Monday, February 5, 2024

CONSUL vs KING: 

Another Interpretation of Magnesia





In the July 2009 issue of Slingshot (Number 265), in an article appropriately titled “Magnesia,” Mark Grindlay provided a six-point summation or “refresher” on the history of the  190 BC engagement between a large and eclectic army led by Antiochus III and the smaller as well as less varied force commanded by Lucius Cornelius Scipio and his colleagues. The veteran member of The Society of Ancients reminded readers of the following pertinent as well as accepted facts: 


> The Seleucids had a huge phalanx in the middle of their line with double the usual 

depth of 32 men.

> Two paired Roman Consular legions (i.e., 2 Roman and 2 socii legions).

> Seleucid Cataphracts crushing one socii legion.

> Scythe chariots routing back through their own troops.

> Lots of missile fire against the Elephants who run berserk destroying the phalanx from 

the inside out.

> A Roman victory marking the end of another Hellenistic power. 


Later, in the section titled ‘Deployment and Armies,’ Mark provided this introduction to the composition of the Seleucid host: “We know the first socii was matched directly to the mounted wing, that the three remaining legions were matched by the Seleucid infantry, and finally, that the Roman cavalry was matched and outflanked slightly by the Seleucid left wing.” The question of the actual placement of the Argyraspides was also mentioned in this section. The topic was further discussed in the ‘Historical Debate’ paragraphs which conclude an engaging and all together excellent piece, in my opinion. It seems unnecessary to remark that armed with this material, it would be a comparatively simple matter to stage a refight of the historical contest using the ARMATI rules. Mark, and one presumes his like-minded associates, provided a sufficient diagram of the tabletop, notes on the opposing orders of battle, and the house or scenario rules that were drafted in order to ensure an enjoyable wargame. To be certain, there was a certain level of attraction to imitating this work. However, instead of “copying that wheel” (if I may revise a familiar saying), I thought it might prove interesting and I hoped entertaining to try and fashion another, albeit fairly similar wheel. I would attempt to refight Magnesia solo while using the TRIUMPH! and or GRAND TRIUMPH! rules and associated army lists. For my starting point, I chose the Seleucid order of battle. 


The Host of Antiochus III  

After reviewing a number of interpretations as well as the original source material, I decided to translate the work done by S. J. Randles into the language and troop types of the TRIUMPH! system. [1] In order to conserve some space on my tabletop, I opted for the 40mm base width dimension for all units. In order to have some point of reference, I established an approximate and working unit scale of 1 base or stand would be the equivalent of 500 infantry or cavalry, and roughly 16-18 elephants as well as around 20 chariots. [2] Working with the simple diagram and order of battle provided by S. J. in “Magnesia Refought - Part 1,” I began my “work” on the left wing of the Seleucid deployment.


For the estimated 1,600 Arabs on camels, I would create 3 stands of Bad Horse.

For the reported 4,000 Cyrtian slingers and Elymaean archers, I would prepare 8 stands of Skirmishers.

For the approximately 4,000 Pisidian, Pamphylian and Lycian peltasts, I would build 8 stands of Light Foot.


These 19 stands or units would comprise the first line on the Seleucid left wing. The representation of the reported 140 scythed chariots presented something of a challenge and so, merited its own paragraph(s) if not section. 


For the listed 2,500 Galatian horse, I would fabricate 5 stands of Javelin Cavalry.

For the suggested 500 Tarentinii light horse, I would make another stand of Javelin Cavalry.

For the reported 1,000 Companions, I would assemble 2 stands of Knights. 

For the large group of 3,000 Cataphracti, I would prepare 6 stands of Cataphracts. 

For the squadron or troop of Indian elephants assigned to this wing, I would develop a stand of Elephants. 


With regard to command and control, I would embed Seleucus with one of the stands of Knights. 


Moving over to the center of this long line, I would construct a vey rough model of the skirmisher screen first. 


For the reported 1,500 Trallian slingers, I would prepare 3 stands of Skirmishers. 

For the indicated 1,500 Carian and Cilician archers, I would make another 3 stands of Skirmishers. 

For the reported 1,000 Neocretans, I would set up 2 stands of Skirmishers. 

Dividing the listed Cretans and Trallians in half, I would fabricate another 3 stands of Skirmishers. 


For the identified 2,700 auxiliaries, I would assemble 5 stands of Light Foot.

For the reported 2,000 Cappadocians, I would prepare 4 stands of Light Spear. 

For the Galatian infantry who “bookended” the main phalanx, I would make 6 stands of Warriors. [3] 

For the large and unusually deep phalanx, I would prepare 32 stands of Pikes as well as 1 stand of Elephants. 


With regard to command and control, I would position Philippus within a unit of Pikes. 


Turning my attention to the right wing of the Seleucid army, I started, as usual, with the skirmisher screen.


