AN ORCHESTRATION OF OTTOMANS

Having “fallen off my horse” trying to lead an Ottoman army as well as a Medieval Polish one while using a set of rules that is often referred to by its four-letter acronym, I voiced some complaints and concerns (that is to say, expressed my disappointment and frustration) but fortunately, did not break any bones or suffer a any kind of concussion. About a week later, I got “back in the saddle,” (if I may continue the equestrian metaphor) and built another Ottoman army to command on a model battlefield. While the terrain selected for this fictional engagement was similar (the tabletop bore a passing resemblance to Pharsalus, 48 BC), instead of Europeans, the opposition was Mamluk Egyptians. The rules were different, too. I thought I would give TRIUMPH! another trial run in this scenario. If things went well, then I hoped to employ these DBA-like rules for a long-delayed campaign game that would engage and entertain me (at least I hoped that it would) until September or October and perhaps even generate a handful of reports that I could post to this blog. That long-term possibility acknowledged, let me get right into the orders of battle for this revised solo wargame effort. 

The Mamluks, taking the place of Caesar’s forces in the historical battle, were drafted from the Mamluk Egyptian list (1250 AD to 1517 AD), available for free at MeshWesh, (Please see http://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/home.) Nine stands of Elite Cavalry (Royal Mamluks) were deployed on the right wing of the line of battle. All of these units had the ‘Shower Shooting’ ability or battle card. (An explanation of this capability is also available on the MeshWesh link.) This contingent added up to 45 points. The center command included 14 units of infantry and 3 of cavalry. The foot elements were a mix of Warband (Ghazis), Horde (City Rabble), Bow Levy (Ashir Bowmen) and others. The horse were divided evenly between an Elite Cavalry unit (Mamluks), a Horse Bow (Turkoman horse archers) and Javelin Cavalry (Kurdish). This command added up to 46 points. On the left, there were 3 units of Javelin Cavalry (Bedouin), 8 units of Horse Bow (Turkoman horse archers), and one unit of Elite Cavalry (Mamluks). The left wing formation added up to 48 points, which gave the Egyptians a total strength of 139 out of a possible 144 points. 

The Ottomans were selected from the Ottoman Empire (1362 AD to 1520 AD) list. Their left wing consisted of 5 units of Elite Cavalry (Qapukulu). These formations had the ‘Shower Shooting’ ability as well. They were assisted by 5 units of Horse Bow (Akinjis). This command was valued at 45 points. The Ottoman center was a mixed formation of foot, much like their enemy. This command included Archers (Janissary Bowmen), Warband (Iayalar), Elite Foot (Voynuks), along with other types as well as a “battery” of Artillery (Bombards and other guns). Adding up the numbers, this formation was worth 47 points. The right wing of the Ottoman army, which assumed the historical position of Pompey and his colleagues, was composed of 12 units of Horse Bow (Akinjis). These horsemen were fairly close to the river and marshy ground, and were worth 48 points. The Ottomans had 140 points overall, just one more than the Egyptians. The Egyptians had 38 units compared to 36 units fielded by the Ottomans. 

How It Played

Having a movement rate three or four times faster than the combined formations of foot, the wings of opposing horse were the first units to make contact and see action on this improvised and aesthetically unimpressive battlefield. Over on the Egyptian left flank, Turkomans and Akinjis engaged in a chaotic and swirling melee. Oddly or interestingly, each side gained a local advantage against the enemy left. The result was not a revolving door-like shift of the sector’s battle line orientation, but more of a breaking apart into smaller contests. Both sides suffered losses in the back and forth melees. The Egyptian contingent was the first to become demoralized, followed in the next turn by the Ottoman right wing. Even in this “broken morale” state, both sides continued to hammer away at each other while other portions of their respective lines turned tail and galloped away. The command dice favored the Ottomans and so, more Egyptian formations were forced to break off the action and seek the temporary safety afforded by distance. To be certain, little remained of what once were rather robust forces of light cavalry on both sides in this sector. 

On the Egyptian right wing, the Mamluks had some assistance from light cavalry attached to the infantry center. Facing a handful of enemy elite cavalry and the same number of horse bow, the Mamluks believed they had the advantage. Two turns of ineffective “shower shooting” were followed by charges into contact. Unfortunately, the Mamluks suffered from abysmal dice rolling and were soon reeling from a few lost melees. The only successes scored in this sector were by the reinforcing light cavalry from the Egyptian center. While they were able to attack the flank of some occupied Ottoman units, they were not able to turn the tide of this local battle. Their better dice could not reverse the impact of the bad dice visited upon the Mamluk formations. In due course, the Mamluks were demoralized and their dice troubles continued, which resulted in more units fleeing the field of battle. 

The opposing infantry centers had advanced into artillery range (the Ottomans had some bombards and other pieces), but were still too far apart for the various archer units to retrieve, knock and loose volleys of arrows. After the Egyptian segment of Game Turn 7 was finished, an accounting was made of lost and routing units. While the Ottomans had been bloodied, especially their Akinjis on the right wing, the Egyptians had been pushed past their determined breaking point, with 75 points of an original 139 lost. 

The fictional battle was concluded without completing the Ottoman phase of the seventh turn. The infantry lines would never meet and there would be no pursuit of the Egyptian foot by the surviving—and it has to remarked, bloodied and tired—Ottoman cavalry. 

Remarks

This was not a typical or traditional TRIUMPH! wargame. There were no 15 mm or 28 mm scale miniature armies employed; there was only one player instead of two; there were no dice rolls made to determine the topography, tactical advantage, or number of terrain pieces and placement of same, and there were no camps constructed and placed. (As this was a GRAND TRIUMPH! scenario, using armies three-times the normal size, it is my understanding that there would have been a total of six camps, three on each side.) Furthermore, the deployment rules were not strictly adhered to. The primary example of this was the arrangement of the Egyptians Mamluks (Elite Cavalry) on their right wing instead of in the center. 

In terms of appearance, this “refresher course” or “tutorial” in the mechanics of TRIUMPH! looked more like a simple boardgame than a traditional or typical historical miniatures engagement. The various troop types or units were depicted with cardboard counters with identifying tags attached so that Horse Bow could be differentiated from Warband, and Warband could be differentiated from Elite Foot. In order to fit the comparatively large forces on the 6 by 3.75 feet playing surface, the dimensions for units with a 60 mm base width listed in Appendix A were reduced by 50 percent. A base or stand of Elite Foot (the Ottoman Voynuks) had a frontage of 3 cm and a depth of just 1 cm. During the course of the tabletop battle, it was found that this modified size of units was a bit “fiddly.” If the decision is made to conduct further tests or to pursue a solo campaign using this set of rules, then the 40 mm base width units will be employed, or perhaps an adjustment will be made so that 50 mm base width formations can be prepared and deployed for action. If this decision is made, I will also make my units “prettier” (albeit still non-traditional) and will experiment with identifying the troop type on the actual base or stand instead of attaching an additional tag to the unit. 

