Explanatory Note:

For a change of pace, the following effort is not one of the armful of articles that have been submitted to Slingshot by this solo wargamer/writer over the past few years. As will become evident rather quickly, this “research” was inspired by an article found in that long-running publication. 

As this piece was not written for consideration by the editor of that well known and well regarded journal, I did not have to worry about the mechanics and nuances of British-English versus American-English. However, and as always, any lazy or silly mistakes that made it through the fairly rigorous editing process (i.e., five or six proof readings) are entirely mine. 

ARGENTORATUM:

INTERPRETATIONS & ITERATIONS

It would be interesting, I think, and well worth the time, to compare and contrast the two-page set of guidelines or instructions found in Issue 23 of Slingshot, The Journal of the Society of Ancients, with the nine-page analysis and examination that was published in Issue 321. The shorter submission was written by Phil Barker, an instantly recognizable if not iconic name in the wargaming community, and was titled “Reconstructing the Battle of Strasbourg.” The second submission or treatment, with the title “Argentoratum, AD 357,” was produced by the late Patrick Waterson, an admired, respected, and erudite member of the smaller in number, but illustrious and worldwide Society of Ancients community. [1] In order to complete this comparison/contrast, I would need to purchase “The Golden Years of Slingshot, 1965-2015,” which would, according to the currency exchange rates as of December 01, 2020, require an outlay or investment of roughly 55 US dollars. Let us round this up to 60 US dollars for postage and shipping, an amount that I am, as of this typing, not inclined to pay. Even without a copy of what might be labeled the “Barker Brief”or “Strasbourg Summary” in front of me, it seems possible to attempt a tentative comparison and contrast of these two submissions. 

 

In terms of general or obvious similarities, both gentlemen tackled the same historic engagement, and both articles were published in the same magazine or journal. Based on an article Mr. Barker (it feels disrespectful as well as odd to refer to him as Phil; it’s like being on a first name basis with a celebrity, an important government representative or even a religious official) submitted to Issue 12 of Miniature Wargames, it appears that both writers consulted or studied the narrative account provided by Ammianus Marcellinus. [2] This is where the comparison ends. Due to it being limited or condensed to just two pages, I cannot be certain that Mr. Barker discussed the specific stages of the battle.  

Looking at the numerous differences between these two articles, let me start with Patrick’s division of the engagement into five distinct phases. (I feel more comfortable using his first name, as we had what might be described as a “working relationship” when I was an active and  contributing member of The Society.) Patrick examines these segments of the historical contest, supporting his analysis and “arguments” with the sections of the narrative account supplied by  Ammianus. The material from this ancient author is reinforced by the writing of three others. In the bibliography, Patrick provides links for Orations, by Flavius Julianus, Funeral Orations for Julian, from Libanius, and Book II of New History, by Zosimus. Due respect to Mr. Barker, but my guess is that he probably did not refer to these additional narratives. He did, however, provide instructions for recreating the battle. I do not think this was the engine that powered Patrick’s work. While Patrick did supply a few ideas for “enlivening” what was in his words, “a Roman walkover,” I have a hunch that Mr. Barker explained how an early edition of the WRG Ancients rules could be used for refighting the battle. The substantial difference in length between the two pieces has already been mentioned. I rather doubt that, but again, I could be mistaken, “Reconstructing the Battle of Strasbourg” included any maps. I would also guess that this set of instructions in Issue 23 of Slingshot did not contain any pictures. The engaging and excellent—in my opinion—piece written by Patrick is certainly colorful. There are three photographs of 28 mm miniature Late Romans, all supplied by another well known name in the ancient wargaming community, Simon MacDowall. There are three full-color maps of the contest, showing deployment, mid-point, and conclusion of the battle. There are two wargamer-friendly “force structure” tables as well. While I cannot confidently comment on the possible differences existing in each article with respect to numbers, organization and deployment, my hunch is that each author would respectfully disagree with his counterpart. Finally, I cannot help but wonder what Mr. Barker would say about Patrick’s argument or conclusion, based on reading between the lines of Ammianus, that there were something like 80 carroballistae on the Roman side of the field on that fateful and evidently rather warm day in late summer of 357 AD. The inferred presence of quite a few pieces of Roman field artillery or “mobile missile platforms” (MMPs?) on this ancient battlefield was something not mentioned in other examinations, whether these were academic, “academic,” or conducted by experienced historical miniature wargamers. 

In the wargamer-friendly information provided in the diagrams, speculative orders of battle, and summary explanation found on page 206 of Warfare in the Classical World, there is no mention of carroballistae. Similarly, no mention or reference could be found in a paper authored by Adam Glen Hough in The Graduate History Review: Vol 2 (2010). [3] In his refight of the battle using his Vis Bellica rules, Robert Avery permits the Romans one unit of light artillery, though the rationale behind this decision is not explained. [4] Simon MacDowall might be viewed as an expert on this engagement as he reports, at Legio Wargames.com, having “played the scenario, or versions of it, many times.” [5] Interestingly, in the order of battle using his Comitatus rules, he offers the following option for the Auxilia Palatina contingent: “Up to 2 of these may be crossbowmen to represent the possibility that the Balistarii, Julian had with him prior to the battle were crossbow armed. Another alternative is to have them as artillery.” [6] It was not until about a week or so into this developing project that I typed “Battle of Strasbourg” into an Internet search engine. As one might expect, I was directed to the Wikipedia entry. There was no mention or reference to carroballistae found here either. [7] If “Reconstructing the Battle of Strasbourg” is determined to be the earliest evidence of the clash between Caesar Julian and  King Chnodomar provided by a historical wargamer or earnest student of ancient military history, then the Osprey book “Strasbourg AD 357: The Victory That Saved Gaul,” written by Raffaele D’Amato and Andrea Frediani, might be the most recent work offered on the battle. [8] While it might be interesting to see how this team of authors approaches and or tackles the subject matter, I am rather skeptical that their research will turn up anything new or significant. But again, I concede that I may be mistaken. 