For the other half of the Cretans and Trallians, I would build 3 stands of Skirmishers.

For the reported 2,500 Mysian archers, I would prepare 5 stands of Skirmishers.

For another batch of Cyrtian slingers and Elymaean archers, I would make 8 more stands of Skirmishers. 


Switching the places of the Silver Shields and the Cataphracts, I would prepare 20 stands of Pikes to represent the presumed 10,000 Argyraspides.

For the second large group of 3,000 Cataphracti, I would prepare another 6 stands of Cataphracts.

For the listed 1,000 Agema, I would build 2 stands of Knights. 

For the reported 1,200 Dahae light cavalry, I would make 2 stands of Horse Bow. 

There was a third stand of Elephants that would be attached to or included with this wing. 


King Antiochus III (“the Great”) would ride - in presumed safety - with a stand of Knights. 


Crunching Some Numbers . . . 

In accepting and employing the interpretation made by S. J. Randles, my tabletop will eventually hold the following “models” and representational numbers: 


17,500 skirmishers - 35 bases or stands

16,000 phalangites - 32 bases or stands

10,000 Silver Shields - 20 bases or stands

6,000 Cataphracts - 12 bases or stands

4,000 peltasts - 8 bases or stands

2,500 auxiliaries - 5 bases or stands

2,500 Galatian cavalry - 5 bases or stands

2,000 Cappadocians - 4 bases or stands

2,000 Agema/Companions - 4 bases or stands

1,500 Camel troops - 3 bases or stands

500 Tarentinii - 1 base or stand

54 war elephants - 3 bases or stands (at an approximate scale of 1:18)

140 scythed chariots - represented by 7 counters or markers


This adapted representation gives me: 17,500 skirmishers; 34,500 infantry, and 12,500 cavalry, in addition to the elephants and chariots. This plan provides me with “miniature” numbers broadly comparable to those reported in the ancient sources as well as modern analyses and interpretations.


In its current iteration, the first line of troops, that is the bases or stands comprising the Seleucid left wing would have a footprint of around 76 centimeters or nearly 30 inches. The second line of cavalry and elephants would have an estimated frontage of 64-70 centimeters, so almost 28 inches if the longer measurement is taken. Looking at the center, it was found that, without including the pike phalanx, the other foot units would have a larger footprint than the skirmisher screen. In its current configuration, the skirmisher screen for the center would stretch for 44 centimeters or around 17 inches. Not including the numerous stands of Pikes, the main body of the center would be comparable to the cavalry line of the left wing, so approaching 25 inches. If the phalanx was modeled as a block 4 units across by 8 units deep, then, even without any gaps between the other types making up the Seleucid center, this combined formation would have a footprint of almost 32 inches. Moving to the right wing, it was found that the skirmisher screen basically mirrored that of the left, so 25 inches of tabletop would be needed to hold these light missile troops. If the Silver Shields were arranged in smaller block of 3 units across by 6 units deep, then all of the second line troops in this sector would be covered by friendly skirmishers. 


Adding up the three skirmisher screens, a total footprint of 72 inches was determined. Based on these simple calculations, subject to revision of course, then a minimum of 6 feet of table space would be needed. If I wanted to allow some room for error, then a frontage of 7 feet would allow a little flexibility. The problem or challenge, obviously, is getting the three main bodies to fit within this calculated frontage. Another problem is making sure that the Seleucid frontage does not completely overwhelm the Roman line of battle.


With regard to the point totals of these three sectors or understandably large commands, it was determined that the Seleucid left wing was worth 117 points (57 of these being provided by the first line of camel troops and skirmishers.) This sum would likely increase once the scythed chariots question was answered. In their current configurations, the point value of the Seleucid center was 178, and the point value of the Seleucid right was 152. Both of these point totals were higher than the point total provided for in a standard game of GRAND TRIUMPH!


In conjunction with concerns and considerations about this initial order of battle for the Seleucids, it was noted that Seleucus would be in charge of 32 units, Philippus would have to lead 59 units, and Antiochus III would be responsible for 47 units. Setting aside these impressive as well as problematic numbers for a few minutes, I shifted my mental abilities (insert your own joke here) to the scythed chariot question and concerns.   


Its Cuts Both Ways 

To be certain, I am very grateful to have the narrative accounts of Livy and Appian, but these historians left more questions than answers with regard to the placement and action of the numerous scythed chariots in the employ of Antiochus III. One ancient writer has these vehicles on the Seleucid left in front of a body or bodies of cavalry, while the other simply informs that “they were in the space between the armies to begin the battle.” The modern interpretations of this battle and its wargame reconstruction leave me with the impression that these deadly-looking but often not so deadly in application horse-drawn weapons were arranged on or in advance of the Seleucid left wing. [4] Even though I have not yet drafted the Roman order of battle, it seemed quite apparent that these scythed chariots, however they are ultimately depicted, would be facing more mounted formations and loose or open order infantry units than close order foot. This apparent historical context ran counter to the Battle Card specifically designed for modeling scythed chariots with the TRIUMPH! rules. 


