical feel” with a question about the rules, while playing Turn 4, the following took place. A stand of Seleucid skirmishers managed to destroy a stand of enemy elephants. These pachyderms were directly in front of and in contact with the leading edge of a friendly unit of light foot. These infantry suffered no adverse effects or penalties when the elephants were knocked out and the survivors presumably routed through their ranks. Ironically, during this same move, another unit of Seleucid skirmishers was forced to evade after losing a melee. These troops were destroyed because they ran into a friendly stand (elephants) that was in their evade path. I find it odd that skirmishers can do pretty well when they are attacking elephants; it seems that these light troops can dart, dash, and throw various missiles. Evidently, these same troops do not have that same flexibility when running into them. In both examples, I do not believe the elephants were standing shoulder-to-shoulder and so, presenting a wall of animal tusks, trunks, and crew-filled towers. Going back to the elephants being destroyed and routing, perhaps the lack of any effect is simply an abstraction of the rules. Perhaps morale is more of a “broad brush” applied to a command rather than a “specific brush” used for a particular unit or units in certain situations. Tacking on a little bit about melee here - with these rules, melee is an “either or” proposition. While there are a number of outcomes such as ‘fall back’ or ‘evade,’ defeat and destruction seems linked more to decisive die rolling than anything else. In this refight of Raphia, not a single unit suffered losses or became fatigued after fighting for three or more turns in a row. 

I wonder if that hardy band who may or may not comment on my orders of battle will also remark upon my decisions regarding command and control? Instead of setting up a traditional GRAND TRIUMPH! scenario wherein a general and two sub-generals attempt to win the day against an enemy triumvirate, I decided to make use of the ancient narrative, and like others, add a little more color to this simple reconstruction. I did wonder and worry though, if I was creating too much command and control for both armies by providing the identified leaders with the capabilities of a TRIUMPH! general. For each early turn of my reconstruction, there was a pretty good chance that each command/formation would be moving. (This did not always happen. The elephants - on both sides - proved to be stubborn at times.) Coincidentally, at around the same time that I was preparing and then playing this wargame, a discussion was started about ‘unit activation’ in ancient warfare and ancient wargame rules on the Ancients Discussion Board at TMP. The discussion/debate was shared with members of The Society of Ancients. Some of these gentlemen experts shared their opinions and thoughts.    

Very early on in this project, I considered imitating the excellent work of one S. J. Randles. In a few ‘ancient’ issues of Slingshot, this gentleman described for readers how he went about refighting Magnesia three times with the WRG rules. I thought about refighting the historical battle of Raphia, and then wargaming it a second time, but allowing free deployment. In the deciding contest, I imagined employing even larger armies doing battle over terrain that was a little more interesting. Prudence and realism intervened, fortunately, and this overly ambitious idea was stored in a small box, sealed, and then placed on a high shelf out of my line of sight. An alternative project, wherein the battle of Raphia would be broken into three component parts (right, left, and center) and each piece of the historical engagement played as a wargame was also contemplated. This more reasonable idea was placed in a large brown envelope and filed away for possible further study. 

In Chapter 86 of Book V, Polybius provides the interested reader/student with a “score sheet” of the losses suffered by both sides. Accepting that the accuracy of these figures is suspect, it was still interesting to note the remark about the elephants of Ptolemy. How is it possible for the winning army in an ancient battle to have “most of their pachyderms captured”? Ideally, I should have liked to offer a detailed breakdown of the “model” armies and their respective casualty lists as well as demoralization status. Unfortunately, I did not make a point of keeping careful records. However, I can report, or reiterate, that the Seleucid left wing was roughly handled in this refight. I can also report that Antiochus III had 130 points of troops still on the table when the decision was made to end the game. If my math is correct, this means the Seleucids lost approximately 49 percent (for all intents and purposes, half) of their army. Working the same division problem for the Ptolemaics informs that Ptolemy IV lost around 41 percent of his force. Although his casualties were not as great as those suffered by the Seleucids, Ptolemy IV had no troops on either wing, and he was under the serious threat of having his Royal Guard, his royal person, and the rear of a portion of his phalanx attacked by strong units of enemy cavalry.    