Shifting to a brief analysis or critique of the recently completed wargame, well, it goes without saying that it was much more successful than the previous encounter. To revisit the equestrian comparison made in the first paragraph, I might remark that this solo experiment was a rather enjoyable trot through the countryside. Even though the infantry centers of the abstract armies never came to grips, I had a chance to try out ‘Shower Shooting’ (it did not have that much of an impact on the course of the battle), as well as see how good of a cavalry commander I was on the wings. On the Ottoman side of the field, I did fairly well. In fact, I was surprised that my outnumbered elite horse and their lighter neighbors were able to deliver a very bloody nose to the Mamluk cavalry arranged against me. Looking briefly at the other wing, I thought the swirling combat between the opposing lines of Horse Bow and or Javelin Cavalry was fairly realistic. Then again, going back to the Egyptian right, I did find it curious that Horse Bow would have the same combat modifier as Elite Cavalry. I also found it somewhat curious that flank attacks would be seconded to frontal combats. This “confusion” is a result of playing a number of wargames with different sets of rules. (I recall that Tactica II places a great emphasis on flank attacks. These combats or melees are resolved first during the melee phase of a game turn.) Given that I lack a depth of experience with TRIUMPH!, I was more than a little rusty when it came to working out the demoralization rules. Here again, I was reminded of other rules, for example, Simon Miller’s To The Strongest! To be certain, however, this aspect of the GRAND TRIUMPH! rules does prevent those strange situations where a flank, wing, or contingent fights to the last unit without any apparent penalty. Questions to the rules forum about melee procedures and demoralization were quickly and expertly answered, which was greatly appreciated. It appears that demoralized units “disappear” or are removed after the first turn of “routing” if they do not receive orders to hold in place or to continue fighting, which they can do, but with an appropriate negative modifier. 

In conclusion, if I may switch from an equestrian to academic theme, I would give this second effort involving Ottomans a grade of B-minus. It was definitely better than the previous disappointment. (I almost typed “disaster” but figured that that word choice might be a little too dramatic.) With regard to the alliterative title, I drew inspiration from the catchy and clever titles used by PHGamer. (Please see https://philonancients.blogspot.com/2021/08/ for quite a few battle reports, each one containing quite a few photographs.) With regard to the general impression or format, I tried to base this “quick and dirty” narrative on the excellent and original work done by the Charles Grant in WARGAME TACTICS. My apologies for not including any pictures of this simple solo wargame. As I stated, the representation of units and formations was very basic; some might even call the depiction or “modeling” crude. The general purpose of the fictional scenario was to reacquaint myself with the selected rules and see if I might want to take the chance of using them in a campaign game. Ideally, I would have liked to include a couple of maps, but I have yet to figure out how to incorporate diagrams into these blog posts. Perhaps I should inquire on the TMP boards? Surely somebody over there will have a suggestion or two about free wargame mapping programs that work with Apple computers and the BigSur OS.  

MODELING MORAT

Orders of Battle: A Discovery

Based on my amateur investigation and research, it appears that it would be a fairly simple and straightforward matter to prepare and deploy the Swiss formations present at the 22 June 1476 Battle of Morat (or Murten). [1] According to one source, the strength of the Swiss Confederation relief army, which delivered a decisive defeat upon Charles the Bold, his Burgundians and the other allied contingents present, was in the range of 25,000 foot and 1,800 horse. The Swiss infantry consisted of pikemen, halberdiers, crossbow troops and handgunners. Their cavalry contingent was commanded by one Rene, the Duke of Lorraine. [2] Another source reinforces these numbers, but offers slightly less infantry (approximately 24,000 men) carrying a variety of arms (pikes, halberds, battle axes, bows, crossbows and arquebuses), while confirming the numbers of cavalry as well as their origin. [3] A paper written by one Albert Winkler provides even greater detail concerning the composition of the Swiss formations at Morat. [4] In “The Battle of Murten: The Invasion of Charles the Bold and the Survival of the Swiss States,” the academic informs the curious reader or interested historical wargamer:

The Swiss were arrayed in three large battle formations. The “vanguard” 

        (Vorhut) comprised roughly five thousand men chiefly from Berg, Fribourg, and 

        Schwyz. Likely, the Bernese stood in the first lines of this configuration because 

        they were motivated to fight well, to lift the siege of Murten, and to save their 

        fellow countrymen. In the center of the vanguard stood men carrying 

        harquebuses and crossbows, and pikemen were placed on the sides of the 

        configuration. Hans von Hallwil, a respected military leader and citizen of Bern, 

        led the vanguard, and heavy cavalry numbering 1,500 knights, largely from 

        Alsace, accompanied the disposition. (27)

He continues:

The “main mass” formation (Gewalthaufen) was comprised of 10,000 or more 

        men. The principal banners of the Swiss states stood in the center of this 

        formation protected by rows of men wielding halberds and by pikemen in 

        contingents of 1,000. The final configuration was the “rearguard” (Nachhut), led 

        by Kaspar von Hertenstein of Luzern. This formation was considered “large and 

        powerful” (gros und stark), but it was not more carefully described. Likely, it was 

        arrayed similar to the “main mass” with rows of halberdiers and men with pikes (27-28)

Interestingly, the Swiss approach to warfare or their apparent aversion to military command or hierarchy does not allow one to place a firm label on the individual officer leading the Gewalthaufen. Winkler does explain however, that a “Wilhelm Herter placed the forces in order for battle, but there was probably no overall commander since such a position was against Swiss custom and practice.” (27)

Armed with this information and these numbers, it seems that establishing an approximate scale of one unit represents 500 actual men would work out rather nicely for staging a refight of this action in miniature. Starting with the cavalry or knights commanded by Rene (or Rene II), these mounted troops could be depicted with 3 or perhaps even 4 units, stands, or even colored counters, if one were of that mind set. Rene could be embedded with one of the units or placed on his own command stand or base. The vanguard of 5,000 men, approximately, would consist of 10 units of Swiss soldiers. The following is an “educated guess” on my part, but perhaps the division of types could be 3,000 missile men and 2,000 close combat troops. One would need to fabricate 3 units of crossbow light infantry or skirmishers, 3 units of handgunners, and 4 units of pikemen or perhaps 2 units of pikemen and 2 units of pikemen mixed with halberdiers. The personality of Hans von Hallwil could be integrated into one of the heavy infantry units or again, depicted on a separate command stand. To model the “main force,” I decided to increase its strength to 12,000 men. This number was divided evenly into halberdiers and pikemen. There would be 12 units of the former and 12 units of the latter. As to specific arrangement or formation, I am toying with a “block” measuring 8 units wide and 3 units deep, or a more compact body, with a frontage of 6 units and a depth of 4 units. As a third option, it seems possible and perhaps even more realistic to arrange this formation in an array of 4 columns of 6 units each. I suppose that a small number of missile troops could be added, but this adjustment would take away the concentrated “punching strength” of the “division.” Either way, I am nominating Wilhelm Herter as the primary officer in command. Due to the size of the formation, I am giving him a subordinate commander. These leaders may be integrated into a unit or based on separate stands. The increase of the main body means that the “rearguard” has a strength of just 7,000 men. This translates in 14 units, stands or counters using my approximate scale. As of this typing, very early on the morning of 17 January, I am thinking that 6 stands of halberdiers and 8 stands of pikemen should be or will be prepared for this last formation. Kaspar von Hertenstein and a subordinate officer will be in charge of these men. 

