MODELING MORAT

Orders of Battle: A Discovery

Based on my amateur investigation and research, it appears that it would be a fairly simple and straightforward matter to prepare and deploy the Swiss formations present at the 22 June 1476 Battle of Morat (or Murten). [1] According to one source, the strength of the Swiss Confederation relief army, which delivered a decisive defeat upon Charles the Bold, his Burgundians and the other allied contingents present, was in the range of 25,000 foot and 1,800 horse. The Swiss infantry consisted of pikemen, halberdiers, crossbow troops and handgunners. Their cavalry contingent was commanded by one Rene, the Duke of Lorraine. [2] Another source reinforces these numbers, but offers slightly less infantry (approximately 24,000 men) carrying a variety of arms (pikes, halberds, battle axes, bows, crossbows and arquebuses), while confirming the numbers of cavalry as well as their origin. [3] A paper written by one Albert Winkler provides even greater detail concerning the composition of the Swiss formations at Morat. [4] In “The Battle of Murten: The Invasion of Charles the Bold and the Survival of the Swiss States,” the academic informs the curious reader or interested historical wargamer:

The Swiss were arrayed in three large battle formations. The “vanguard” 

        (Vorhut) comprised roughly five thousand men chiefly from Berg, Fribourg, and 

        Schwyz. Likely, the Bernese stood in the first lines of this configuration because 

        they were motivated to fight well, to lift the siege of Murten, and to save their 

        fellow countrymen. In the center of the vanguard stood men carrying 

        harquebuses and crossbows, and pikemen were placed on the sides of the 

        configuration. Hans von Hallwil, a respected military leader and citizen of Bern, 

        led the vanguard, and heavy cavalry numbering 1,500 knights, largely from 

        Alsace, accompanied the disposition. (27)

He continues:

The “main mass” formation (Gewalthaufen) was comprised of 10,000 or more 

        men. The principal banners of the Swiss states stood in the center of this 

        formation protected by rows of men wielding halberds and by pikemen in 

        contingents of 1,000. The final configuration was the “rearguard” (Nachhut), led 

        by Kaspar von Hertenstein of Luzern. This formation was considered “large and 

        powerful” (gros und stark), but it was not more carefully described. Likely, it was 

        arrayed similar to the “main mass” with rows of halberdiers and men with pikes (27-28)

Interestingly, the Swiss approach to warfare or their apparent aversion to military command or hierarchy does not allow one to place a firm label on the individual officer leading the Gewalthaufen. Winkler does explain however, that a “Wilhelm Herter placed the forces in order for battle, but there was probably no overall commander since such a position was against Swiss custom and practice.” (27)

Armed with this information and these numbers, it seems that establishing an approximate scale of one unit represents 500 actual men would work out rather nicely for staging a refight of this action in miniature. Starting with the cavalry or knights commanded by Rene (or Rene II), these mounted troops could be depicted with 3 or perhaps even 4 units, stands, or even colored counters, if one were of that mind set. Rene could be embedded with one of the units or placed on his own command stand or base. The vanguard of 5,000 men, approximately, would consist of 10 units of Swiss soldiers. The following is an “educated guess” on my part, but perhaps the division of types could be 3,000 missile men and 2,000 close combat troops. One would need to fabricate 3 units of crossbow light infantry or skirmishers, 3 units of handgunners, and 4 units of pikemen or perhaps 2 units of pikemen and 2 units of pikemen mixed with halberdiers. The personality of Hans von Hallwil could be integrated into one of the heavy infantry units or again, depicted on a separate command stand. To model the “main force,” I decided to increase its strength to 12,000 men. This number was divided evenly into halberdiers and pikemen. There would be 12 units of the former and 12 units of the latter. As to specific arrangement or formation, I am toying with a “block” measuring 8 units wide and 3 units deep, or a more compact body, with a frontage of 6 units and a depth of 4 units. As a third option, it seems possible and perhaps even more realistic to arrange this formation in an array of 4 columns of 6 units each. I suppose that a small number of missile troops could be added, but this adjustment would take away the concentrated “punching strength” of the “division.” Either way, I am nominating Wilhelm Herter as the primary officer in command. Due to the size of the formation, I am giving him a subordinate commander. These leaders may be integrated into a unit or based on separate stands. The increase of the main body means that the “rearguard” has a strength of just 7,000 men. This translates in 14 units, stands or counters using my approximate scale. As of this typing, very early on the morning of 17 January, I am thinking that 6 stands of halberdiers and 8 stands of pikemen should be or will be prepared for this last formation. Kaspar von Hertenstein and a subordinate officer will be in charge of these men. 