Looking over the Battle Card information for scythed chariots, I noted the cost, the “targeting” procedure, and the limited melee advantage gained by the active player. According to this Battle Card, a scythed chariot marker can only be used against enemy close order foot. Further, the “combined melee” can only be initiated by mounted units against the selected target formation or formations. Reading further, I noted the following under the ‘Historical Background’ section: “Scythed chariots were used as one-shot sacrificial weapons designed to disorder enemy close order foot formations to make them vulnerable to an immediate cavalry attack.” This argument is supported by a narrow selection of evidence discovered in an informal as well as not too lengthy search. [5] The last sentence argues, it seems to me, two points. First, that there should be no physical model of a scythed chariot. A counter, marker or some similar device will suffice to indicate the intended target. The second concerns the impossibility of exercising any control over a stampede, which may or may not be a separate topic with respect to scythed chariots. 


Returning to the Grindlay article or evidence, it appears accepted historical fact that the Seleucid scythed chariots wrought more destruction if not disorder on their own formations than they did against the enemy. A review of the ancient narratives confirmed this position. So, the obvious question is, how does one write a house/scenario rule to allow for the possibility if not high probability of a “one-shot weapon” that backfires more often than not? My extended “answer” (quote marks intentional as this is vey much a work in progress, an idea subject to revisiting and revision) is as follows:


> keep the cost at 2 points per “stand” or marker, counter, etc. 

> keep the 2 MU by 2 MU size.

> expand the -1 melee penalty to all enemy units except Skirmishers and Horse Bow.

> if directed against supported pike formations, the melee penalty increases to -2.

> if directed against enemy Skirmishers (or Archers), there is no melee penalty applied.

> after “targeting” is completed but before melee rolls are made, the active or phasing player will roll a d6. 

> a result of 1-3 indicates that the horse teams have been frightened or wounded and have panicked. The melee penalty is applied against the friendly unit behind and within 8 MUs of the scythed chariot counter/marker. 

> a result of 4-6 indicates that the horse teams have galloped straight and true, so the melee penalty is applied against the enemy unit. 

> regardless of melee outcome, the 2 MU by 2 MU stand, sabot or counter is removed from the tabletop.


As the approximate or working scale for scythed chariots in this interpretation is 20 vehicles to a stand or marker, etc., it seems reasonable to permit the Seleucids to have 7 of these counters or markers to use during the planned refight. 


And Now for Something Completely Roman

In the second part of his engaging series on refighting Magnesia with the WRG 6th Edition rules, S. J. Randles notes that the standard or typical three-line (four, if one includes the Velites) formation of a Polybian Roman legion is rather difficult to model on a wargaming table. However, he was able to engineer a solution which appears to have worked well enough, as he was able to stage three satisfactory refights of the historical battle. Understandably and not surprisingly, representing in miniature the accepted formation of a Polybian Roman legion presents a fairly sizable challenge when the TRIUMPH! rules and army lists are utilized. In fact, in the Polybian Roman army list, the three types of legionaries are not even recognized. Hastati, Principes, and Triarii are all lumped together as either Elite Foot or Heavy Foot. There are no notes provided for depicting a Roman legion, and there are no notes regarding the pila volley or line relief. Evidently, these tactics, these potential rule complications are abstracted into the melee factors the Roman Elite Foot or Heavy Foot have against enemy cavalry and infantry. [6] For better or worse, and at the acknowledged risk of being figuratively tarred and feathered by a more vocal group of the TRIUMPH! community, I am going to try and follow in the footsteps of S. J. Randles and model the two Roman legions and two Allied or socii legions that were present on that foggy day in 190 BC (BCE). 


Starting on the left of the Roman line of battle, right next to the River Phrygius, the Allied legion here would consist of 3 stands of Light Foot to represent the Velites, 3 stands of Heavy Foot to represent the Hastati, and then 4 stands of Elite Foot to depict the Principes and Triarii. The Velites and Hastati would be deployed as a block of 6 stands or units, 3 bases wide and 2 bases deep. The remaining legionaries would be arranged in a group of 4 stands: the Principes arranged in a line of 3 stands, and the Triarii acting as a central reserve behind the middle unit. Diagram A should provide some clarity to this attempted explanation. 