Shifting my attention to the Burgundian side of this late fifteenth century battlefield, it seems an easier task to prepare the formations of Charles the Bold for the considered reconstruction. If I rely solely on the illustration and information provided in The Dictionary of Battles, then I will only need to model 600 archers, 3,000 infantry, and 1,200 cavalry. I will also need some artillery, although a specific number of pieces is not provided. Employing the previously established “working unit scale,” 2 units of archers will be needed, and 6 units of infantry (pikemen or perhaps a mix of pikemen and missile troops), along with 2 units of cavalry will have to be readied for the tabletop. Having no details about the Burgundian cannon from this “coffee table book,” I am thinking that 3 units or stands of guns would be sufficient to represent the artillery employed by Charles. 

Additional information is provided from the Murten Panorama, [5] but specific, wargamer-friendly details are frustratingly lacking. The total strength of Charles’s army is estimated at 22,000 men. This number is broken down into: 5,700 archers, 5,100 infantry, and 2,100 cavalry. There are mercenaries in this force, originating from Italy and Savoy. There were also 900 English archers present. Presumably, these were men armed with longbows, but it is not clarified as to whether these 900 men were included in the count of 5,700 archers or formed a  separate body. Unfortunately, while the Burgundian artillery is mentioned, there are no numbers provided. The only description is that the pieces present at Murten were older models, as the newer, brass cannons had been lost at the previous engagement at Grandson. Annotating the paper written by Albert Winkler, it was found that Charles employed troops from all across Europe. There were “allies” or contingents from Savoy, Milan, Venice and Aragon. There were also troops from Germany, Flanders, England, and Poland. As for the exact strength of the Burgundian army, estimates place it at between 19,000 and 22,000 men, so almost the same size as the Swiss relief force. Interestingly, Winkler notes that the ad-hoc force under Charles was quite undisciplined and lacked effective leadership. As a result of this and pre-battle siege operations, the Burgundian army suffered some casualties. Furthermore, because an enemy force was under siege in the town of Morat, a portion of the army was dedicated to this operation. Another “educated guess” puts the available strength to counter or address the Swiss relief column at around 18,000 men, perhaps as few as 16,000.  

If I combine the source material regarding the Burgundian army strength, then I might suggest that 12 units of archers be fabricated. It seems historically accurate to make 2 of these units English longbow “companies,” 2 units crossbow light infantry or skirmishers, and perhaps 2 or 3 units of handgunners. The rest would be Burgundian archers. Ten units of Burgundian infantry (medium or heavy) would account for the 5,100 listed in the one source. The mercenaries (identified simply as mercenaries rather than by state or country of origin) would be represented by 16 units. These various formations would be a mix of medium and heavy troops. Perhaps a quarter of them should be armed with bows, crossbows, or even arquebuses. As for the number of cannon, of varying weight, this information is unfortunately unavailable. However, the Winkler paper does indicate that Charles wanted to have 60-times more pieces at Murten than he had at Grandson. It is also reported that Murten was shelled for days by the Burgundians and that the arrival of especially heavy cannon did great damage to the fortress walls. With respect to the actual engagement on 22 June, Winkler informs that Charles directed his men to construct a grünhag or “green hedge” consisting of trenches and fences. Evidently, many cannon were emplaced to fortify this position. There is an additional note suggesting that a perpendicular breastwork was built on the left of the Burgundian line and that 100 or 150 guns were positioned there to take the Swiss advance in its right flank. The L’Art de la Guerre rules are the only ones of the three sets selected that offer any kind of representative unit scale for cannon or ancient pieces of artillery. If I establish a “working scale” of one model or unit equals 25 to 30 pieces, then I might deploy 3 units of artillery along the main “green hedge” and 2 units behind the flanking breastworks. My thinking (acknowledging again, a set of very amateur qualifications in the field of late fifteenth century military history) would be as follows: a light, medium, and heavy piece in the main defensive works and a light and medium piece or unit in the additional barricade. A final thought regarding the composition of the command structure of the Burgundian army. Charles the Bold (or Rash) should be present, obviously, but his ability as a leader of men should be rather low. The adjectives “uninspired” and “incompetent” come to mind. He should also have a subordinate general. Based on my study of the map included in the Winkler research, the Italian contingent should be led by a Troylus, and the Savoyards should be commanded by an officer and a gentleman named Romont. 

Rulebooks: The Sorting and Selection

Looking over my small library of rulebooks, my current thinking is that Armati, L’Art de la Guerre (ADLG) [3rd Edition], and the TRIUMPH! rules might provide for entertaining refights of this historical battle. The approximate unit scale fits very well within the Armati parameters, and it seems that the presence and effects of artillery are sufficiently addressed in the original and Advanced Armati books. Instead of the provided army lists, I think the Burgundian Ordonnance and Cantonal Swiss lists, produced by Aetius and found on the Warflute site [6] , offer a better representation for the historical wargamer interested in attempting a reconstruction of this comparatively little known action. [7] The “established” unit scale also works rather well with the ADLG rules. The Swiss list (Number 220 and found on pages 199-200) provides sufficient choice of troop types. The Burgundian Ordonnance list (Number 235 on pages 209-210) gives one enough variety to build this diverse and reportedly poorly disciplined force. A bonus provided by the ADLG Burgundian list is that fortifications are included. In reviewing the appropriate army lists for a TRIUMPH! refight of this battle, the only fieldworks available to the Burgundians are stakes for their units of longbow archers. [8] For the Armati adaptation, I suppose one could adapt the terrain type “rough ground,” but it seems quite apparent that special scenario rules will be required for both the Armati and the TRIUMPH! versions of this historical engagement. Having taken a few pages to look at how the opposing armies might be modeled, I should like to turn to a consideration of the field of battle.