Shifting my attention to the Burgundian side of this late fifteenth century battlefield, it seems an easier task to prepare the formations of Charles the Bold for the considered reconstruction. If I rely solely on the illustration and information provided in The Dictionary of Battles, then I will only need to model 600 archers, 3,000 infantry, and 1,200 cavalry. I will also need some artillery, although a specific number of pieces is not provided. Employing the previously established “working unit scale,” 2 units of archers will be needed, and 6 units of infantry (pikemen or perhaps a mix of pikemen and missile troops), along with 2 units of cavalry will have to be readied for the tabletop. Having no details about the Burgundian cannon from this “coffee table book,” I am thinking that 3 units or stands of guns would be sufficient to represent the artillery employed by Charles. 

Additional information is provided from the Murten Panorama, [5] but specific, wargamer-friendly details are frustratingly lacking. The total strength of Charles’s army is estimated at 22,000 men. This number is broken down into: 5,700 archers, 5,100 infantry, and 2,100 cavalry. There are mercenaries in this force, originating from Italy and Savoy. There were also 900 English archers present. Presumably, these were men armed with longbows, but it is not clarified as to whether these 900 men were included in the count of 5,700 archers or formed a  separate body. Unfortunately, while the Burgundian artillery is mentioned, there are no numbers provided. The only description is that the pieces present at Murten were older models, as the newer, brass cannons had been lost at the previous engagement at Grandson. Annotating the paper written by Albert Winkler, it was found that Charles employed troops from all across Europe. There were “allies” or contingents from Savoy, Milan, Venice and Aragon. There were also troops from Germany, Flanders, England, and Poland. As for the exact strength of the Burgundian army, estimates place it at between 19,000 and 22,000 men, so almost the same size as the Swiss relief force. Interestingly, Winkler notes that the ad-hoc force under Charles was quite undisciplined and lacked effective leadership. As a result of this and pre-battle siege operations, the Burgundian army suffered some casualties. Furthermore, because an enemy force was under siege in the town of Morat, a portion of the army was dedicated to this operation. Another “educated guess” puts the available strength to counter or address the Swiss relief column at around 18,000 men, perhaps as few as 16,000.  

If I combine the source material regarding the Burgundian army strength, then I might suggest that 12 units of archers be fabricated. It seems historically accurate to make 2 of these units English longbow “companies,” 2 units crossbow light infantry or skirmishers, and perhaps 2 or 3 units of handgunners. The rest would be Burgundian archers. Ten units of Burgundian infantry (medium or heavy) would account for the 5,100 listed in the one source. The mercenaries (identified simply as mercenaries rather than by state or country of origin) would be represented by 16 units. These various formations would be a mix of medium and heavy troops. Perhaps a quarter of them should be armed with bows, crossbows, or even arquebuses. As for the number of cannon, of varying weight, this information is unfortunately unavailable. However, the Winkler paper does indicate that Charles wanted to have 60-times more pieces at Murten than he had at Grandson. It is also reported that Murten was shelled for days by the Burgundians and that the arrival of especially heavy cannon did great damage to the fortress walls. With respect to the actual engagement on 22 June, Winkler informs that Charles directed his men to construct a grünhag or “green hedge” consisting of trenches and fences. Evidently, many cannon were emplaced to fortify this position. There is an additional note suggesting that a perpendicular breastwork was built on the left of the Burgundian line and that 100 or 150 guns were positioned there to take the Swiss advance in its right flank. The L’Art de la Guerre rules are the only ones of the three sets selected that offer any kind of representative unit scale for cannon or ancient pieces of artillery. If I establish a “working scale” of one model or unit equals 25 to 30 pieces, then I might deploy 3 units of artillery along the main “green hedge” and 2 units behind the flanking breastworks. My thinking (acknowledging again, a set of very amateur qualifications in the field of late fifteenth century military history) would be as follows: a light, medium, and heavy piece in the main defensive works and a light and medium piece or unit in the additional barricade. A final thought regarding the composition of the command structure of the Burgundian army. Charles the Bold (or Rash) should be present, obviously, but his ability as a leader of men should be rather low. The adjectives “uninspired” and “incompetent” come to mind. He should also have a subordinate general. Based on my study of the map included in the Winkler research, the Italian contingent should be led by a Troylus, and the Savoyards should be commanded by an officer and a gentleman named Romont. 