Studying the drawing provided by S. J., it was noted that Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus was behind this legion or in this sector. This leader assignment conflicted with the wealth of detailed information and interpretation provided by Luke Ueda-Sarson. [7] It was also noted, and supported by the ancient authors, that a very small group of Roman cavalry was stationed on this flank. Even though depicting this formation goes against the approximate unit scale established for this project, I think it is not completely unreasonable to prepare a single stand of Bad Horse (with reduced factors or a negative melee modifier), and place it behind the Allied legion on the left. The proposed Roman order of battle is as follows: 


For the Allied legion on the left—

03 bases or stands of Light Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Velites

03 bases or stands of Heavy Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Hastati

03 bases or stands of Elite Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Principes

01 base or stand of Elite Foot to represent approximately 500 Triarii


01 base or stands of Bad Horse to model the small number of Roman horse guarding this flank


As of this typing, I have not decided who to place in charge of this formation or exactly how to represent the Roman leadership. I am thinking that the individual should be embedded with the Triarii unit and not given his own stand of Javelin Cavalry (except for the overall commander, perhaps), as detailed on the Polybian Roman army list.


For the Roman legion on the left—

03 bases or stands of Light Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Velites

03 bases or stands of Elite Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Hastati

03 bases or stands of Elite Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Principes

01 base or stand of Elite Foot to represent approximately 500 Triarii


For the Roman legion on the right—

03 bases or stands of Light Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Velites

03 bases or stands of Elite Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Hastati

03 bases or stands of Elite Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Principes

01 base or stand of Elite Foot to represent approximately 500 Triarii


For the Allied legion on the right—

03 bases or stands of Light Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Velites

03 bases or stands of Heavy Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Hastati

03 bases or stands of Elite Foot to represent approximately 1,500 Principes

01 base or stand of Elite Foot to represent approximately 500 Triarii


For the Macedonians and Thracians in the camp—

01 stand of Skirmishers

01 stand of Light Foot

02 stands of Rabble [8]

01 stand of Elephants [9]


For the Pergamene and Achaean peltasts on the right—

06 bases or units of Light Foot


For the Italian and Pergamene cavalry and skirmishers on the far right—

06 stands or units of Javelin Cavalry

02 stands of Skirmishers


For command and control of this division or corps of 8 or perhaps 14 units, Eumenes of Pergamon will be placed with one of the stands of Javelin Cavalry. 


Crunching Some More Numbers . . . 

Reviewing the ancient sources as well as the modern authors, it appears that my intended model Roman army is a more accurate or historical representation than my proposed Seleucid host. As detailed in the above order of battle, there would be: 20,000 legionaries; 3,000 cavalry; 3,000 peltasts; 1,000 skirmishers, and 2,000 camp guards. 


Double checking my math and measurements, when set up without any gaps in their line of battle, the Romans will have a tabletop footprint of 104 centimeters or approximately 41 inches. If I allow for small gaps between each legion and the other contingents, then this frontage could be extended to around 46 inches. If I also factor in a portion of the River Phrygius, then perhaps the Roman line could stretch for something like 52 or 54 inches. This estimated total is quite a bit shorter than the estimated length of the Seleucid line of battle, even if a little overlap on the Roman right is accepted. 


Turning to a very brief consideration of unit numbers and total point values for the proposed orders of battle, the math informs that the Romans would field 60 units worth 244 points. These numbers significantly pale in comparison to the 138 units(!) and 447 points(!) under the overall direction of Antiochus the Great. [10]


As I contemplated ways in which I could make this TRIUMPH! refight of Magnesia work with the numbers I had produced, I also wondered, again, what to do about Roman command and control, if I should develop house rules for line relief as well as pila volleys, and if I should draft something to provide of the possibility of a morale collapse on the Seleucid left. As if these were not enough, I wondered about drafting something that would allow for the possibility of annoyed/frightened elephants trampling disordered pikemen. 


Rethinking, Revising, and Additional Scenario Rules

Several attempts at testing the “Grindlay parameters” informed that my approximate unit scale simply would not work. Even if I stacked the Seleucid formations so that the Skirmishers on the right were in a double-line and the Cataphracts were arranged in a similar fashion - along with the Agema (or Knights), the Seleucid wing would surpass the model frontage of the Allied legion stationed on the Roman left. Adjusting the course of the River Phrygius did not help either. So, it was back to the drawing board. [11] (A place that is, apparently, becoming more and more familiar if not all that comfortable as I advance in years.) 


Rereading the analysis and remarks of Professor Sabin, especially the assessment of the character and quality of the Seleucid forces provided on page 198, I decided to try using what I will call a “flexible unit scale.” For the Romans and their allies, I would employ a 1 stand or unit represented 400 cavalry, infantry, or 16 elephants. For the Seleucids and their diverse contingents, 1 base or stand would be the equivalent of 800 cavalry or infantry, and either 18 elephants or 20 chariots.


I will not subject the reader to a complete revision of the original drafted and adapted orders of battle. However, I think it prudent to show what a legion would look like under this new plan, as well as indicate how some of the Seleucid formations would be changed. 


Revisiting the Allied legion on the right—

04 bases or stands of Light Foot to represent approximately 1,600 Velites

04 bases or stands of Heavy Foot to represent approximately 1,600 Hastati

04 bases or stands of Elite Foot to represent approximately 1,600 Principes

01 base or stand of Elite Foot to represent approximately 600 Triarii



Returning to the center formations of the Seleucid OB,  

- for the identified 2,700 auxiliaries, 3 stands of Light Foot would be fashioned.