In overall summary, I think it was pretty good solo wargame. It was an OK experience. I found myself engaged and entertained, albeit more so by the research and preparation (however filled with mistakes) than by the actual wargaming (also containing a few mistakes here and there). With past projects, I have often given myself a letter grade or assessment, though I do not have any official rubric to which I refer and check off boxes or something similar. For this refight of Raphia, I think a C+ or perhaps even a B- is warranted. The numerical equivalent would range between a score of 77 and 81. To repeat: This refight was OK. To be sure, it could have been better. There is room for improvement.  

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It would be fair to comment that I have a bit of a history with Raphia. In fact, this TRIUMPH!-based project marks my sixth visit or tour of the ancient battlefield, at least as represented by playing at ancient war on a tabletop. The first “working vacation” to this distant location took place in early 2013. The written-by-a-relative-rookie report was accepted by the editorial board of WARGAMES illustrated^®, and “Wrestling with Raphia - Being the Account of One Wargamer’s Attempt to Pin Down Polybius” appeared in the October issue. While I enjoyed the process of preparing and playing this particular battle, it appears that it did not go over well with at least one reader. (Please see the “rant” offered by someone identifying themselves as ‘ubercommando’ at http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=321673. It appears that the adage is true, and especially so when it comes to writing about wargaming: You can’t please all of the people all of the time. It also appears that even if you provide informational links to other sources in an article, one should not expect readers to investigate these. Anyway, it occurs to me that this first attempt and its reception could justifiably be classified as “ancient history.” In fact, this criticism had been forgotten until unearthed by researching this present project.) A few years later, I returned - a little more experienced - to the Seleucid right flank at Raphia with a three-battle article published in the January/February 2017 issue of Slingshot, The Journal of the Society of Ancients. As far as I am aware, there was no review or other response to this elephant-heavy submission. Three additional visits were made to Raphia. These solo projects were posted to this blog in early May of 2021, late December of the same year, and late February of 2023, respectively. Fortunately as well as satisfyingly, these three posts provided sufficient cause for several individuals to leave positive comments, so it appears that I am making progress, however slowly. One could even remark that my Raphia “score” is now 4-1. I offer another nod of thanks to those several gentlemen and fellow historical wargamers. 

It would also be fair as well as probably more interesting to say that there is a long and rather varied history of refighting Raphia in miniature or as a boardgame. In the sentences following, it is not my intention to provide a complete chronological and cross-category history of Raphia wargames. I think it is sufficient, for the purposes of this post, to simply offer a kind of outline. That qualification aside, I have not been able to verify this, but perhaps the earliest submitted Raphia wargame report was written by one G. M. Cavanagh III. His “Convention Report” was published in the January 1977 issue of Slingshot. The short but engaging piece included a black and white photo of the large and bare tabletop populated by quite a few 25mm figures. (The hairstyles of the assembled player-generals certainly gave a 70s “vibe” to the proceedings. Noting that a Colleen Wheaton took on the role of Queen Arsinoe hints at an almost revolutionary development or is just an outlier, but it is more likely that this fact strongly suggests type casting. Again, it was the 1970s.) The provided deployment diagram and orders of battle were also very interesting to study and compare with other treatments of this large and well known Hellenistic battle. Just four years after this San Diego gathering, in the May 1981 issue of Slingshot, John Boehm provided interested readers with his interpretation of Raphia. Instead of WRG 5th Edition rules, John and 10 player-generals employed slightly modified 6th Edition rules. There was no photo with this brief report, but there were detailed orders of battle and a deployment diagram included. The presumption is that 25mm figures were used for this friendly contest which lasted for about two hours and required six turns. (Sidebar: It is somewhat curious, at least to me, to note that Raphia has received so little coverage in Slingshot.)  