In his excellent article, Patrick contends that the Roman carroballistae:

. . . would have been shooting downslope, the elevation provided by the cart 

        would have been accentuated by the downslope view, allowing them to engage 

        the Alemannic formations over the heads of the Romans. Shooting into packed 

        masses of Alemannic infantry from above, most of the missiles would have 

        struck heads. They would also have struck hard at Alemanni morale. 

In his interpretation of the contest, Patrick has the Romans on a gentle hill or slope. Julian’s outnumbered formations have a slight advantage then, against the roiling mass of barbarians.

The diagrams of the action in Warfare show a low hill of several elevation lines behind the main Roman line of battle. Phrased more succinctly, the majority of Roman troops are positioned on level ground, on the same ground as the more numerous but less professional Alemanni warriors. An opposite view is taken by Mssrs. Barker and MacDowall, as well as by Adam Hough. In his “ancient” article which appeared in Miniature Wargames 12, Phil Barker refers to the Germans “making for the high ground and rough terrain.” Apparently, that is where they stayed until rested and then attacked by the Romans. For Simon MacDowall’s scenario, his table has the barbarians waiting on a gentle hill or ridge (it runs the length of his 6 by 4-foot model battlefield) composed of three elevation lines. In his academic paper, Adam Hough informs:

The tactical preparations made by Chnodomar were entirely negated by Julian’s 

patience and ability to hold his units in formation. Severus’ legion did not fall 

        prey to the ambush on the left flank, and Chnodomar lost the advantage of the 

        hill (bold type is my format change) be being forced to charge Julian at a 

        distance, rather than from short range, as was Alamanni custom.

A careful study of the Ammianus narrative by this wargamer-writer did not yield a definite resolution to this apparent disagreement. The ancient author does refer, in XVI.12.19, to “a hill of gentle slope, covered with grain already ripe, and not far distant from the banks of the Rhine,” but this is the only reference to this particular terrain feature in his account. In Section 141 of the Funeral Oration offered by Libanius, there is another mention of the hill. In this passage, the baggage train guards, “left on the top of the hill,” join the general and evidently rather desperate engagement. Estimating that the camp of Julian might have been a mile or more from the Roman line of battle, I am inclined to “follow” the Warfare diagrams which show a majority of the Romans deployed on level ground. On the other hand, the map included with the Wikipedia description has a certain appeal. In this representation of the battlefield, there is high ground, but its orientation does not appear to favor either side. The direction of this slope runs diagonally, from the far right of the barbarian position to the far right of the Roman line. In his consideration of the engagement, Jonathan Webb comments of the various interpretations of the location of the hill or gentle slope and concludes, “Regardless of which side held this terrain, it does not appear to have significantly affected the battle.” [9] At this time (very early morning of December 02, 2020), I have not decided how or even if I will model this gentle slope on my table top. It was much easier to make a decision about the rough terrain on the Alemanni right.

In his brief description found in Section 140, Libanius informs that Chondomar and his subordinate kings and chieftains “had strengthened their own right wing with a reserve which they concealed behind an elevated water-course, overgrown with reeds, that country being marshy, that concealed them sitting down.” This planned ambush did not succeed, however. Somehow, the Romans advancing on the far left of the line saw this barbarian reserve and, ironically, surprised the warriors into either launching a premature attack or forced them to yield the concealing and rough terrain. The narrative provided by Ammianus supports, generally, this version of events. In XVI.12.23 there is mention made of “secret and puzzling ambuscades.” In XVI.12.26, the Romans on the left, under the direct command of Severus, stop short of springing the ambush, stop short and deploy in front of “trenches filled with (Alemanni) soldiers.” Then, in XVI.12.37, it turns out that the German warriors did launch a premature charge and were “driven back by the force of a left wing marching in close formation.” As with previous sub topics, there is a variety of opinions on this “surprise attack” and the terrain from which it was launched.

The Warfare maps show a line of concealed trenches, just within a wooded area, running nearly perpendicular to the barbarian formations on the far right. Curiously, these trenches are not occupied. A similar depiction is offered in Robert Avery’s Vis Bellica scenario, which leads me to believe that the Warfare information may have been used while preparing his version of the contest. For his Comitatus model of the battle, Simon MacDowall decorates a small fraction of his tabletop with woods (i.e., rough terrain) but notes: “As the Romans suspected the ambush I suggest that there is no point in trying to hide a possible deployment by the Alamanni in the woods.” In the Wikipedia version, there appear to be around 2,000 German warriors positioned in the forest on the far right of Chondomar’s line. These troops are not as condensed or solidly formed as the warrior contingents drawn up in the open. Interestingly, there is no indication of trenches, a water-course, or any other feature that might assist in hiding an ambush. The academic though non-wargamer, at least I guess that he is not, Adam Hough describes the Alamanni right as resting on a canal, and that the ambushing force was “hidden by reeds and carefully constructed ditches.” Turning to the article prepared by Patrick Waterson, it was found that approximately 5,000 Alemanni warriors were placed in ambush, in a stream bed, that ran at an angle to the main line formed by the rest of Chnodomar’s tribal levies and warbands. If only to break up an otherwise featureless and plain-looking table, it seems that some sort of terrain feature or combination of features will have to be positioned on the far right of the barbarian line. Perhaps this feature or combination of features will extend towards the center of this short-edge of the table? Perhaps this feature, whatever final form it takes, will extend all the way to, or brush up against, the Roman left? 