- for the reported 2,000 Cappadocians, 2 stands of Light Spear would be made. 

- for the Galatian infantry, I would build 4 stands of Warriors. 

- for the main phalanx, I would prepare 20 stands of Pikes in addition to 1 stand of Elephants.


Shifting, admittedly somewhat abruptly, to a consideration of house or special scenario rules, 

I should like to build upon the foundation provided by fellow TRIUMPH! enthusiast Roger Cooper. At the end of his proposed OOB for Magnesia with GRAND TRIUMPH!, the gentleman offered half a dozen additional points. I have transcribed them here, including my comments and thinking. 


> The battlefield was fairly open.

Agreed. The ancient source material describes the possibly difficult terrain in the 

immediate vicinity of the River Phrygius, so this needs to be addressed or modeled in an 

aesthetically pleasing way on the tables of those with the resources, skill, and talent. 

Otherwise, it appears that the plain at Magnesia was pretty flat and featureless. A good 

portion of it must have been free of natural obstacles for the scythed chariots to have 

been deployed. 


> Both sides fought hard in this battle and an organized retreat occurred. 24 points of losses are required for a defeat.

This statement reminded me of the sixth bullet point under the ‘Scenario Rules We 

Added’ section of Mark Grindlay’s thought-provoking piece on the battle. He and his 

friends decided: “No army break points were established, as it was a long and bloody 

battle.” As for the organized retreat, well, perhaps this can be applied to the withdrawal 

of the main Seleucid phalanx (which formed a square), but the left wing was quickly 

routed and the right was evidently busy, and so distracted, around the Roman camp. 

Anyway, I am not sure at this point of the process/project what the demoralization levels 

will be for commands on either side of my tabletop.


> The Romans were well-coordinated. +1 to command die rolls. 

Accepted. In fact, having the command and control information courtesy of Luke Ueda-

Sarson, I am thinking that the Romans will have 6 separate commands/commanders and 

so, will roll 6 dice for command pips when it is their turn. 


> Both sides had fortified camps.

Agreed and supported by the ancient narratives. However, for my purposes, I 

am only going to represent the garrison of Macedonians and Thracians behind the  

Roman lines. It seems to me that if or when the Seleucid field army is defeated, that this 

will be the “eviction notice” for their encampment, fortified or not.


> Roman Elephants were inferior in numbers and quality. They are -1 in close combat and cost only 3.

This is fair and sensible. I wish I had thought of it. Indeed, one wonders if the Roman 

elephants need to be depicted at all. They were not included in the Grindlay scenarios 

and were essentially dismissed by Professor Sabin. On further reflection, it appears that 

the Seleucid nellies did not play a major role either, except for wrecking the retreating 

hollow square formed by the main phalanx.


> Seleucids were never able to deploy their Scythed Chariots for attack so they are considered Battle Taxis.

Afraid that I must respectfully disagree. Livy notes where these chariots were placed in 

the Seleucid line of battle. The ancient historian also describes how they were armed as 

well as remarks on the experience/knowledge of Eumenes with regard to dealing with 

these kinds of vehicles. Perhaps I am placing too much weight on the “evaded their 

encounter” language found in Chapter 41, but given the numbers involved and the 

positioning, I would think that the Seleucids started moving well before the Roman right 

did. Then again, it is interesting to think about Livy’s description of this whole local 

action being a “fruitless mimicry of war,” of it being a preface to “a regular engagement.” 


This seems as good a place as any to revisit and revise the previously drafted amendments to the Battle Card for Scythed Chariots and Stampedes. 


For this attempt at a solo refight: 


  • Seven scythed chariot counters/markers, measuring 2 MU by 2 MU will be placed in a line with their left touching the camels (i.e., Bad Horse) stands, and their right marking the division between the skirmishers and peltasts.
  • These counters/markers will advance (no command pip needed) in a straight line each turn at a rate of 6 MUs.
  • When contact is made against an enemy unit, the “targeted” stand will roll a d6. A result of 1-3 indicates that the horse teams have been frightened and or wounded, and have panicked. A result of 4-6 indicates that the horse teams have galloped straight and true, producing a DISORDER marker on the unfortunate target.
  • Scythed chariots that have panicked turn 180 degrees and run away 12 MUs (two normal moves).
  • Friendly units encountering this out-of-control scythed chariot roll a d6. On a result of 1-2, the unit is destroyed. On a result of 3-6, the contacted unit is marked DISORDERED. 
  • Stands or units marked DISORDERED will have a minus 2 melee modifier if engaged by an enemy formation. 
  • DISORDER lasts for a full turn. If a unit is run into by scythed chariots in Turn 3, and is DISORDERED by that collision, the marker is not removed until Turn 5. 
  • Scythed Chariots are removed after contacting a unit (enemy or friendly), or after making the 12 MU “run away” move without crashing into anything or anyone. 