Rulebooks: The Sorting and Selection

Looking over my small library of rulebooks, my current thinking is that Armati, L’Art de la Guerre (ADLG) [3rd Edition], and the TRIUMPH! rules might provide for entertaining refights of this historical battle. The approximate unit scale fits very well within the Armati parameters, and it seems that the presence and effects of artillery are sufficiently addressed in the original and Advanced Armati books. Instead of the provided army lists, I think the Burgundian Ordonnance and Cantonal Swiss lists, produced by Aetius and found on the Warflute site [6] , offer a better representation for the historical wargamer interested in attempting a reconstruction of this comparatively little known action. [7] The “established” unit scale also works rather well with the ADLG rules. The Swiss list (Number 220 and found on pages 199-200) provides sufficient choice of troop types. The Burgundian Ordonnance list (Number 235 on pages 209-210) gives one enough variety to build this diverse and reportedly poorly disciplined force. A bonus provided by the ADLG Burgundian list is that fortifications are included. In reviewing the appropriate army lists for a TRIUMPH! refight of this battle, the only fieldworks available to the Burgundians are stakes for their units of longbow archers. [8] For the Armati adaptation, I suppose one could adapt the terrain type “rough ground,” but it seems quite apparent that special scenario rules will be required for both the Armati and the TRIUMPH! versions of this historical engagement. Having taken a few pages to look at how the opposing armies might be modeled, I should like to turn to a consideration of the field of battle.

“Walking” the Terrain

The map on the lower left corner of page 72 of The Dictionary of Battles contains neither a compass rose nor a ground scale bar. This, at least to me, is rather disappointing as well as frustrating. That subjective assessment aside, working with the information provided in the basic map, it appears that the right of the Burgundian position rested on or near a village named Salvenach. There was a road network present, with a crossroads in front of the left wing of the prepared position. A road or trail passes through the left-most side of the “green hedge,” and a second or minor road or trail passes between the extreme left of the Burgundian defensive line and the flanking artillery emplacement. It appears that there was a wooded area behind the Burgundian position. (Perhaps these trees were reduced in number in the preparation of the works?) There appears to be a “finger” of woods pointing at the far left end of the Burgundian defensive line. The small space or gap between these woods and the “green hedge” was guarded by a separate work wherein more than several pieces of artillery were positioned. The “supposed direction” of the Swiss advance came from another wooded area, and was framed by the villages of Salvenach on its left and Oberburg on its right. The ground between the “green hedge” and the woods from which the Swiss formations issued appears flat and unremarkable. Curiously, there are no hills indicated on this diagram of the battle. 

Two maps, one tactical and one grand-tactical, are offered in the Panorama material. Taking a close look at the tactical map first, I was pleased to find a compass rose as well as a ground scale bar. Using these helpful tools, it was determined that the Burgundian defensive line ran roughly south to north. Perhaps southwest to northeast would be a more correct description. It also appeared that the extent of the defensive line or position stretched for approximately 1,100 meters. There were some similarities between this map and the one offered on page 72 of The Dictionary of Battles. The village or hamlet of Salvenach was indicated; the “green hedge” or grünhag was marked; the division of the various troop types was also indicated, and there was a road running through the left side of the breastworks. In both schematics, the cavalry of Charles the Bold was positioned in the “open ground” between the right end of the barricade and the built-up area of Salvenach. With regard to differences between the two diagrams, the tactical Panorama map did not list the numbers of cavalry and infantry present. Furthermore, the Burgundian center was divided into arquebusiers, arbalesters (crossbowmen) and pikemen. There was also a terrain feature, the Burggraben, drawn on the tactical map. This feature could be the “finger” of woods seen on the Dictionary diagram of the battle. The Swiss advance, by my inexpert measurement, appears to have started from approximately 850 meters away, and issued from an unidentified shaded area. Perhaps this shaded area represents a wooded area or a wooded hill or some sort?