Shifting my attention to the combined concerns of numbers involved, the types of units present, their deployment as well as respective frontages and depths, the disagreement between various interpretations was more pronounced. For example, Patrick explains that, “Ammianus provides only sketchy details for each side’s order of battle.” A reported 35,000 barbarians were present, and Julian’s small army numbered some 13,000, with “only a few contingents distinguished.” Taking the other side, Simon MacDowall offers a similar number for Julian’s army, but informs that “many of his (Julian’s) actual units are known.” With regard to the Alamanni, the tendency of Romans to inflate enemy numbers was noted, so the overall total of barbarians on the actual field may have been closer to 20,000. 

The information found on page 206 of Warfare in the Classical World is, again, wargamer-friendly and, I would remark, readily transferrable to any number of wargame rules for the ancient period. Unlike any other visual representation of the battle, the barbarian infantry are illustrated by small wedge-shaped symbols, which matches the description given by Ammianus in XVI.12.20. There are asterisks next to the Infantry and Cavalry breakdowns, however, noting that the “information about some units’ strength and disposition is incomplete and so speculative.” This speculation is continued on the Wikipedia page, though there does appear to be more thought and research put into the composition of the opposing forces. One of the attractive aspects of this communal effort is that names of possible sub-commanders of the Alemanni are identified. There is also the interesting possibility of a contingent of Burgundian troops being present. On the Roman side, names for the handful of legions that were present are suggested. The supporting auxiliary formations of archers are also indicated. 

The suggested deployment of Julian’s army, as indicated in the full-color map included with the Wikipedia description, seems fairly traditional, if not quintessentially Roman. Slight variations of this interpretation are presented in Simon MacDowall’s model, Robert Avery’s adaptation, the first diagram of the Warfare explanation, and in the estimation offered in the paper written by Adam Hough. In stark contrast, Patrick Waterson argues for a different deployment. Based on his close reading of the source material, especially the narrative provided by Ammianus, his Roman position consists of a main line and a couple of supporting formations. On the Roman right, Patrick places a reserve formation of auxiliaries and legionaries, with the legion infantry positioned on the right or outer flank of the auxiliaries. In Patrick’s version of the historical battle, the Roman center appears dangerously thin, being manned by just three legions, or an estimated total of 4,800 heavy infantry. 

Finally and briefly, the Warfare information indicates that the “German cavalry dismounted at the insistence of the infantry who feared abandonment.” This adjustment was taken to heart by Robert Avery in his Vis Bellica scenario. In his Comitatus scenario, Simon MacDowall gives the barbarian commander/player the option of dismounting his cavalry force. In my opinion, Patrick effectively refutes these interpretations, citing or referencing Sections 21 and 22, 24, 36 and 37 of Ammianus, Book XVI, Chapter 12. 

In the ‘Tips and Tactics’ section of his Strasbourg scenario, Simon MacDowall writes: “This is a fairly simple and straight forward game.” He continues, explaining that he “has played this scenario, or versions of it many times.” While I can see how most wargames featuring Romans and barbarians could be categorized as “simple and straight forward,” the variety of interpretations concerning terrain and troops leads me to believe that a miniature reconstruction of this particular battle may not be so direct and easy. Unlike the accomplished author and well-known wargamer, I have not had the pleasure of refighting this engagement on my tabletop. Drawing inspiration from Patrick’s article, I thought I might address this discrepancy. To be certain, I do not intend to compete with or attempt to surpass Simon MacDowall in this specific regard. However, I do think it might prove educational, engaging, and entertaining to stage five  refights of the contest between Julian and Chnodomar using five different sets of rules. In effect, I would be staging a mini-Battle Day. [10] My amateur effort would be different on a number of levels. For example, and in no particular order of significance, I would be playing all of these wargames solo. Given this approach, the project would necessarily be long-term. Indeed, I estimate that it would take at least five months, if I averaged one game per month, or perhaps half a year to complete the handful of tabletop battles. These wargames would be set up and played using no painted and based miniature figures whatsoever. 

When I can, when the opportunity presents itself, I like to proceed or work in alphabetical order.  The rulebooks that will be employed in this admittedly rather ambitious project are the following: ARMATI 2nd Edition; Hail Caesar; IMPETVS; L’Art de la Guerre or ADLG, and To The Strongest! Each report will follow a similar format and will include a brief critique and evaluation. When all five wargames have been played, I think I will draft a final critique and evaluation, wherein I compare and contrast (briefly) the selected rulesets and perhaps even rank them, though this kind of assessment would be entirely and obviously subjective. 

Post Script:

My original position of being disinclined to find the required amount of funds and send them over the Atlantic so that I could secure a compilation of hundreds of electronic copies of Slingshot weakened as December progressed and then essentially evaporated by the middle of the month. (Given this impressive display of will power, it is probably a good thing that I never started collecting and painting actual miniatures. I can easily picture having a lead mountain the approximate height of the second story window to the immediate right of my writing/typing desk.) Unfortunately, there was a problem with the purchased memory stick which arrived in early January of 2021. This concern was communicated, and a replacement device was soon on its way, courtesy of the excellent customer/member service “department” personnel. Anyway. As I now had access to Issue 23 of this reputable publication, I was able to do a proper comparison/contrast of Barker and Waterson. By complete accident, I stumbled across an article by James Manto in Issue 216 (please see “Slouching Toward Strasbourg: The Battle of Argentoratum (357 AD) Refought” on pages 20-22). As this report directly concerned my current interests, I decided to conduct a brief examination of this “new” material as well.

The demonstration put on my Mr. Barker and, one presumes, his colleagues, took place on March 15 of 1969 at the A.G.M. or Annual General Meeting. To quote, in full, the fifth paragraph of the brief summary: “Strasbourg was selected because it was fought between 35,000 barbarians on the one hand and 13,000 Romans under the Caesar Julian on the other. It thus gives great opportunities to bring out the relative value of discipline and numbers”. With regard to numbers, both authors are in agreement. However, deployments and terrain highlight the differences between the two interpretations. 