Moving forward a few decades, it appears that there was a period when WAB (Warhammer Ancient Battles) was used with some frequency to refight Raphia. Here is a link to a post made in the first half of 2007: https://ancientbattles.com/WAB_Successors/battle_reports/Raphia_battle_01.htm. A couple of YouTube videos (combined running time of around 24 minutes) were also discovered. These spectacular miniature demonstrations (Battle 89 and 96, respectively) appear to be very colorful endorsements or commercials for the Wargamer Aide de Camp play aids. (Sidebar: I wonder, what is the current status of Wargamer Aide de Camp?) In contrast to this kind of scenario, I would offer the excellent work of the well known and well regarded in the wargaming community Aaron Bell. Please see https://prufrockian-gleanings.blogspot.com/2014/07/game-day-raphia.html. I would be remiss if I did not include the words-almost-fail-me spectacles presented by Simon Miller. Please see https://bigredbat.blogspot.com/2016/04/raphia-and-other-battles.html. Another interpretation, one might call it a 6mm cousin of Simon’s, was found here: https://irregularwars.blogspot.com/2015/02/hail-caesar-battle-of-raphia-217bc-in.html. In contrast to these impressively large refights, it seems that Raphia can also be managed with a smaller number of figures and on a much smaller table. Please see https://shaun-wargaming-minis.blogspot.com/2016/12/battle-of-raphia-217bc-using-ancients.html. This kind of interpretation showcases, I think and would argue, the intelligence and resourcefulness of historical wargamers. To be certain, traditional figures are not a requirement for a good and fun refight of Raphia. Boardgames, such as C&CA (Commands and Colors ANCIENTS) provide a viable option. Please see https://boardgamegeek.com/thread/2784805/epic-raphia-oh-the-pachydermity. Searching for a suitable end point for this nearly a half century timeline, I hesitated to use my late February 2023 post “Raphia Revisited.” I was both pleased and relieved to find this event listed in the program of the second annual Advance! Miniature Wargaming Convention which took place in San Diego (how’s that for full circle?) about a month ago. [Note: This line was typed on the morning of 19 May.] Evidently, Jeff Jonas (the aforementioned colleague of Simon Miller) was umpiring “Elephant Archos,” a wargame “loosely based on Raphia.” Please see https://www.sdhistmingamers.org/advance-2023-1. 

There can be no question, refighting the historical battle of Raphia would be very difficult if not essentially impossible if ancient wargamers did not have the necessary source material. The following list is by no means complete, nor is it organized in any certain way. The following amendable list is a combination of those sources that I listened to, read, referenced, annotated, or considered securing as I “worked” my way through this project/post. There may be a comment or two offering a brief description or just my opinions and thoughts about each item.

—https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Raphia

Not a bad starting point at all, especially for those with very little or no 

knowledge of the engagement. 

—https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/5*.html

This ancient narrative was referenced in the second full paragraph of 

this post. Perhaps it is redundant to list it again here, but the value of 

this account cannot be overestimated. (Notice I did not type ‘historical 

accuracy.’) Anyway, I found this translation after reading Professor 

Philip Sabin’s analysis of the battle. (See below.) I copied V.63 through 

V.88, but the wargamer-friendly sections are 63-65 and 79-85.

—The Hellenistic Age Podcast - Episode 72: The Fourth Syrian War - The Battle of Raphia

This is a really good listen. It provides a lot background as well as an 

excellent description of the battle. The mention of current books on 

the subject is worth investigating if not adding to one’s library. The 

length of the episode is approximately 50 minutes, so it is ideal for an 

early morning walk or a session at your painting station/table. 

—The chapter or section on Raphia, found on pages 157-160 of Professor Philip Sabin’s well reviewed 2007 text, LOST BATTLES - Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World.

This book was also referenced in the second paragraph of this post. 

Although geared toward modeling the contest with his set of rules, this 

analysis and summary of Raphia by the academic is very, very good. 

For those who do not have the time to listen to the podcast episode, 

these few pages are an excellent alternative. 