Turning to a brief examination of the grand-tactical map, Salvenach and the “green hedge” are landmarks. This diagram shows the three accepted phases of the battle. Evidently, the key to the Swiss victory was their penetration or breaching of the Burggraben, which allowed them to flank the “green hedge” and then defeat the Burgundians in detail as Charles brought up reinforcements in a piecemeal fashion. Using the ground scale bar provided on this map, it appears that the larger battlefield was approximately 4 kilometers deep and 3 kilometers wide. This grand-tactical map does show elevated ground, ridges, or hills. In fact, it appears that Charles’s command tent was roughly 1.5 kilometers behind (to the west) of the “green hedge.” In addition to showing the position of Salvenach, this larger battlefield map also shows three more villages, towns, or castles/fortresses. To the north, there is Muntelier; to the south there is Meyriez, and in the middle is Murten. 

It was both interesting and a little frustrating to compare the previous two maps with the one supplied by Albert Winkler in his research. The “Winkler Map” as I will call it, does show the village or town of Montellier (a French spelling of Muntelier?) as well as Morat (a variation of Murten), but does not include Meyriez, Salvenach, or the Burggraben. Unfortunately, there is no compass rose or ground scale bar on the “Winkler Map.” Interestingly though, there is a road network shown. The stretch leading away from Montellier goes to Bern, which matches, in a general sense, the road shown on the Panorama grand-tactical map. This particular road passes close to a hamlet or village identified as Ulmitz. (This locale was not found on any other diagram of the engagement.) Two more roads, both running behind the Burgundian defensive lines, take travelers to Aveuches or Frieburg. As for terrain features, there are a few. First, there is a large woods appropriately called “Wood of Morat.” These trees sit atop a rather large hill, and using the compass rose found in other diagrams, this wooded area is to the east of both Montellier and Morat. There is another largish hill to the southwest of this feature. There are no trees indicated on this elevation, however. If there were, perhaps they were used to prepare the two sets of breastworks and additional siege works? Additionally, there is a small hill in between the two larger terrain features. The “Winkler Map” identifies this as München Weyler. This elevation is covered by the barricade (presumably the “green hedge”) that formed the main part of the Burgundian defensive line. In addition to the fairly long primary barricade, which protects the Burgundian camp, there is a smaller, eastward facing set of breastworks between Morat and the woods named after that town or fortress. Another interesting aspect of this diagram is that it shows three blocks of Swiss troops as well as their cavalry contingent. The vanguard and main body are pointed at the main line of Burgundian defenses. The reserve formation is shown advancing through the woods and appears aimed at the open ground just to the north of München Weyler. A final comment about the “Winkler Map.” Of all the diagrams secured and studied, this was the only one to specifically indicate and identify the Lake of Morat.  

The commonality between all the maps and accounts is the “green hedge” or grünhag. While general descriptions of this man-made terrain feature are provided, there are, unfortunately, insufficient details that would permit an accurate modeling on a tabletop. In the Wikipedia entry [9], the “green hedge” is described as “an elaborate ditch and palisade entrenchment.” In The Dictionary of Battles summary, it is simply referred to as an “entrenchment.” Again, the accompanying map identifies it as a “hedge.” Albert Winkler does not provide much more, explaining only that, “The Burgundians built a barrier, the 'green hedge’ (grünhag) or palisade, to stop any Swiss advance from the direction of Bern. The men dug trenches, constructed fences, and placed many cannon to fortify the position . . .” (27) The tactical map from the Panorama material suggests that the “green hedge” was approximately 700 meters in length, but offers no details as to its specific construction. 