Mr. Barker arranges the German infantry in a massed and very deep formation on a steep ridge. Patrick is in agreement about the depth of the barbarian units, but he places the Roman forces on a ridge or at least slightly elevated position. In his view, the Germans have to attack uphill, whereas Mr. Barker has the screaming hordes charging downhill - with, one estimates, quite a bit of impetus. As to the location of Chnodomar, Mr. Barker stations the king on the left of the German deployment, among the light cavalry and supporting light infantry. In Patrick’s version of the historical battle, Chnodomar is with his “elite globus”, which is positioned as a reserve behind the very deep main line of warriors. 

In Mr. Barker’s demonstration, which was a fairly decisive Roman victory and including at least a few ballistae models, the attending players were “satisfied that they had achieved a realistic portrayal”. In fact, they “thought it more realistic than the real battle”. Patrick cannot report the same evidence, for he did not actually wargame the battle. However, his assumption is that any refight might run the risk of being one-sided or worse, boring, as the “historical contest was a Roman walkover with a few exciting moments”. 

As mentioned above, it was by accident that I happened to stumble upon “Slouching Toward Strasbourg . . .”. One afternoon or evening, I was skimming through the contents of the new memory stick, just seeing what was there, and I discovered, fortunately, the engaging article/report by James Manto. (Going back to the provided Index, I typed Argentoratum then Strasbourg in the search window. Curiously, the submission written by James did not appear.) 

The provided orders of battle seemed more in tune with Patrick’s research and were more detailed than the broad statements made in Mr. Barker’s summary. For his reconstruction, James did include two units or models of carroballistae. Evidently and obviously, Argentoratum has been studied before, as James informs that Perry Gray wrote an article for SAGA magazine about the engagement, or at least about the Roman forces that were present. 

In terms of the terrain, due to logistics and trunk space, James opted to ignore the question of which side had the advantage of being on a ridge or low rise; he did keep the large wooded area on the German right/Roman left, however. With respect to deployment, James arranged the Romans in two lines. The legions were in the second line. This placement is quite different from the positions advocated or suggested by Patrick. Like Mr. Barker, James had Chnodomar over on the far left, commanding his few thousand horsemen supported by light troops. 

Over the course of a weekend, James was able to umpire/play three refights of Argentoratum employing his own rules, Legion and Empire. Over the course of this weekend (in early 2001 or late 2000), history was reversed twice. The Germans won on Saturday morning, lost on Saturday afternoon, and forced the Romans to concede on Sunday morning. Like the player-generals in March of 1969, the participants in the games staged by James had an enjoyable experience. 

James concluded his article/report with a few paragraphs on possible revisions to the tabletop refight of Argentoratum. There was talk of dismounting the barbarian cavalry, tinkering with leadership values, toying with terrain, and swapping out the Roman mobile “field artillery” for a unit or two of men armed with crossbows. 

While I will admit to a history of tinkering with established and accepted sets of rules, I think, for the sake of this planned project, that I will try to keep the variables to a minimum. Again, the overall idea is to use Patrick’s article as a foundation and see what I can or might build with five different rulebooks. 

NOTES

1. Patrick Waterson passed away in January of 2020. At the risk of embellishing or overstating, in my estimation, he was a pillar in The Society of Ancients. He was also an encyclopedic force to be reckoned with in its electronic forums as well as in the Guardroom pages of its signature and long-running publication. The Editorial of the March/April 2020 issue of Slingshot was, in essence, an obituary, though one formatted for members of The Society. In the July/August 2020 issue of Slingshot, Professor Phil Sabin offered a written memorial to Patrick titled “Honour and Loss.”   
2. Please see “The Sharp End in AD360,”on pages 13 and 14 of Miniature Wargames, Issue 12. From an advertisement for the ‘National Wargames Championship’ found on page 18, I am guessing that this issue appeared in late 1983 or perhaps early 1984. (I could not help but notice the price. In the UK, the magazine cost 75p. The cost in this country, some 3,000 miles across The Atlantic Ocean, was $3.50.) My guess is that Issue 23 of Slingshot appeared in the post in late 1969 or early 1970. The following link will take the interested reader to the relevant book, chapter, and starting section of the fairly wargamer-friendly narrative written by Ammianus: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0082%3Abook%3D16%3Achapter%3D12%3Asection%3D19
3. Please see “Julian and the Decision to Fight: Strasbourg, 357.” Here is the link to an abstract of the article which will also take the interested reader to the complete paper: https://www.historyoftheancientworld.com/2010/12/julian-and-the-decision-to-fight-strasbourg-357/.
4. Please see https://www.vislardica.com/vb-sc-argentoratum.
5. Please see http://legio-wargames.com/strasbourg/4542978511.
6. On studying Mr. MacDowall’s scenario notes, I wondered if there might be some confusion over the meaning over the word “ballistari.” Could Patrick have interpreted or translated it one way and Mr. MacDowall another? A quick Internet search turned up this interesting page or site: lukeuedasarson.com/Balistarii.html.
7. Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Strasbourg. (Sidebar: In the November 23, 2020 issue of The New Yorker, Louis Menand offered an interesting and thought-provoking article titled “WHAT DO YOU KNOW? Wikipedia, “Jeopardy!,” and the fate of the fact.” I honestly had no idea that Wikipedia would celebrate 20 years on January 15 of 2021. 
8. The publication date for this title, Number 336 in the Osprey Campaign Series, was May 30, 2019. Securing a copy would cost me around 20 US dollars. 
9. Please see www.theartofbattle.com/battle-of-strasbourg-357.
10. For a general overview of this annual event, please see http://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day. For a more detailed look at how Battle Day works, please see http://www.soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/175-battleday-2019-report and http://soa.org.uk/joomla/battle-day/161-soa-battleday-2018-report.