Along these same lines, I have had some time to think about some ideas for the Roman and Allied legions. The following are some scenario rules that I want to test in this refight. 


  • Hastati and Principes units will get a +1 pila volley modifier in their first melee ONLY.
  • Hastati and Principes may receive rear support, similar to that available to Pikes. This support confers a +1 melee modifier.


Hopefully, these revisions and scenario rules will be sufficient for the planned refight. If anything comes up during the solo wargame, it will have to addressed at that time, noted for future consideration, or discussed in the conclusion of this post. 


Magnesia, January 2024 AD/CE

My guess is that I have tested the endurance of the majority of readers with the almost 5,000 words before this section. My worry is that I may have exhausted the patience of a large percentage of those who clicked on the provided link to this report. Anyway, the following description of the tabletop contest is communicated through a few maps instead of a second body of text containing several thousand words. 











After the tenth turn of play was completed, an informal as well as subjective survey of the tabletop was made. The Seleucid left and Roman right were both a shambles. Their ordered lines were no more, and their respective starting strengths were distant memories. In fact, in terms of leadership costs, the fighting on this side of the plain had been particularly deadly. Diophanes, commanding the Pergamene and other peltasts was the first to fall. He was followed, in alarmingly quick succession, by Seleucus, Eumenes, and then Zeuxis. Looking over the infantry-heavy sectors, it was noted that the Seleucid phalanxes - both the Silver Shields and the very deep formation - had not really come into contact with the main Roman line. To be sure, there had been some fighting against Velites and the occasional Hastati unit or units, but nothing that could justifiably be called major. Philippus still had control of the main phalanx, but King Antiochus appeared more interested in what was happening closer to the riverbank than with monitoring the progress of the Silver Shields. Here, with the help of the Dahae horsemen as well as a few skirmishers, the Cataphracts had finally managed to inflict some damage on the Allied legion stationed on the Roman left. The contest had been difficult and slow, however. Antiochus would have to deal with the Roman legion next in line, if not the enemy camp garrison as well. Given the conditions of both armies (a count of losses informed that the Seleucids had lost 107 points worth of units - 48 of these being skirmishers, while the Romans had lost 86 points - nearly half coming from the contingents under Eumenes and Diophanes), the unilateral decision was made to halt the scenario and call it a rather bloody draw. 


Comments

To the extent that the “refresher” or summary provided by Mark Grindlay can be used as a kind of rubric, I shall begin this concluding section with an evaluation/critique of the recently “completed” refight of Magnesia. 


Point 1) The unusually deep phalanx employed by Antiochus was depicted on my tabletop. The depth of this formation was modeled by arranging 5 bases or stands in column, while having 4 bases or stands across the front. The phalanx was divided into halves by positioning a single stand of elephants between the second and third frontline bases. 


Point 2) There were two Consular legions on my table. With the revised unit scale, I think the deployment of these several formations was fairly accurate. The one problem area was the representation of the Triarii. 

Point 3) In my refight, the Seleucid Cataphracts were not able to “crush” the socii legion holding the Roman left. However and eventually, they were able to inflict some damage on its ranks. As related in the maps and captions, this damage was due, in part, to the assistance of the Dahae horse archers and skirmishers.


Point 4) The scythed chariots did not repeat their disastrous historical performance in this refight. If I recall correctly, only one stand of friendly Cataphracts was discomforted by a panicked squadron of “run away” chariots. 


Point 5) The Seleucid phalanx did not form a hollow square on my non-traditional table. During the refight, the single base of elephants advanced ahead of the pikemen and engaged the enemy. (This was a part of the extended contest between the skirmishers and light troops on each side.) The animals were eventually defeated, but their destruction did not have a significant ripple effect. It occurs to me that this might only be feasible in a focused scenario, one played with a different unit and elephant scale. 


Point 6) My refight of Magnesia did not result in success for Lucius Scipio or his colleagues. However, he and his outnumbered “miniature” army were able to inflict a fair number of losses on the Seleucid host. 

On further review, it appears that I was only able to meet two of the six “standards,” so referencing only this adapted rubric informs that I have a lot of work to do if I hope to improve this preliminary grade. 


On further reflection, I cannot help but notice the difference between the time and effort spent on preparation compared to the time and effort spent playing the solo wargame. Given that Magnesia has been refought more than several times on more than several tabletops, I wonder if it was necessary for me to go back over what I would suggest is a fairly familiar order of battle if not narrative. As the goal was to make use of the TRIUMPH! and GRAND TRIUMPH! rules, I think that the time, effort, and resulting number of words were required. Again, I was not trying to “reinvent the wheel”; I was simply tinkering with it. If I may borrow a couple of additional idioms in the hope that they apply here. I think it was important for potential readers to have joined me as I “looked under the hood.” I also think it was important for these select few to “see how the sausage was made.” 