—Warfare in the Ancient World

My falling apart copy provided two maps, orders of battle, and a brief 

summary of the contest on the bottom half of page 93. According to 

this interpretation, Ptolemy’s army has a Macedonian and Egyptian 

phalanx. In terms of numbers or strength, these two units account for 

45,000 men. On the other side of the ancient battlefield, the 

deployment diagram shows the Hypaspists and Silver Shields 

(combined strength of 10,000) positioned on the left of the Seleucid 

phalanx. The 10,000 Arab and tribal infantry are on the left of the 

Silver Shields. 

—BATTLE: A Visual Journey through 5,000 Years of Combat, foreword penned by R.G. Grant. 

There is a color diagram of Raphia along with some explanatory text 

and a small excerpt from the narrative of Polybius provided on the 

bottom half of a page without a number titled ‘After Alexander.’ There 

is a reference in the text to “training 20,000 Egyptian hoplites” and 

their role in winning the battle of the phalanxes.

—“Stelae, Elephants, and Irony,” by Patrick J. O’Kernick / Please see https://www.jstor.org/stable/26551238

—“Climax of the Syrian Wars: The battle of Raphia 217 BCE,” by Michael Park (Please see Ancient Warfare IV.6 (2010) Here is the link https://www.academia.edu/2397710/Climax_of_the_Syrain_Wars_The_battle_of_Raphia_217_BCE?email_work_card=title.

This PDF was an interesting read. As a wargamer, I appreciated the 

detailed map that was included in the article. It was interesting to see 

the “at an angle” cavlary on the Seleucid right wing. It was more 

interesting to see the Ptolemaic phalanx divided into two largish units. 

Those with painting skills might appreciate the two full-color pages 

depicting the clash of elephants.

—“Elephants at Raphia: Reinterpreting Polybius 5.84-5,” by Michael Charles / Please see The Classical Quarterly (May 2007)

I would strongly encourage interested readers to conduct their own “information excavation” on this particular topic. Typing “battle of Raphia,” “Raphia wargame,” or “wargaming Raphia” into your preferred search engine will, obviously, return thousands of results in the blink of an eye. How much time spent sifting and sorting through these results and which ones you select and save is up to you.    

I grant that it might be viewed as redundant if I suggested that the history of refighting Raphia, in one form or another, over the past 50 years has been colorful, educational, inspiring, interesting, as well as quite entertaining. As I draw this latest project to a close, I cannot help but wonder if some ancient wargamer from the future, say in the mid or late 2070s, might take it upon themselves to look back to the year 2024 and research what has happened with regard to the history of wargaming Raphia.  

_________________________________________

Appendix A

THE SELEUCID RIGHT

COMMAND 1

03 units of Knights; Antiochus III (the Great) attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Antiochus (the Great) will confer a +2 melee modifier to the unit of Knights he is riding with.
2. [Optional] The units of Knights in this command have a +1 melee modifier due to their veteran status, due to their being the bodyguard for the king. 
3. This command is demoralized when it has lost 08 points. 
4. Antiochus (the Great) may assume command and control over any other “division” in his army if he is within 8 MUs and declares this to be the case.
5. If Antiochus is killed, the point value of his destroyed unit/stand is 08 points.

COMMAND 2

03 units of Elite Cavalry; Antipater is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Antipater has a +1 melee modifier.
2. This command is demoralized when it has lost 08 points.
3. Elite Cavalry is not a troop type offered on the Seleucid army list. I borrowed this type from an appendix in my PDF copy of the rules, figuring that Antipater would not lead more Knights. This substitution was done a few times when putting together both orders of battle. 

COMMAND 3

04 units of Elephants; Philip is riding one of these pachyderms

04 units of Skirmishers; Eurylochus is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Philip is in charge and provides a +1 melee modifier.
2. To reflect the reported superiority of the Seleucid war elephants, these animals have a +1 melee modifier when facing off against Ptolemaic elephants.
3. The skirmishers were placed in front of (and touching) the elephants, so as to form a physical screen.
4. This command is demoralized when it has lost 10 points.