 Explanatory Note:

The following is an article that was submitted to Slingshot in April of 2018. However, submitted does not necessarily translate to accepted and published. At the acknowledged risk of sounding like a broken record (see the previous explanatory notes), I figured that sufficient time had passed. This classic clash would be the fourth solo wargame report posted to my blog.

As with the previous posts, this material was proofread again before posting, but I did not bother to change some of the spelling from British-English back to American-English. I also did not bother to adjust the punctuation from English rules to American format and guidelines. 

ANOTHER RECONSTRUCTION OF RAPHIA

“The Show So Far”

An informal search of the Slingshot Index (1965-2010) produced the following result: evidently, Mr. George Cavanagh was the first member to produce an article about the 217 BC battle between King Antiochus III and King Ptolemy IV Philopater. His report, “Raphia refought with WRG 5th”, was published on pages 25-28 of Slingshot Issue 69. As The Journal of The Society of Ancients began in 1965 (the year of my birth, incidentally), I would estimate that his narrative appeared sometime in 1976. Given that this was such a large battle (the account written by Polybius informs that 175 elephants, 11,000 cavalry, and 132,000 infantry were present on the day), I was somewhat surprised to see that Mr. Cavanagh was able to expound upon his effort in just a few pages. Someday, I should like to read and study his short story. I do not imagine, however, that this pioneering gentleman was the first ancients wargamer to stage the epic contest of Raphia on a table top. I do imagine that this particular record is, probably as well as unfortunately, lost to modern (i.e., twentieth century) history. Mr. Richard Nelson did not refight the battle in miniature, but he did review the Raphia boardgame in Issue 86. Approximately four years after Raphia with WRG 5th graced the pages of the august journal, a Mr. John Boehm picked up the gauntlet. His article, “A Rematch at Raphia [with WRG 6th]”, was published in Issues 95 and 96 of Slingshot. At some point, I should like to sit down and read this two-part report as well. There has been nothing Raphia-related printed in the pages of this read across the globe journal until the January-February 2017 issue (Number 310). In “Pondering the Portrayal of Pachyderms”, I focused on the Seleucid right flank at Raphia, where the two Successor kings engaged in battle on a portion of the wide, flat, and apparently featureless plain. Given the size of this engagement, and given the variety of troop types involved, it is somewhat surprising to see that it has been written about only three times in the pages of this international magazine. Perhaps the impressive or overwhelming size of the contest prevents interested individuals and clubs from staging model reconstructions of the engagement? 

Though coverage in the pages of Slingshot has been sparse, the 217 BC battle of Raphia has been fairly well documented online. An informal search of the Battle Reports forum on the Society Of Ancients website showed that respected member Mr. William Butler has refought the battle of Raphia on at least two occasions. The first occurred around the end of August 2014, at the Pacificon convention, where he staged a refight using more than a few 6 mm figures and employed his Scutarii rules. (Please see http://18clovehamhock.blogspot.com/2014/09/raphia-at-pacificon.html.) The second sizable spectacle took place at the end of March, 2015, at Conquest Sacramento. (Please see http://18clovehamhock.blogspot.com/2015/03/raphia-at-conquest-sacramento.html.) An informal Google search for “Raphia as a miniature wargame” yielded a handful of results. An interpretation of the big battle, using home-grown rules, was posted in mid-July of 2014. (Please see http://wargaming4grownups.blogspot.com/2014/07/raphia-revised.html.) Another treatment of the struggle between Successor kings, using Mr. Priestley’s colourful and popular Hail Caesar rules and also staged with 6 mm figures, was played in mid-February of 2015. (Please see http://irregularwars.blogspot.com/2015/02/hail-caesar-battle-of-raphia-217bc-in.html.) In late April of 2016, Mr. Simon Miller, the well-known wargamer, rules writer, and hobby blogger, staged the most impressive version of Raphia (at least in my opinion) at the Wargames Holiday Centre. (Please see http://bigredbat.blogspot.com/2016/04/raphia-and-other-battles.html.) A cursory search for additional wargaming efforts did not produce many viable returns. At the acknowledged risk of appearing to self-promote, I did stumble across my “Wrestling with Raphia: Being the Account of One Wargamer’s Attempt to Pin Down Polybius”, which was published in the October 2013 issue of Wargames Illustrated magazine. (Please see http://www.flamesofwar.com/Portals/0/all_images/WargamesIllustrated/ArticlePics/WI320/Archive/Wrestling%20with%20Raphia.pdf.)

Given this accumulated coverage of reports about wargaming the battle of Raphia, one might well ask if yet another article about yet another adaptation is necessary or warranted. Regarding coverage in the pages of Slingshot, I would respectfully submit that more than enough time has passed. Additionally, while the battle of Raphia has been modeled on a variety of table tops using a variety of rule systems as well as figure scales, the struggle between King Antiochus III and King Ptolemy IV has not, at least as far as I know, been staged using coloured counters (or other representative pieces) in place of painted miniatures and has not been played using the L’Art de la Guerre rules. The following narrative, for lack of a better introduction, is a report of how I went about refighting the 217 BC battle of Raphia with coloured counters instead of painted and prepared units of miniature figures and employing L’Art de la Guerre or ADLG. 