“Walking” the Terrain

The map on the lower left corner of page 72 of The Dictionary of Battles contains neither a compass rose nor a ground scale bar. This, at least to me, is rather disappointing as well as frustrating. That subjective assessment aside, working with the information provided in the basic map, it appears that the right of the Burgundian position rested on or near a village named Salvenach. There was a road network present, with a crossroads in front of the left wing of the prepared position. A road or trail passes through the left-most side of the “green hedge,” and a second or minor road or trail passes between the extreme left of the Burgundian defensive line and the flanking artillery emplacement. It appears that there was a wooded area behind the Burgundian position. (Perhaps these trees were reduced in number in the preparation of the works?) There appears to be a “finger” of woods pointing at the far left end of the Burgundian defensive line. The small space or gap between these woods and the “green hedge” was guarded by a separate work wherein more than several pieces of artillery were positioned. The “supposed direction” of the Swiss advance came from another wooded area, and was framed by the villages of Salvenach on its left and Oberburg on its right. The ground between the “green hedge” and the woods from which the Swiss formations issued appears flat and unremarkable. Curiously, there are no hills indicated on this diagram of the battle. 

Two maps, one tactical and one grand-tactical, are offered in the Panorama material. Taking a close look at the tactical map first, I was pleased to find a compass rose as well as a ground scale bar. Using these helpful tools, it was determined that the Burgundian defensive line ran roughly south to north. Perhaps southwest to northeast would be a more correct description. It also appeared that the extent of the defensive line or position stretched for approximately 1,100 meters. There were some similarities between this map and the one offered on page 72 of The Dictionary of Battles. The village or hamlet of Salvenach was indicated; the “green hedge” or grünhag was marked; the division of the various troop types was also indicated, and there was a road running through the left side of the breastworks. In both schematics, the cavalry of Charles the Bold was positioned in the “open ground” between the right end of the barricade and the built-up area of Salvenach. With regard to differences between the two diagrams, the tactical Panorama map did not list the numbers of cavalry and infantry present. Furthermore, the Burgundian center was divided into arquebusiers, arbalesters (crossbowmen) and pikemen. There was also a terrain feature, the Burggraben, drawn on the tactical map. This feature could be the “finger” of woods seen on the Dictionary diagram of the battle. The Swiss advance, by my inexpert measurement, appears to have started from approximately 850 meters away, and issued from an unidentified shaded area. Perhaps this shaded area represents a wooded area or a wooded hill or some sort?

Turning to a brief examination of the grand-tactical map, Salvenach and the “green hedge” are landmarks. This diagram shows the three accepted phases of the battle. Evidently, the key to the Swiss victory was their penetration or breaching of the Burggraben, which allowed them to flank the “green hedge” and then defeat the Burgundians in detail as Charles brought up reinforcements in a piecemeal fashion. Using the ground scale bar provided on this map, it appears that the larger battlefield was approximately 4 kilometers deep and 3 kilometers wide. This grand-tactical map does show elevated ground, ridges, or hills. In fact, it appears that Charles’s command tent was roughly 1.5 kilometers behind (to the west) of the “green hedge.” In addition to showing the position of Salvenach, this larger battlefield map also shows three more villages, towns, or castles/fortresses. To the north, there is Muntelier; to the south there is Meyriez, and in the middle is Murten. 

It was both interesting and a little frustrating to compare the previous two maps with the one supplied by Albert Winkler in his research. The “Winkler Map” as I will call it, does show the village or town of Montellier (a French spelling of Muntelier?) as well as Morat (a variation of Murten), but does not include Meyriez, Salvenach, or the Burggraben. Unfortunately, there is no compass rose or ground scale bar on the “Winkler Map.” Interestingly though, there is a road network shown. The stretch leading away from Montellier goes to Bern, which matches, in a general sense, the road shown on the Panorama grand-tactical map. This particular road passes close to a hamlet or village identified as Ulmitz. (This locale was not found on any other diagram of the engagement.) Two more roads, both running behind the Burgundian defensive lines, take travelers to Aveuches or Frieburg. As for terrain features, there are a few. First, there is a large woods appropriately called “Wood of Morat.” These trees sit atop a rather large hill, and using the compass rose found in other diagrams, this wooded area is to the east of both Montellier and Morat. There is another largish hill to the southwest of this feature. There are no trees indicated on this elevation, however. If there were, perhaps they were used to prepare the two sets of breastworks and additional siege works? Additionally, there is a small hill in between the two larger terrain features. The “Winkler Map” identifies this as München Weyler. This elevation is covered by the barricade (presumably the “green hedge”) that formed the main part of the Burgundian defensive line. In addition to the fairly long primary barricade, which protects the Burgundian camp, there is a smaller, eastward facing set of breastworks between Morat and the woods named after that town or fortress. Another interesting aspect of this diagram is that it shows three blocks of Swiss troops as well as their cavalry contingent. The vanguard and main body are pointed at the main line of Burgundian defenses. The reserve formation is shown advancing through the woods and appears aimed at the open ground just to the north of München Weyler. A final comment about the “Winkler Map.” Of all the diagrams secured and studied, this was the only one to specifically indicate and identify the Lake of Morat.  

The commonality between all the maps and accounts is the “green hedge” or grünhag. While general descriptions of this man-made terrain feature are provided, there are, unfortunately, insufficient details that would permit an accurate modeling on a tabletop. In the Wikipedia entry [9], the “green hedge” is described as “an elaborate ditch and palisade entrenchment.” In The Dictionary of Battles summary, it is simply referred to as an “entrenchment.” Again, the accompanying map identifies it as a “hedge.” Albert Winkler does not provide much more, explaining only that, “The Burgundians built a barrier, the 'green hedge’ (grünhag) or palisade, to stop any Swiss advance from the direction of Bern. The men dug trenches, constructed fences, and placed many cannon to fortify the position . . .” (27) The tactical map from the Panorama material suggests that the “green hedge” was approximately 700 meters in length, but offers no details as to its specific construction. 

“Here They Come!” The Battle, Briefly

According to the account provided in The Dictionary of Battles, the Swiss attack took the Burgundians by surprise on the afternoon of 22 June. Even so, the artillery and archers caused a number of casualties in the advancing column(s). In this version of the engagement, the Swiss vanguard held the right of the line. The cavalry from Lorraine were stationed on the left. The main body and reserve formation were directed against the Burgundian right, so as to cut off any kind of retreat. The Swiss pressed home their attack and the Burgundian line crumbled. In addition, there was a sally of defenders from the besieged fortress of Morat. 

The Wikipedia entry adds an interesting wrinkle. Evidently, Charles ordered his treasurer to pay the eclectic assemblage of troops. The resulting disorder (men getting paid, others taking their lunch) and apparently some inclement weather resulted in the surprise and overwhelming of a skeleton force left at the grünhag. In this account, the Swiss debouch from the Birchenwald Woods and penetrate the left flank of the Burgundian defenses. The position is turned, and any attempt to “plug the gap” is defeated by successive waves of strong and stubborn Swiss troops. 