COMMAND 4

05 units of Raiders; Hippolochus is embedded with one of these units

02 units of Light Foot, 02 stands of Bow Levy, and 01 stand of Light Spear; Byttacus is attached to a unit of Light Foot

Notes:

1. The units under Byttacus form a single line next to the Silver Shields (i.e., Command 5). The units under Hippolochus are deployed to the right of Byttacus. 
2. As explained in the notes for Command 2, the referenced army list did not allow for certain troop types to be used. For this interpretation of Raphia, I gave myself license to employ other troop types. 
3. Hippolochus is in overall command and provides a +1 melee modifier.
4. This command is demoralized when it has lost 14 points.

Remarks regarding The Seleucid Right Wing:

1. This formation has a strength of 24 stands.
2. This formation has a combined point value of 82.

THE SELEUCID CENTER

COMMAND 5

10 units of Pike; Theodotus the Aetolian is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. To reflect their veteran status, these Silver Shields have a +1 melee modifier. 
2. These units are arranged in a double-line with a frontage of 5 units.
3. The demoralization level of this phalanx is 12 points. 

COMMAND 6

21 units of Pike; Nicarchus is attached to one unit and Theodotus, surnamed Hemiolius, is attached to another unit

Notes:

1. This phalanx is deployed 7 units across and 3 units deep.
2. Nicarchus is in overall command. Theodotus will only roll a command die if his superior officer is killed.
3. Both named leaders will contribute a +1 melee modifier, however.
4. The demoralization level of this formation is 21 points.

COMMAND 7

10 units of Horde; Zabdibelus is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. This formation is arranged in a double-line.
2. Zabdibelus confers a +1 melee modifier.
3. This contingent of “Arabs and neighboring tribes” is demoralized when it has lost 06 points.
4. [Optional] The ‘supporting bowmen’ Battle Card may be used for this formation. These integrated archers may fight (provide a +1 modifier) against any enemy troops in contact. 
5. This is yet another example of troop type substitution for scenario play.  

Remarks regarding The Seleucid Center:

1. The Seleucid phalanx has three sections and a combined strength of 41 stands.
2. This formation has a combined point value of 113.

THE SELEUCID LEFT

COMMAND 8

05 units of Bow Levy; Aspasianus the Mede is embedded in one of these units

Notes:

1. These men are drawn up on the left of the Arabs.
2. This contingent was deployed with three units in the first line and supporting units positioned on behind the right and left. 
3. Aspasianus, like other commanders, will provide a +1 melee modifier.
4. This formation is demoralized when it has lost 04 points. 

COMMAND 9

03 units of Skirmishers, and O3 units of Light Foot; Menedemus is attached to a unit of Light Foot

Notes:

1. This formation is deployed with the Skirmishers in the first line and the Light Foot in the second.
2. Menedemus provides a +1 melee modifier.
3. This group is demoralized when it has lost 06 points. 

COMMAND 10

03 units of Elephants; Myicus rides on the back of one of these pachyderms

02 units of Skirmishers; Lysimachus the Gaul is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Lysimachus is in overall command of this contingent. As leader, he will confer the usual +1 melee modifier.
2. Myicus will also have a +1 melee modifier.
3. As with their counterparts on the other wing, these larger and scarier elephants will get a +1 melee modifier when facing the nellies opposing them.
4. The command was deployed with the elephants in a line and the skirmishers screening the animals on the right and left. 
5. This command is demoralized when it has lost 06 points.

COMMAND 11

03 units of Javelin Cavalry; Themison is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. As with all other named personalities, Themison confers a +1 melee modifier.
2. This “division” is demoralized when it has lost 04 points. 