Preparations

After reviewing the collected source material and considering a number of options, I started this rather ambitious solo project by modeling the cavalry of the guard on the far left of Ptolemy’s line of battle with three units of heavy cavalry. Every one of these “squadrons” would have the impact ability. As King Ptolemy would be riding with this “regiment” of horse, it seemed justifiable to upgrade one of the units to elite. The royal person would not be integrated or attached to any of these formations, however. He was deployed as an individual commander, though he was, of course, accompanied by a suite of subordinates, couriers, and similar types. Instead of positioning the contingent of Cretans next in line, I moved the light infantry archers (at least I presumed that they would be archers as opposed to another type of unit) under the respective commands of Cnopias of Allaria and Philo of Cnossus forward so that they could be a part of the screen of 40 elephants. Six bases or stands of Cretan bowmen were prepared; four of these units were classed as elite skirmishers. For the pachyderms, I built four units. Half were designated African elephants. Being smaller by comparison as well as lacking towers, these creatures were rated as mediocre. The other half were designated as Indian elephants, with towers and crews, so these animals were rated as elite. 

For the cavalry under the command of Polycrates, I fabricated four bases of Egyptian light cavalry armed with javelins. To represent the Libyan horse, I made eight bases of mediocre medium cavalry. Initially, I thought I would upgrade the infantry of the Royal Guard to elite, but after rereading the section of the ancient author’s narrative account about their performance, I decided to keep them as regular troops. To represent this formation, three units of heavy spearmen were produced. Their embedded commander was Eurylochus of Magnesia. This officer would also control the four units of peltasts (light-medium infantry with javelins) and three units of mediocre heavy infantry pikemen. Socrates the Boeotian was a personality attached to the peltasts. Ammonius of Barce was a personality attached to the Libyans who were armed in the Macedonian fashion. Taken all together, this left wing of Ptolemy’s larger army formed a line 25 units long. There was an elephant and skirmisher screen of 10 units in front of Polycrates’ cavalry. To maximize the available playing surface, I reduced the footprint of each unit type so that its frontage measured just 2 cm. Unit depths were adjusted accordingly. As a result, the left wing of Ptolemy’s army extended for approximately 60 cm.

Turning my attention to the centre of Ptolemy’s army, I fabricated 24 units of heavy infantry pikemen to represent the Macedonian portion of the impressive phalanx. Four of these units were upgraded to elite. Andromachus of Aspendus was the overall commander of the formation. He led a corps of 12 units of pikemen. His subordinate, Ptolemy, the son of Thraseas, commanded the other half of the Macedonian phalanx. To represent the approximately 20,000 native Egyptian troops who were, evidently, heavily armed, I prepared 12 units of mediocre heavy infantry pikemen and 6 units of Levy. Two-thirds of this formation was under the command of Sosibius, while the remaining six units were led by an anonymous subordinate. The entire phalanx of King Ptolemy IV occupied 90 cm, roughly, of my flat and featureless model battlefield. 

Proceeding to the right wing of Ptolemy’s long line, I prepared five units of heavy spearmen and three units of medium spearmen to represent the Greek mercenaries under the command of Phoxidas. Dionysius the Thracian led four units of Thracian medium swordsmen along with two units of impetuous medium swordsmen. These troops represented the Gauls identified by Polybius. Five units of cavalry were produced to represent the horsemen under the command of Echecrates the Thessalian. This was a mixed force, containing one unit of Galatian heavy cavalry (elite), three units of Greek medium cavalry, and one unit of Nubian light cavalry armed with javelins. Three units of African elephants formed a screen in front of the mixed formation of troopers. These pachyderms did not have a skirmisher screen and were classed as mediocre, like their brothers and sisters on the left wing. Echecrates was nominated as overall commander for this sector. His troops had a footprint of approximately 36 cm. 

Shifting my focus to the Seleucid side of the ancient battlefield, I started with the left wing of the army deployed by King Antiochus III. Guessing at the composition of the 2,000 cavalry under the command of Themison, I fabricated two units of light cavalry with bows to represent Scythians, one unit of mediocre light camelry with bows to represent Bedouins, and five units of medium cavalry. The Lydian javelineers and Cardacian troops were represented by one unit of light-medium infantry armed with javelins and two mixed units of medium spearmen and archers. The personality embedded with this small contingent was Lysimachus the Gaul. The command of Menedemus was next in line. This formation contained two units of light infantry slingers, two units of light infantry archers, and four units of light-medium infantry armed with javelins. A mixed block of 5,000 foot soldiers was on the right of the light troops. This command, under Aspasianus the Mede included five units of mediocre medium spearmen with missile support. The large Arab contingent (which, according to the ancient author, included several neighboring tribes) led by one Zabdibelus, was modeled with 10 units of medium infantry. Six of these were spearmen, and three of these units had missile support. The other four units were swordsmen. Four units of elite elephants were positioned as a screen in front of the contingent led by Aspasianus. The pachyderms were joined by the Lydians and Cardacians. Given that Zabdibelus commanded the largest contingent on this flank, he was nominated as the overall commander in this sector. The units under his control stretched across approximately 65 cm of my table top. 

The centre sector of this young king’s battle line contained two phalanxes. The larger formation was under the shared command of Nicarchus and Theodotus (surnamed Hemiolius). Nineteen units of heavy infantry pikemen were prepared to represent this phalanx. Eleven units were led by Nicarchus, and the remaining units were led by Theodotus. Roughly a third of the units in this large phalanx were rated as mediocre. The smaller phalanx, the one containing men carrying silver shields and commanded by Theodotus the Aetolian, was represented by 10 units of heavy infantry pikemen. Three of these bases or stands were upgraded to elite troops. The footprint of these combined phalanxes equaled approximately 60 cm of the model plain. 