The brief version offered in the Panorama material makes no mention of paying troops, lunch, or poor weather. The attack by the Swiss Confederates was totally unexpected, however. Evidently, the first assault failed and numerous losses were suffered, but then a successful push was made against the Burggraben which allowed a flanking move to be completed. At approximately the same time, the Swiss vanguard broke through the “green hedge” and started wreaking havoc in the various encampments. Charles could not retrieve the situation and his army was decisively defeated. 

The narrative offered in the Winkler paper is more detailed as well as more graphic in its description of events. Instead of an alleged payday causing disorder among the various Burgundian contingents, it appears that a heavy rain storm the night before June 22 convinced Charles that the Swiss relief army would not commit to battle. The sudden appearance of the Swiss vanguard caused no little confusion and consternation in the Burgundian camps. Evidently, by the time Charles and a majority of his forces were dressed for action (i.e., had donned their armor), the Swiss were through the barricade and the defenders were in flight. Somewhat confusingly, at least to me, there appears to have been another rain storm the morning of the battle, for the Swiss vanguard is reported as “marching through the forest during the heavy rain.” Just when they advance into the open, the skies clear and the sun comes out. The vanguard and accompanying cavalry were targeted by the Burgundian guns and suffered accordingly, but the rate of fire saved the Swiss column(s) from obliteration. The main formation of the Swiss also came up and managed to negotiate the “green hedge.” Apparently, there were “roads that led through the position for egress and entry.” The Swiss foot took advantage of these weak points and stormed the works, cutting down the artillery crews first. Cavalry counter attacks launched by Charles did little to disrupt the Swiss steamroller(s). When the garrison from Murten launched a sally against the disordered and occupied Burgundians, Charles’s army disintegrated in rout. His panicked army suffered significant casualties during the pursuit. 

While the 12-year-old narrative offered by the academic is longer and more detailed than anything else found, read, and annotated, it did produce a number of questions from this amateur wargamer and writer. For example, where was the Swiss rearguard and what role, if any, did it play in the battle? The Winkler paper is the only source to make mention of the weather, albeit in a somewhat confusing manner. Did it, in fact, rain the morning of 22 June? If there was a rain storm, wouldn’t there be a risk to the Burgundian archers’ bow strings to say nothing of the artillery ammunition? Presumably, the crews were not working with manufactured and universal charges for their cannon. Staying with the artillery and the reported slow rate of fire, if there were 100 or more pieces, why weren’t the guns fired in salvoes of 25 pieces at a time (a kind of ‘rolling barrage’) so that discharged cannon could be reloaded while other pieces were hurling shot at the packed ranks of Swiss pikemen and others? (Admittedly, I am applying twentieth-century tactics and twenty-first century thinking to fifteenth century military operations.) Regarding the roads (it appears that there was more than one) through the “green hedge,” instead of “weak points” it seems to me that these might have been “choke points” or at least a kind of funnel that would allow concentrated fire and opposition to the Swiss attack. What level of disorder was caused to the Swiss formations by having to negotiate and overcome these obstacles? Finally, how was the sally from Murten able to have so much of an impact? This was a siege. According to my study, Charles had troops set up to shell and to cover Murten. His army was in the process of digging approach trenches. Acknowledging that it is never a good thing to have to fight on two fronts, would there not have been “blocking” or siege troops in position to prevent such a sally, and by doing so save the majority of the army from collapsing in rout? [10]

Remarks and a Plan, Maybe . . .

Upon discovering or stumbling across and then reading the entry about Morat while absent-mindedly thumbing through The Dictionary of Battles one dismally cold late afternoon near the end of December, my initial thoughts were: this might be an interesting project to develop for my tabletop and, this might be a battle I could blog about. I confess that I was tempted to do the “usual thing” and prepare my “armies” for a refight. In fact, I was in the early stages of drafting plans for scenarios employing Armati and a L’Art de la Guerre. Then, as is often the case, I started thinking about a different kind of scenario. This one would be a counterfactual, wherein Charles the Bold was prepared for the Swiss, and had the majority of his various formations in line and ready for the Swiss attack(s). This solo project would allow me the opportunity wargame a larger battle (my default position, apparently), and to use the map found in the Winkler paper as opposed to any other diagram of the engagement. After several days and more than several false starts (electronic drafts of 500 to 1,500 words wherein I played with various titles, content, and structure), I decided to go in a different direction. Instead of a typical wargame report, I would focus on the “research” and historical study or interpretations of the engagement and how these might be used to stage a reconstruction of the colorful and one-sided contest. 

I have no doubt that in talented hands, The Battle of Murten (or Morat) would make an excellent demonstration game at a show or convention. Whether in 15mm or 28mm scale (or perhaps even 6mm), I think the massed formations of Swiss and the “disordered” formations of Burgundians and their allies would look very nice indeed. However, the main draw of this demonstration would be the terrain. Again, in the right hands, the model landscaping of the 8 by 5-foot or 12 by 6-foot table would, I imagine, look spectacular. I am quite certain that Murten would win the ‘Best Terrain’ prize and perhaps even secure the ‘Best Game’ or similar top prize. 

For the present, my solo wargaming “schedule” is filled with a Spartans vs Vikings “agenda,” a much delayed (i.e., procrastinated) campaign game, and giving a newish rulebook another try. Of course, I may find myself distracted or inspired by yet another idea or blog post made by a traditional historical wargamer. The idea of refighting Morat (or Murten), in one form or another, and with one, two, or even three sets of rules, still appeals. It would be great if I were able to set up the battle for its 546th anniversary (this coming June), but I cannot plan that far ahead. For now, what some may describe as me “wittering on” [11] for almost 5,000 words about this comparatively little known battle of the Swiss-Burgundian Wars will have to suffice.  

Notes

1. Both identifying names seem acceptable. Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Morat. 
2. Page 72 of The Dictionary of Battles—The World’s Key Battles from 405 BC to Today offers three paragraphs which provide background information, opposing plans, and a very brief summary of the action in addition to what might be called a wargamer-friendly diagram of the engagement.
3. Please see https://www.murtenpanorama.ch/en/schlacht/221.php.
4. Please see https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/3/. Readers might also investigate or peruse the following sites or links: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/1804/ and https://www.medievalists.net/2020/02/the-battle-of-murten-the-invasion-of-charles-the-bold-and-the-survival-of-the-swiss-states/.
5. Again, please see https://www.murtenpanorama.ch/en/home/index.php. 
6. Please see the ‘Age of Chivalry’ section of the ‘Tourney Approved’ list under ‘Armies.’
7. Admittedly, this is a complete supposition on my part. However, if you conducted an informal survey of 100 ancient/medieval wargamers and asked them which of the following four battles did they recognize (Pharsalus, Raphia, Agincourt, and Murten or Morat), my guess is that Murten would not be on that list. 
8. Please see http://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/armyList/5fb1b9e9e1af060017709d0d/explore and http://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/armyList/5fb1b9e8e1af060017709c95/explore. 
9. Again, please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Morat.
10. I could not help but think about or make a connection to the 225 BC Battle of Telamon, which was selected as the engagement for The Society of Ancient’s 2019 Battle Day. Please see https://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/168-battleday-2019.
11. The English language is a wonderful thing. I was not aware of this phrase or word until I heard it used by Rebecca (played brilliantly by Hannah Waddingham) in an episode of “Ted Lasso.”