Coincidentally, at around the time this solo wargame was winding down, the well known and well regarded Big Lee posted a video “lecture” on the following topic: “History of the Tabletop: Writing scenarios for Wargaming Real Battles.” (Please see https://www.blmablog.com/2024/01/history-on-tabletop-writing-scenarios.html.) As per usual, this was an engaging and thought-provoking “chat.” If I understood him and the main points he was making, then I think I was familiar with the source material and the lay of the land. (This second remark reminded me of the first part of the “Featherstone Rule,” wherein modeling the actual landscape is important.) I am not sure, however, that I did as well with telling a story and especially with regard to playtesting. Focused playtesting would have shown me that the amendments for the scythed chariots needed a little more work. Also, I would have been made aware of the “problem” with the Roman and Allied Velites. As these troops are classed as Light Foot, they are not able to pass through (i.e., withdraw behind) the lines of Hastati or Principes. (This restriction is covered in Section 42, sub-section 42.2 of the rules.) This restriction does not appear historical. Playtesting would also have shown me that while the converted orders of battle were fairly accurate and reflected the imbalance between the opposing armies, the number of Seleucid skirmishers was still too great. A large portion of the action in the center of the tabletop revolved around the swarms of Seleucid skirmishers fighting the Velites along with some of the Hastati. This back-and-forth skirmishing prevented the main lines from getting “stuck in.” To be fair, the Roman commanders held their legions back. It is worth mentioning that the Seleucid leaders were hampered by poor command dice. Anyway, it appears that the Romans were not eager to expose their left or right flanks to Seleucid attention. Another review of the Seleucid casualty count informed that quite a few points were from the loss of skirmisher stands. This gave me additional pause, and made me think about how I let things transpire in the sector far from the river. While I did enter into the refight thinking that I would follow Mark Grindlay’s idea about having no definitive breaking point for either army, it seems to me that the TRIUMPH! or GRAND TRIUMPH! rules about demoralization have to be utilized in some way. By doing so, one might be better able to recreate the panicked flight of the Seleucid left wing. The attritional battle between Eumenes and Seleucus would not have happened. And I am fairly certain that something could have been figured out for the opposing centers. 


In summary, I allow that this refight could be viewed as practice for a more serious as well as better designed wargame. On the other hand, accepting and acknowledging these various flaws, I still think that things went fairly well. While the selected rules worked well enough, I think there might be a better set of rules out there for another attempt at this historical battle. Then again, it might simply be the case that the chosen rules weren’t in the right hands. If so, I look forward to reading how someone else managed Magnesia with the TRIUMPH! and or GRAND TRIUMPH! rules. At the risk of being shouted down, of possibly being lambasted on a social media platform, or more likely, not getting any traffic on an ancients wargaming forum, I would suggest that this effort adds something to the figurative mountain of work that has been done on how to refight Magnesia on a tabletop. Even though the self-assessment using the “Grindlay rubric” indicated a number of problem areas, in staging this solo wargame, I think it’s reasonable to claim that I was educated, engaged, and entertained. Ideally, similar results will be produced in handful of individuals who invest the time and energy in reading this post.   