For the right, the wing under the direct command of King Antiochus III, I started with the elephant screen. Six stands of elite elephants were prepared. These pachyderms were led by Philip, a foster-brother to the king. The 2,500 Cretans were taken out of the line and placed with the elephants. Five bases of elite light infantry bowmen were built. Sixteen units of cavalry were fabricated to represent the powerful force of horsemen under the command of Antipater. Three of these “squadrons” were elite heavy cavalry. These units had the impact ability. Two “squadrons” were regular heavy cavalry. This corps of five units was reserved for King Antiochus. The other command included the following formations: three units of regular medium cavalry, a contingent of Galatians (five units of elite medium cavalry), and three units of Scythians. These “squadrons” were light cavalry armed with bows. The mercenaries from Greece were represented by five units of heavy spearmen. These soldiers were under the command of Hippolochus the Thessalian. The ad-hoc formation led by Byttacus the Macedonian was modeled with five units of mediocre medium infantry pikemen. Choosing to skip the reported angled deployment of a portion of Antipater’s cavalry, the right wing of the Seleucid army occupied roughly 55 cm of my table. 

How it Played: Turn by Turn

Map 1 illustrates the look of my finished model battlefield. In general, the opposing deployments matched the description provided by Polybius. According to the ancient author’s narrative, both commanders “started the dance” by ordering their elephants - those screening the right wing of Antiochus and those screening the left wing of Ptolemy - into action, so I flipped a coin to see who would have the first move of the refight and consequently, the first move for each turn. Luck smiled on King Antiochus III. He would “lead” and King Ptolemy IV Philopater would “follow”.

Turn 1 - King Antiochus signaled for his cavalry, elephants, and other troops on both wings to start forward. The Arab contingent and other blocks of the phalanx remained still. King Ptolemy replied in kind but added the Egyptian phalanx to his orders. These mediocre troops started out rather well, with two-thirds of the pikemen under the command of Sosibius advancing at a quick-march. The elephant and skirmisher screen in front of Ptolemy’s position walked forward until they were nearly in range of the enemy. 

Turn 2 - On the Seleucid left, Themison moved his cavalry away from approaching enemy pachyderms. His Scythians and Bedouins, however, were able to contact the enemy light horse and send them packing after an ineffective exchange of missiles. Having scared away the enemy cavalry, the Ptolemaic elephants wheeled to their left in order to advance upon the enemy elephants. In the centre of the field, the numerous phalanxes began moving toward each other, albeit slowly. The Arab contingent under Zabdibelus did not join in this general advance. Over on the wing where the opposing rulers had situated themselves (the “kings’ wing” as it came to be known), the Seleucid skirmishers had drawn first blood in an exchange of arrows. The mix of Ptolemaic elephants were urged forward past their accompanying light infantry. In the ensuing contest with the enemy elephants, the initial advantage went to the combination of African and Indian animals. On the outside of this shoving match, opposing elements of each king’s guard cavalry charged. Men fell on both sides of the swirling contest. However, neither royal personality was involved at this point.

Turn 3 - Contradicting the narrative written by Polybius, the weaker elephants of King Ptolemy were proving especially capable or lucky with their melee dice. Half of the elephants posted on this wing by King Antiochus panicked or perished this turn. The remainder advanced against the infantry of the Royal Guard under Eurylochus. These foot soldiers suffered severely at the feet, tusks, and pike-armed crews of the lumbering animals. To the right of the Royal Guard, the phalanx of Ammonius had been engaged by the phalanx under Byttacus. There were some losses on both sides, but the struggle between these deep formations would continue. On the other side of this sector, the melee between units of guard cavalry continued without either side gaining a notable advantage. As both sides contained elite formations and all troopers were rated as heavy horse, many combats resulted in ties due to the inherent armour bonus. In the middle of the plain, the opposing phalanxes continued their measured advance. The distance between the Egyptian infantry and the Arab contingent was closing; the distances between the phalanxes on the other side of this sector were still fairly substantial. On the Ptolemaic right wing, the medium spearmen belonging to Phoxidas managed to force the light infantry under Menedemus to run away, at least for the time being. The Thracians under Dionysius had a very bad time with the enemy elephants who charged into their lines. The Gauls escaped this melee but were able to witness friendly elephants rout an enemy unit of Cardaces. Further out on the flank, the cavalry under Echecrates caught up with a unit of fleeing Scythian horse but even with the advantage of numbers and position, the Greek cavalry were unable to inflict any damage. Adding injury to insult, the Scythians managed to give the pursuing enemy horse a bit of a bloody nose.

Turn 4 - Embarrassed by this development, the Greek cavalry doubled their efforts and were successful in running down the enemy light troopers. Additional casualties on this flank were produced when a unit of elephants ran into and then over a unit of Gauls. Pachyderms led by Myïcus engaged the enemy, and another unit of Thracians collapsed. This rout resulted in the death of Dionysius, the first named officer or personality to be lost on the day. The medium spearmen of Phoxidas took a hit from the javelin volley loosed by the Thracians under Menedemus. The medium foot followed up and the resulting melee saw men falling on both sides of the ragged battle line. A very small portion of the Egyptian phalanx had been contacted by allied troops, but this fighting was inconclusive. Back on the outer edge of this sector, there was a bit of an intermission in the cavalry contest. Echecrates noted that he was outnumbered. The elephants of both sides, having taken a few losses, continued to lumber in different directions. Meanwhile, the opposing phalanxes continued to advance. The distance between the opposing formations of pikemen continued to shrink. Over on the “kings’ wing”, there had been some progress made in the clash between guard cavalry formations. Both sides had lost a unit in the struggle. Ptolemy now faced uncomfortable odds. Fortunately, the reserve formations of Polycrates were nearby. Three units of Egyptian light horse galloped forward to harass the Seleucid “squadrons” while Ptolemy sorted out his remaining elite troopers. In the approximate centre of this sector, 30 elephants had broken through and were “running” toward the cavalry lines of Antipater. Closer to the centre of the field, the Royal Guard continued to struggle against the Seleucid elephants, and the infantry under Byttacus and Ammonius remained locked in combat. (Map 2 depicts the state of a portion of the field at the conclusion of this game turn.)