Remarks regarding The Seleucid Left Wing:

1. This formation has a strength of 19 stands.
2. This formation has a combined point value of 58.

_________________________________________

THE PTOLEMAIC RIGHT

COMMAND A

03 units of Javelin Cavlary; Echecrates rides with one of these stands

Notes:

1. Echecrates confers a +1 melee modifier. 
2. This command is demoralized when it has lost 08 points.

COMMAND B

04 units of Light Foot, 02 units of Warband, and 02 units of African war elephants;Dionysius the Thracian is attached to a unit of Light Foot

Notes:

1. This “division” is deployed with the Gauls (i.e., Warbands) to the left of the Light Foot (i.e., Thracians). The Elephants are placed as a “screen” in front of the Light Foot. 
2. Dionysius provides a +1 melee modifier.
3. This command is demoralized when it has lost 09 points.

Remarks regarding The Ptolemaic Right Wing:

1. This formation has a strength of just 11 stands.
2. This formation has a combined point value of 38.

THE PTOLEMAIC CENTER

COMMAND C

08 units of Spear; Phoxidas is attached to one of these units of Greek mercenaries

Notes:

1. As per usual, Phoxidas adds a +1 melee modifier.
2. This contingent is deployed in a 4 stand by 2 stand rectangular phalanx. 
3. This command is demoralized when it has lost 12 points. 

COMMAND D

20 units of Pike; Sosibius is married to one of these units

Notes:

1. This formation is deployed in a 4-deep phalanx, so it measures 5 stands across.
2. Due to the relative inexperience of these troops, they will melee with a MINUS 1 modifier. 
3. [Optional] In the Ptolemaic turn, on a d6 roll of 6 (rolled prior to any command pip determination), Queen Arsinoe has motivated these troops to fight better and harder. The MINUS 1 modifier is waived for the present turn. 
4. Sosibius provides a +1 melee modifier.
5. This command is demoralized when it has lost 18 points. 

COMMAND E

24 units of Pike; Andromachus and the other Ptolemy are attached to separate units in this formation

Notes:

1. This Macedonian phalanx is arranged with a frontage of 8 stands and a depth of 3 ranks.
2. Andromachus is in overall command and confers a +1 melee modifier.
3. Ptolemy (son of Thraseas) is a subordinate commander. He does not provide a +1 melee modifier.
4. This command is demoralized when it has lost 21 points. 

Remarks regarding The Ptolemaic Center:

1. This sector has a strength of 52 stands.
2. This formation has a combined point value of 164.

THE PTOLEMAIC LEFT

COMMAND F

04 units of Pike; Ammonius of Barce is attached to one of these units

03 units of Light Foot; Socrates the Boeotian is embedded with one of these units

Notes:

1. The contingent of Libyans (i.e., Pike) is deployed in a 2-by-2 formation.
2. The Light Foot are placed on their immediate left, in a single line.
3. Ammonius, like most of the identified commanders, provides a +1 melee modifier when his unit is engaged in close combat.
4. Socrates confers a +1 melee modifier when his peltasts are in combat.
5. This contingent is demoralized when it has lost 07 points.  

COMMAND G

04 units of Elite Foot; Eurylochus of Magnesia is attached to one of these units

01 unit of Knights; Ptolemy IV is riding with these troopers

Notes:

1. This body of “Royal Guard” is deployed in a 2-by-2 formation, just like the Libyans.
2. Eurylochus confers a +1 melee modifier.
3. The Guard infantry are demoralized when they have lost 08 points.
4. King Ptolemy IV provides a +1 melee modifier when engaged in combat.
5. King Ptolemy IV may assume command over any formation in his army.
6. If Ptolemy is killed, the point value of his destroyed unit/stand is 08 points.

COMMAND H

03 units of Elephants. 04 units of Skirmishers; Cnopias of Allaria is attached to a unit of Skirmishers

Notes:

1. There is no melee modifier for Cnopias.
2. This command is demoralized when it has lost 08 points. 

COMMAND I

03 units of Javelin Cavalry; Polycrates is attached to one of these units

Notes:

1. Polycrates gives his unit a +1 melee modifier.
2. This command is demoralized when it has lost 04 points. 

Remarks regarding The Ptolemaic Left Wing:

1. This formation has a strength of 22 stands.
2. This formation has a combined point value of 77.