SPARTANS vs VIKINGS: Part 1

Drawing inspiration from a “stumbled across” discussion thread on The Miniatures Page (TMP) - Ancients Discussion Board or Forum, I decided to embark upon a long-term solo project wherein I would conduct a number of experiments based on the suggested hypothetical. [1] The “work in progress” plan (more of an hastily scribbled outline, really) was to stage six battles between the identified-in-the-title ahistorical opponents using six different sets of rules. These scenarios would not be “controlled experiments” in the sense that point values or sizes of the opposing forces would be equal, the terrain would be identical for the planned half dozen engagements, and I would be wearing a lab coat while taking copious notes on a clipboard. These scenarios would, for lack of a better description, provide a kind of “wargaming filler,” giving me something to do between more serious as well as historical, if admittedly non-traditional projects. In the initial draft of this long-term project, a single post, one containing details and narratives of all six experiments as well as an evaluation of the entire effort was considered. Legitimate concerns about the required stamina, both on the part of this amateur author/wargamer as well as the reader resulted in the revision of this original plan. It seemed a much better idea, a more prudent course, to tackle the project a little bit at a time. In other words, six short or medium-length reports would be drafted, edited and posted over the course of around six months (perhaps longer) instead of a single epic post. With this approach, it was believed that a suitable level of interest could be maintained by both parties. Without further preamble then, let me move right along to the first counterfactual contest between the armies of “King Leonidas” and “Ivar the Boneless,” wherein I employ the Armati 2nd Edition rules. 

Preparations

For this first contest between two very different forces, I drafted a Spartan army from one of the amended lists provided in Matthew Bennett’s “Real Spartans with Armati,” a short but thought-provoking article which appeared in the May/June 2018 issue of Slingshot, The Journal of the Society of Ancients. [2] As per usual, my Spartans would be represented with two-dimensional color counters instead of painted and based miniatures of any scale. For a slight change of pace, I decided to use 15 mm Optimal Scale, instead of reduced 15 mm Epic Scale formations. My Spartans would be a double-size army, with approximately 160 points worth of bonus units. My Vikings would also be a double-size army, but these longship raiders would be reinforced by 200 points worth of bonus units. Instead of drawing these fierce fighters from the army list provided (coincidentally) on page V of the rulebook, I decided to use the 800-1016 list, created by a “GildasFacit” (a.k.a. Tony Hughes) and found on the War Flute site, under the ‘Experimental’ category of ‘Armies.’

Rolling 2d6 and consulting my “work in progress” terrain table (drafted for a solo campaign game that has yet to see its first arrow loosed in ranged combat [3]), my Spartans and Vikings would meet on a field bearing a resemblance to The Granicus. Obviously, this setting gave me pause. The river and its difficult banks reportedly posed little challenge for the impetuous Alexander and his Companions, but it seemed to me that this kind of landscape would pose a number of problems for Spartan hoplites and Viking huscarls. The situation was resolved by making another roll on the terrain table or chart. This time, thankfully, the dice informed that these two armies would do battle over terrain very similar to the field of Idistaviso. The Spartans would deploy on the ground the Romans had originally occupied in 16 AD. Their cavalry would not start out in the woods on the left flank, however. The Viking “greater army” would arrange its formations across the same area where Arminius had gathered his tribesmen.

Adopting an even more “bare bones” approach to the depiction of terrain features, I decided to use the materials at hand instead of making specific additional purchases. To that end, I depicted the looping course of the river on the Spartan right flank with a long piece of blue yarn. The positioning of this meandering feature lopped off a fair portion of the right short-edge of my tabletop. The woods on the other side of my “model” battlefield were depicted with a long piece of dark green yarn. Studying the diagram of the battlefield on page 192 of Warfare in the Classical World, it seemed to me that the multi-tiered hill was eggplant shaped, with the narrower end jutting into the original Roman lines. For this scenario, I reoriented the hill, increased its overall size but reduced its height to only three tiers or levels. In Armati language, this large hill was still a “gentle rise.” To be consistent, this feature was also fabricated with long pieces of suitably colored yarn. To be sure, there was little aesthetic value to the terrain on my table. However, I could see at a glance where the river was, know where the woods started, and with the hill, I could imagine how line of sight, “surprise,” and a possible “uphill advantage” might play a part in the planned engagement. 

Deployments & Plans

I started with the Spartans. First I spent a day or so arranging and rearranging the heavy and light divisions. (There were 8 heavy division control points and 6 light division control points available. After double checking my “work,” it was determined that the Spartan army had a morale breakpoint of 13 key units.) On my far right, closest to the “bank” of the (very abstract) river, I deployed some peltasts and some Ekdromoi (light heavy infantry). These units were supported by two units of Thessalian heavy cavalry. My battle line of hoplites consisted of three divisions of Spartans on the right. The general of the army was with these veterans. These capable troops were organized in formations of a single unit of PH (the Hippeis), and two groups of Spartiates (also classed as PH). Moving left down this necessarily short line, there were three divisions of Perioikoi (more PH). The subordinate general of the army was in this area. Two screens of skirmishing javelins and slingers provided some cover for the arrangement of hoplites. On the left of my line, I placed the Helots (low quality FT) and the single “regiment” of Spartan heavy cavalry. Both of these formations were uncontrolled, meaning that they could not move until threatened by an approaching enemy formation. Peltasts and Ekdromoi formed a light infantry “bookend” on the far left of the larger formation. These units could go into the woods if needed. They could also harass and hit any enemy efforts on this side of the field. 

This photo was taken from behind the approximate center of the Spartan line of battle. The simple representation of the large three-tiered hill can be seen. The Viking formations are along the top of the frame. The skirmishers with bows are visible “screening” the main formation(s). There are two “divisions” of Berserkers positioned forward of the line as well.

The Vikings also had 8 heavy division control points, but only enjoyed 4 light division control points. (Even though this army had quite a few more bonus points, their key unit breakpoint was only 14.) Their battle line stretched also all the way across the space between the river bank on the left to the woods on the right. Instead of placing their best units on the right of this line, as the Spartans had done, the several formations of King’s Huscarls were deployed in the center. Extending to the left and right of these troops were Vikings of a lesser quality. There were Jarl’s Hindmen [or perhaps Hirdmen] (FT), Lesser Hindmen (FT), and then Bondi (also FT). Several units of skirmishers carrying short bows were scattered in penny packets across the entire front. Several groups of Berserkers were also positioned forward of the main line. The Vikings had no mounted troops and did not hide any troops in the woods on their far right. 