Notes

  1. S. J. Randles offered readers of Slingshot a three-part examination of the historical battle and his experiments and experiences in wargaming the action in Issues 114, 115, and 117 of the long-running journal. Dr. Chris Winter provided an account of his interpretation of the historical battle, including rather extensive orders of battle, using Field of Glory (FoG) in Issue 278 of Slingshot. The excellent work done by Luke Ueda-Sarson was read and annotated. Please see http://lukeuedasarson.com/MagnesiaReport.html. A search of the TRIUMPH! Forum turned up an initial effort at orders of battle by a Roger Cooper. Please see https://forum.wgcwar.com/. Type ‘Magnesia’ into the search field. I also looked at the analysis provided by Professor Philip Sabin on pages 197-200 of LOST BATTLES - Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World. The narrative accounts of Livy (XXXVII.38-44) and Appian (Syr. 30-6) were also searched, copied and pasted, printed out, read multiple times and heavily annotated. 
  2. Regarding the question of unit scale in TRIUMPH! wargames, please see the dedicated ‘No Troop Scale’ video on the TRIUMPH! YouTube Channel at: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCIMiqEZjn1w43ZN1ox_JXWw. 
  3. In the article from Mark Grindlay, his group decided that the Galatian contingent would be heavy infantry or FT in ARMATI terms, rather than Warband or WB. I thought about creating a new Seleucid troop type of Heavy Foot for these fierce warrior types, but opted to stay with the original army list on this particular point. Interestingly, Mark also made reference to “Cappadocian heavy infantry,” so I wondered if I should have upgraded these stands to Raiders.  
  4. In the black and white wargamer-friendly diagram included with Mark Grindlay’s article, there are 3 units of Scythed Chariots posted in front of the Seleucid left wing. Drawing a straight line brings them into potential contact with enemy cavalry, not infantry. In the earlier effort submitted by S. J. Randles, he estimates 140 of these special chariots present at Magnesia as this was number present at a parade (army review?) in Daphne. A close study of his diagram finds the chariots directly opposite all of the Roman and Allied cavalry. The Cretan archers and Trallian slingers posted on the far right of Scipio’s line of battle also fall within the scythed chariots “mowing path.” At the risk of relying too much on articles found in older issues of Slingshot, I should like to add the research and comments made by a Darrell Smith in “The Scythed Chariot Under the Microscope,” which appeared in the September 1992 edition. A list of eight historical engagements was put together in which scythed chariots were a common denominator. For the entry on Magnesia, the gentleman wrote: “A large number of Seleucid chariots were deployed on the army’s left flank and charged an opposing Roman army. The chariots took casualties from the Roman light troops (velites) and routed without contacting the legionary infantry.” 
  5. Responding to Darrell Smith’s short but sharp article, a Martyn Brawn was inspired to comment. The following selected remarks appeared in The Journal of the Society of Ancients four issues later. Martyn stated: “In wargaming terms the role of the scythed chariot is to disorder steady close or loose formation foot ready for follow up troops to seal their fate.” He also suggested additional amendments (to WRG 7th Edition) or revisions to those previously offered. Martyn argued for the removal of “the necessity for wavering test on mounted contacted by scythed chariots.” He continued, explaining that, “Cavalry is not a legitimate target of scythed chariots and so we should remove the incentive for their use in this way.” Returning to the September 1992 issue, a Brian Lewis (who evidently wrote about scythed chariots with Darrell) observed that wargamers often “kept their scythed chariots in reserve, or had them spread out as single elements, so as to prey on small enemy units without fear of coming under fire from missiles.” He surmised: “If this is an accurate description of how scythed chariots are employed, it appears that they are used quite differently by ancients gamers than they were in history.”
  6. A search the key word ‘Magnesia’ on the TRIUMPH! Forum (please seehttps://forum.wgcwar.com/search.php?keywords=magnesia) resulted in the finding of a possible order of battle developed by a Roger Cooper. (Please see https://forum.wgcwar.com/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=991&p=5829&hilit=magnesia#p5829.) Interestingly, Roger established the legion strength at 22 stands of Elite Foot, which would represent, at his working unit scale, approximately 22,000 heavy infantry. Dividing this number of stands by 4 produces legions of 5 stands of Elite Foot each, with 2 stands left over. Curiously, there are no stands of Velites (Light Foot) provided as screens to the legions. 
  7. According to Luke Ueda-Sarson (again, please see http://lukeuedasarson.com/MagnesiaReport.html), the distribution of Roman and Allied commanders saw Marcus Aemilius in charge of the camp and the Allied legion on the left. For the Roman legion on the left, it was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. The consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio led the Roman legion to its right, and Gnaeus Domitius, apparently the real commander-in-chief on the day, was in charge of the Allied legion on the right of the line. 
  8. The variety of troop types representing this camp garrison of 2,000 men is due to Livy’s description of the Macedonians and Thracian being volunteers who had accompanied the army. 
  9. Livy explains that this small group of elephants “were placed behind the veterans, in reserve.” The ancient writer goes on to comment on their size and ability to cope with the larger variety of elephants in the Seleucid army. Evidently, the Roman elephants played no part in the historical battle. However, as I like having elephants on my table when I can, will make an exception. These African pachyderms will be assigned to the camp garrison command and its leader. 
  10. In a contribution to the conversation about Magnesia, at the end of April 2022, Rod (a Grand Master on the TRIUMPH! Forums with approximately 900 posts since joining in 2016 and frequently seen at conventions umpiring TRIUMPH! wargames as well as teaching the rules) explained: “ This is on my list to do as part of my current painting project, but I have not gotten to an OOB yet. I would start with roughly equal force sizes though.” Logistically and in other ways, this makes sense, but this approach seems to defy the common sense tenets promoted by Donald Featherstone on refighting historical battles realistically. On this point, see the bottom of page 10 in Battle Notes for Wargamers.  
  11. In hindsight, I should have listened to or followed Roger Cooper. In his working OOB, he established the following scales: 1 unit of infantry equals 1000 men, and 1 unit of cavalry equals 500 men. He further explained that, “I have a minimum of 1 unit of each named contingent and a 40% reduction of the Seleucid army.” His “final” order of battle added up to 53 Seleucid units, 4 of which were camp guards. I did not include camp guards in my original order of battle, but the total number of units in my prospective Seleucid army was more than twice the total determined by Roger. 

 

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