“Here They Come!” The Battle, Briefly

According to the account provided in The Dictionary of Battles, the Swiss attack took the Burgundians by surprise on the afternoon of 22 June. Even so, the artillery and archers caused a number of casualties in the advancing column(s). In this version of the engagement, the Swiss vanguard held the right of the line. The cavalry from Lorraine were stationed on the left. The main body and reserve formation were directed against the Burgundian right, so as to cut off any kind of retreat. The Swiss pressed home their attack and the Burgundian line crumbled. In addition, there was a sally of defenders from the besieged fortress of Morat. 

The Wikipedia entry adds an interesting wrinkle. Evidently, Charles ordered his treasurer to pay the eclectic assemblage of troops. The resulting disorder (men getting paid, others taking their lunch) and apparently some inclement weather resulted in the surprise and overwhelming of a skeleton force left at the grünhag. In this account, the Swiss debouch from the Birchenwald Woods and penetrate the left flank of the Burgundian defenses. The position is turned, and any attempt to “plug the gap” is defeated by successive waves of strong and stubborn Swiss troops. 

The brief version offered in the Panorama material makes no mention of paying troops, lunch, or poor weather. The attack by the Swiss Confederates was totally unexpected, however. Evidently, the first assault failed and numerous losses were suffered, but then a successful push was made against the Burggraben which allowed a flanking move to be completed. At approximately the same time, the Swiss vanguard broke through the “green hedge” and started wreaking havoc in the various encampments. Charles could not retrieve the situation and his army was decisively defeated. 

The narrative offered in the Winkler paper is more detailed as well as more graphic in its description of events. Instead of an alleged payday causing disorder among the various Burgundian contingents, it appears that a heavy rain storm the night before June 22 convinced Charles that the Swiss relief army would not commit to battle. The sudden appearance of the Swiss vanguard caused no little confusion and consternation in the Burgundian camps. Evidently, by the time Charles and a majority of his forces were dressed for action (i.e., had donned their armor), the Swiss were through the barricade and the defenders were in flight. Somewhat confusingly, at least to me, there appears to have been another rain storm the morning of the battle, for the Swiss vanguard is reported as “marching through the forest during the heavy rain.” Just when they advance into the open, the skies clear and the sun comes out. The vanguard and accompanying cavalry were targeted by the Burgundian guns and suffered accordingly, but the rate of fire saved the Swiss column(s) from obliteration. The main formation of the Swiss also came up and managed to negotiate the “green hedge.” Apparently, there were “roads that led through the position for egress and entry.” The Swiss foot took advantage of these weak points and stormed the works, cutting down the artillery crews first. Cavalry counter attacks launched by Charles did little to disrupt the Swiss steamroller(s). When the garrison from Murten launched a sally against the disordered and occupied Burgundians, Charles’s army disintegrated in rout. His panicked army suffered significant casualties during the pursuit. 

While the 12-year-old narrative offered by the academic is longer and more detailed than anything else found, read, and annotated, it did produce a number of questions from this amateur wargamer and writer. For example, where was the Swiss rearguard and what role, if any, did it play in the battle? The Winkler paper is the only source to make mention of the weather, albeit in a somewhat confusing manner. Did it, in fact, rain the morning of 22 June? If there was a rain storm, wouldn’t there be a risk to the Burgundian archers’ bow strings to say nothing of the artillery ammunition? Presumably, the crews were not working with manufactured and universal charges for their cannon. Staying with the artillery and the reported slow rate of fire, if there were 100 or more pieces, why weren’t the guns fired in salvoes of 25 pieces at a time (a kind of ‘rolling barrage’) so that discharged cannon could be reloaded while other pieces were hurling shot at the packed ranks of Swiss pikemen and others? (Admittedly, I am applying twentieth-century tactics and twenty-first century thinking to fifteenth century military operations.) Regarding the roads (it appears that there was more than one) through the “green hedge,” instead of “weak points” it seems to me that these might have been “choke points” or at least a kind of funnel that would allow concentrated fire and opposition to the Swiss attack. What level of disorder was caused to the Swiss formations by having to negotiate and overcome these obstacles? Finally, how was the sally from Murten able to have so much of an impact? This was a siege. According to my study, Charles had troops set up to shell and to cover Murten. His army was in the process of digging approach trenches. Acknowledging that it is never a good thing to have to fight on two fronts, would there not have been “blocking” or siege troops in position to prevent such a sally, and by doing so save the majority of the army from collapsing in rout? [10]

Remarks and a Plan, Maybe . . .