This photo was taken from above the Spartan right and Viking left. The Spartans are on the left side of the frame; the Vikings are deployed along the right of the frame. Again, the simple representation of the main terrain feature can be seen. The Spartan deployment is fairly historically correct, as the Spartiates are on the right of the line, and the Royal Guard unit holds the place of honor. The Spartan king or general is directly behind this phalanx. Skirmishers screen the Greek formation, and there are cavalry and light-heavy infantry assigned to the far right of the line.

Without going into great detail, the Spartans wanted to engage and win on their right and then wheel left to roll up the enemy line. Ideally, the hoplites would be able to trap the Vikings against the forest. The Thessalian cavalry would also play a key part in this plan. The Vikings, in contrast, were going to rely on brute force and numbers. They hoped to punch through the center of the Spartan line of battle. They also expected a hard-fought battle of attrition, which they would win because of greater numbers. 

A close up of the Viking center, showing the various formations of “King’s Huscarls” as well as “Jarl’s Hindmen or Hirdmen.” The Viking King command stand is also plainly visible. The green die in the upper left shows the Initiative Rating of the large Viking muster; the white dice are used to record the losses of key units. The Viking army will break and quit the field when it loses 14 key units. 

A close up showing the Spartan section of the hoplite deployment. The Royal Bodyguard and Spartiates are clearly visible, as is the Spartan General and skirmisher screen. The colored markers (purple, red, and yellow) are used to track fatigue, casualties (unit break points) and disorder or being “unformed.”

Summary of the Engagement

Both sides opted for a straightforward advance in order to come to grips and decide the issue. Having the greater range, the Viking skirmishers annoyed the Spartans and their allies but did little in the way of actual damage. As the distance closed, the Greek skirmishers let fly with their assortment of missiles. Their sling stones made more of an impact than their light javelins. Both skirmisher screens played little part, however, in the larger action. 

First contact was made on the Spartan right when two units of light-heavy infantry attacked a unit of Bondi. The lower-class Vikings performed poorly in this initial contest. The result did not set the tone of the developing battle, however. In the next turn, contacts were made up and down the line. Over on the Viking right, several formations were facing more open ground as a division of Helots and a single unit of Spartan cavalry had been held as a kind of reserve. On the subject of cavalry, the Thessalian heavy horse moved wide to the right and began to wheel around so as to come up on the Viking left and rear, but they misjudged the distance and timing. The light infantry that moved along with them also took themselves out of the larger action. 

This photo was taken above the Viking right after contact had been made between the opposing lines of heavy infantry. At the top of the frame, melees rage between units of the “King’s Huscarls” and units of Perioikoi. At the bottom of the frame, a portion of the ongoing contest between light-heavy infantry and Bondi can be seen. Several Viking units, screened by fierce Berserkers, have some ground to cover before they can make contact with Helots and a single unit of Spartan cavalry. These formations were held as a kind reserve and were marked “uncontrolled” so that more command and control could be designated elsewhere.

As a few units were trying to get around the Viking flanks (nothing would come of this, however and unfortunately), the main formations of each side crashed into each other on the Spartan side of the gentle hill. The fighting was fierce and chaotic, as one might imagine. Before the Vikings charged, they let fly with all sorts of missiles against the solid formation of enemy shields and neatly arranged spear points. With one or two exceptions, this barrage made little impact. The Spartan Royal Bodyguard received a bloody nose from these close-range missiles and was then further discomforted when engaged by two Viking formations. Their veteran status and fighting ability kicked in and they were soon giving more punishment than they were absorbing. The dice turned against them though, and when a lowly unit of Bondi was able to swing around and take them in the flank, well, that was the end of the Royal Bodyguard. Unfortunately, the Spartan General had joined the fighting the previous turn (to inspire his men), and he was cut down in the confusion of the collapse as the Vikings pressed from the front and the unshielded side of the unit. 

A close up of the fighting shown in the previous picture. Here, the “King’s Huscarls” are engaged with the Perioikoi on what might be called the reverse of the gentle hill. As can be seen by the casualty markers, things are going rather well for the Vikings. One unit of hoplites is about to break. The Viking King has yet to join in the fighting, but will do so shortly. Other Vikings will also join in the struggle. The red dice are the Spartan melee dice; the blue dice are the ones thrown by the Vikings. 

Taken from behind the Spartan center, this photo shows the attack by Berserkers against a couple of units of Perioikoi. The strength of the Viking line can be seen. The Spartans are stretched somewhat thin and are responding to moves and attacks made by the men who came from the longships.

Though a significant loss, the death of the Spartan General and the destruction of his unit did not immediately break the morale of the army. However, one might be tempted to remark “the writing was on the runes” for the Spartan effort. Advantage in the numerous melees swung back and forth as the fighting raged all along the hillside and more level ground. The light-heavy infantry on the Greek left performed well, holding the advance of the Vikings up for a while and inflicting quite a few losses on the enemy. Their bravery and skill was eventually overcome by fatigue and numbers. As the battle continued, fatigue began to take its toll on units from both sides. Casualties began to mount as well, and units were starting to look like shadows of themselves. Though the Spartan formations were of a better quality, generally, than the Viking units arranged against them, the melee dice did not cooperate. As one turn ended and another began, gaps, then holes, and then larger holes began to appear in the Spartan line as unit after unit was broken and routed from the field. A decision was reached on the eighth turn of play when four weakened units on the Greek side of the field were destroyed against the loss of a single unit of Berserkers. 

A close up showing the hard-fought contest on the Spartan left between the Ekdromoi and a variety of Vikings. The light-heavy infantry gave a good account of themselves but were eventually worn down and overrun by an enemy with greater numbers. 

This photo was taken near the end of the battle/scenario and shows the Spartan line in an exhausted and perilous state. A disorganized unit of Bondi has hit the Spartiates in the flank. A bloody melee is taking place further left down the Spartan line. The green die has gone from 5 to 1 due to involuntary breaks in divisional integrity. The white die indicates that the Spartans can only lose 4 more key units before their army morale will be broken. 

Comments

Acknowledging the ahistorical premise of this and subsequent scenarios or experiments, were there any historical aspects to this tabletop engagement? Attempting to answer my own question, I would respond yes and offer the following evidence.

First, the Spartans placed their best unit and their overall commander on the right of the line, the accepted position of honor. They had a small screen of skirmishers and relegated the light infantry and cavalry to operate on the flanks. I cannot be certain, but I think that the Vikings deployed historically, having their best troops or units in the center of the line, with lesser quality troops positioned next to them. If one accepts that Berserkers existed and formed into actual units, then I think it was correct to place these non-key elements forward of the main line of battle so that they could deliver an initial shock against the enemy. As both armies consisted of heavy infantry, I also think that it was historical for the battle to be decided by contact and melee between these various formations. 