Upon discovering or stumbling across and then reading the entry about Morat while absent-mindedly thumbing through The Dictionary of Battles one dismally cold late afternoon near the end of December, my initial thoughts were: this might be an interesting project to develop for my tabletop and, this might be a battle I could blog about. I confess that I was tempted to do the “usual thing” and prepare my “armies” for a refight. In fact, I was in the early stages of drafting plans for scenarios employing Armati and a L’Art de la Guerre. Then, as is often the case, I started thinking about a different kind of scenario. This one would be a counterfactual, wherein Charles the Bold was prepared for the Swiss, and had the majority of his various formations in line and ready for the Swiss attack(s). This solo project would allow me the opportunity wargame a larger battle (my default position, apparently), and to use the map found in the Winkler paper as opposed to any other diagram of the engagement. After several days and more than several false starts (electronic drafts of 500 to 1,500 words wherein I played with various titles, content, and structure), I decided to go in a different direction. Instead of a typical wargame report, I would focus on the “research” and historical study or interpretations of the engagement and how these might be used to stage a reconstruction of the colorful and one-sided contest. 

I have no doubt that in talented hands, The Battle of Murten (or Morat) would make an excellent demonstration game at a show or convention. Whether in 15mm or 28mm scale (or perhaps even 6mm), I think the massed formations of Swiss and the “disordered” formations of Burgundians and their allies would look very nice indeed. However, the main draw of this demonstration would be the terrain. Again, in the right hands, the model landscaping of the 8 by 5-foot or 12 by 6-foot table would, I imagine, look spectacular. I am quite certain that Murten would win the ‘Best Terrain’ prize and perhaps even secure the ‘Best Game’ or similar top prize. 

For the present, my solo wargaming “schedule” is filled with a Spartans vs Vikings “agenda,” a much delayed (i.e., procrastinated) campaign game, and giving a newish rulebook another try. Of course, I may find myself distracted or inspired by yet another idea or blog post made by a traditional historical wargamer. The idea of refighting Morat (or Murten), in one form or another, and with one, two, or even three sets of rules, still appeals. It would be great if I were able to set up the battle for its 546th anniversary (this coming June), but I cannot plan that far ahead. For now, what some may describe as me “wittering on” [11] for almost 5,000 words about this comparatively little known battle of the Swiss-Burgundian Wars will have to suffice.  

Notes

1. Both identifying names seem acceptable. Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Morat. 
2. Page 72 of The Dictionary of Battles—The World’s Key Battles from 405 BC to Today offers three paragraphs which provide background information, opposing plans, and a very brief summary of the action in addition to what might be called a wargamer-friendly diagram of the engagement.
3. Please see https://www.murtenpanorama.ch/en/schlacht/221.php.
4. Please see https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/3/. Readers might also investigate or peruse the following sites or links: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/1804/ and https://www.medievalists.net/2020/02/the-battle-of-murten-the-invasion-of-charles-the-bold-and-the-survival-of-the-swiss-states/.
5. Again, please see https://www.murtenpanorama.ch/en/home/index.php. 
6. Please see the ‘Age of Chivalry’ section of the ‘Tourney Approved’ list under ‘Armies.’
7. Admittedly, this is a complete supposition on my part. However, if you conducted an informal survey of 100 ancient/medieval wargamers and asked them which of the following four battles did they recognize (Pharsalus, Raphia, Agincourt, and Murten or Morat), my guess is that Murten would not be on that list. 
8. Please see http://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/armyList/5fb1b9e9e1af060017709d0d/explore and http://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/armyList/5fb1b9e8e1af060017709c95/explore. 
9. Again, please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Morat.
10. I could not help but think about or make a connection to the 225 BC Battle of Telamon, which was selected as the engagement for The Society of Ancient’s 2019 Battle Day. Please see https://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/168-battleday-2019.
11. The English language is a wonderful thing. I was not aware of this phrase or word until I heard it used by Rebecca (played brilliantly by Hannah Waddingham) in an episode of “Ted Lasso.”