Initially, I worried about the disparity in numbers. A review of the orders of battle showed that the Vikings had 30 units of heavy infantry at their disposal, while the Spartans had just 18 units of heavy infantry on the field. The nearly 2-to-1 advantage of the Norsemen was not key to their victory however, as command and control “problems” prohibited groups of Viking units ganging up on isolated or exposed units of Spartan hoplites and their allies. It seemed that the Viking win was more a case of “unfortunate dice” for the Spartans. One could also point to the frustrating failure of the Thessalian cavalry and light infantry. These elements were not able to swing around the Viking left, at least quickly enough, and play a part in the battle. Under the Armati rules, units that perform complex moves such as extended wheels, become “undressed” or disordered, and have to reorder their ranks or fight with a penalty. Once these units have straightened their lines, then they can move out to join or rejoin the general action. However, even with their 15-inch movement rate, the Thessalian cavalry could not reach the open flank of the Viking line before the engagement was decided. I confess that I am pondering whether this particular aspect of the recently concluded action was historical. (Perhaps ‘realistic’ would be a better word choice?)  It seems to me that cavalry units should be able to wheel and move with some speed. It also occurs to me that any penalty for being disordered should not be as costly as the penalty for being hit in or attacked on a flank, especially while engaged to the front. 

Turning briefly to a consideration of numbers, if I establish a representative unit scale of 600 men per key unit, whether heavy infantry, cavalry, or light troops, then the Spartans had around 15,000 men in the field compared to 18,000 Vikings. Being outnumbered by approximately 3,000 enemy troops should not, I think, pose a tremendous challenge to the experienced Spartans but again, the dice have the final say, and as reported in the brief summary, the dice gods did not look kindly on the sons of Sparta in this first encounter.

The opposing plans seemed historical and fairly sound. The opposing deployments also seemed historical and made appropriate use of the determined terrain. It seemed historical or realistic to have the Spartan commander become involved in the heavy fighting when his veteran phalanx was attacked by three enemy units on two sides. To be fair, the Viking “king” also threw himself into the melee when his huscarls were engaged. To his credit, he was wounded in the desperate fighting, but his men were in no danger of being flanked or assaulted by numerous units of hoplites. 

I think it would be historically accurate to remark that Vikings often employed the shieldwall when they fought against a wide variety of enemies. It was rather ironic then, that for this first of a planned six ahistorical contests, my non-traditional Vikings did not receive direct orders to “form shieldwall!” when they approached or were attacked by the Spartans and their allies. A review of the appropriate section of the rules informs that shieldwalls (or shield walls) can deny impetus and so, potentially save a unit from being swept away. The only units on the Spartan side of the field that had impetus were the Thessalian heavy cavalry. As reported and lamented, these two formations took themselves out of the battle by trying to move around the Viking left and left-rear. The hoped for decisive blow they could have delivered never arrived. This serious mistake should probably be laid to rest at the sandaled-feet of the Spartan commander. 

I confess that I was a little surprised to see the Spartans go down in defeat and so quickly and completely. I would have thought that with superior fighting ability, they would have doled out quite a bit of punishment to the “irregular” and less trained Viking formations. The dice proved me wrong, however, as they often do. I confess that I still wonder about the difference in numbers. Given the restrictions of command and control in Armati, and given the comparative difficulty of wheeling units of heavy infantry into positions of advantage, the Vikings were not able to capitalize on their “superior” numbers. In some respects, I think these longship raiders were just lucky. The dice fell in their favor and a tactical error by the enemy heavy cavalry allowed them to wear down the Greek hoplites. 

If I were to assign a letter grade to this first hypothetical encounter, I would give myself a C-plus, perhaps a B-minus. (This evaluation is based more on subjectivity than on any tried and tested rubric of solo wargaming.) At the risk of starting a new topic or opening up the proverbial “can of worms,” in some respects, I find myself growing a little weary or dissatisfied with the Armati rules and mechanics. Given my history with these rules, this development is more than a little disconcerting. The first entry into this Spartans vs Vikings record then, is a big “W” in the Vikings column. Proceeding alphabetically, the next engagement will see the Hail Caesar rules being employed. I am curious to see if Viking warriors will be cowed by a phalanx of large shields with red lettering on them, by serried ranks of spear points, and by shouts of “This is Sparta!” from the throats of hundreds if not thousands of veteran hoplites and their tough-as-leather unit commanders.

Notes

1. On 12 December 2021, a Russ Dunaway (TMP moniker “Old Glory”) posted the following topic to the Ancients Discussion Message Board: “Greek phalanx vs Viking sheild [sic] wall.” The gentleman posed a hypothetical, asking who would win if Spartan hoplites encountered a Viking shieldwall. To remark that the topic generated a spirited electronic conversation would be an understatement. In fact, I am tempted to compare the situation to Russ throwing a lit match onto a bale of very dry hay. Within a week—a few days, actually—the post had received 893 “hits” and had generated 36 replies. [A check on its status in the very early hours of 03 January 2022 informed that the number of “hits” had increased to 972; the number of replies had gone up just one to 37.] Out of curiosity, I conducted a brief search to see if the topic had been broached previously in other areas. Readers might be interested in taking a look at the following sites/links: https://www.madaxeman.com/reports/Bristol_2019_1.php and https://www.reddit.com/r/whowouldwin/comments/2to9xv/300_spartans_vs_300_vikings/.
2. In his reviewed and revised army lists, Matthew describes or identifies the “second class” phalanx units as Periokoi. Being quite unfamiliar with the complexities and exceptions of ancient Greek, I accepted this term. Then, while thumbing through a recently purchased copy of LOST BATTLES, I happened upon Perioikoi in Appendix 4. Perhaps both spellings are acceptable, but again, being untrained in ancient Greek letters, I deferred to the spelling provided by Professor Sabin.
3. This “table” was also footnoted in the January post titled “A Competition of Condottieri.” While some readers may find it limited or limiting, I find that it offers more potential variety than adherence to the various terrain rules found in the various rulesets. This “table” is not “set in stone.” It is also a work in progress, subject to revision and improvement. Anyway, here it is again. Terrain was determined by rolling 2d6 and consulting the following table:

Die Result “Appearance” of the Battlefield

    2                 Mantinea

    3                 Chaeronea

    4                 Granicus

    5                 Issus

    6                 Arsuf

    7                 Cynoscephalae

    8                 Pharsalus

    9                 Idistaviso

    10         Watling Street

    11         Argentoratum

    12         Chalons

Nine of these landscapes were taken from the pages of Warfare in the Classical World, the remaining two field were borrowed from previous Battle Day reports published in Slingshot. The word appearance is in quotes because my table would be decorated to look like an approximation of the ancient terrain. It would not be an exact, true-to-scale replica.