Turn 5 - On the Ptolemaic right wing, a swing in fortune occurred when Echecrates was killed in a chaotic cavalry melee. Themison appeared to have an advantage, but his infantry friends were not faring so well against the enemy formations. The allied units under Aspasianus were being punished by the heavy spearmen mercenaries led by Phoxidas. A few units of Egyptian pikemen joined in this one-sided melee. The surviving Gauls were proving stubborn in battling a unit of elephants. While Menedemus and this Thracian light-medium infantry had done well against the medium spearmen of Phoxidas, these javelin-carrying units were reduced in the process and would not be able to do much else on this side of the field. On the right-centre of the plain, the Egyptian phalanx had come to grips with the Arab contingent. Though the men fighting with Zabdibelus were doing very well (they had succeeded in routing an opposing unit), overall, the contingent was doing rather poorly. The Arabs had lost almost half of their strength. That Themison would be able to make any headway on this flank with what remained of his cavalry was rather doubtful. Back over on the “kings’ wing”, the guard cavalry of Antiochus was held up by the Egyptian light horse. This permitted Ptolemy to move his guard cavalry against the flank and rear of the enemy units. In a matter of minutes, the cavalry of Antiochus was taking losses. The king found himself involved in the fighting but managed to stay alive. Antipater briefly considered trying to swarm the enemy elephants approaching his position. His horsemen could swat away the skirmishers, but the elephants, even though most were of mediocre quality, would be an entirely different matter. He chose to withdraw and play for time. In the infantry struggle, a unit of the Royal Guard commanded by Eurylochus engaged some elephants led by Philip. Another unit of Seleucid elephants was eliminated through the combined efforts of a decimated but stubborn unit of the Royal Guard and some flanking peltasts. The combat involving the opposing formations of Byttacus and Ammonius saw more men falling in the ranks. Unfortunately, Byttacus was one of these casualties. 

Turn 6 - In the centre of the wide and featureless plain, the formations of the opposing phalanxes finally came into contact. In one part of the massive melee, the initial advantage appeared to be with Andromachus and his pikemen. This block of heavy infantry had succeeded in inflicting losses against and so disordering six units of enemy pikemen. In contrast, the heavy infantry under Nicarchus were only able to cause disorder in two of the units in the Ptolemaic phalanx. To the right, or left, depending on one’s perspective, of this crush of men, shields, and pike points, the situation was rather reversed. Here, the phalanx under Theodotus was having its way against the men led by Ptolemy, son of Thraseas. The Ptolemaic heavy infantry had seven units in disorder compared to just two for the Seleucids. While the “push of pike” was taking place, men and leaders continued to fall on the wings of the battle. On the Seleucid left wing, Themison was speared from his horse in a swirling melee. While he had the numbers, he did not have the luck or sense to stay away from the front line fighting. The Arab contingent and other troops kept fighting against the men under Phoxidas and various units of the Egyptian phalanx, but they also kept losing melees. Slightly behind this scrum, some 20 elephants led by Myïcus engaged some enemy skirmishers. These archers and slingers were the light troops belonging to the command of Menedemus. Over on the other wing, disaster visited the Seleucids. King Antiochus was involved in a melee, fighting with a damaged unit of his guard cavalry against a number of enemy formations. The monarch and his men were caught from behind by a charge of a unit of King Ptolemy’s guard horse. It was over in a few moments. King Antiochus was killed and his “regiment” was routed. Not too far away from this dramatic development, Antipater continued to withdraw his cavalry in the face of enemy pachyderm pressure. 

With the demise of King Antiochus, I paused the wargame to count up the demoralisation points on each side. Thus far, the Seleucids had 22 units in disorder and had lost 28 units. Adding in the points for Byttacus, Themison, and King Antiochus III, the Seleucids had accumulated 82 demoralisation points. In rather stark contrast, the Ptolemaic army had lost 18 units and had 20 units in disorder. With regard to lost leaders, Echecrates and Dionysius were confirmed as killed in action. Ptolemy was looking at a current demoralisation total of 59 points. Given the loss of Antiochus and the difference in army demoralisation points, I considered stopping the wargame. The score seemed very much in favour of Ptolemy and his forces. However, thinking that it would probably take some time for the bad news to spread across the battlefield, I decided to play another turn, or at least for part of another turn.

Turn 7 - On the Ptolemaic right wing, the cavalry of Echecrates, now led by a subordinate, was finally able to conquer the cavalry of Themison. In other contests, the surviving Gauls (not all that many were left) were able to destroy the few elephants still bothering them. A unit of light infantry archers were scattered or trampled by a group of elephants led by Myïcus. Hard fighting continued between the Egyptians, the Arabs, and the contingent led by Aspasianus. Again, the Arabs were suffering terrible losses. Of their original strength of 10 units, only three remained, and two of these were disordered. Casualties increased in the centre of the field as well, for the Levy units of the Egyptian phalanx were charged by the enemy. Two units of Levy simply evaporated and two others were severely damaged compared to the light losses suffered by the Seleucids. In the fights between the other phalanx formations, gaps started to appear in the line. (Map 3 provides a snapshot of the melee between the heavy infantry pikemen of Ptolemy and Theodotus.) The death of King Antiochus seemed to usher in a kind of pause or intermission in the fighting on the left wing. The cavalry of King Ptolemy were cleaning up and reorganizing. The horsemen under Polycrates were waiting for new orders. Some distance to their front, approximately 30 elephants and a handful of skirmishers continued to chase the retreating cavalry of Antipater. 

A new calculation of demoralisation points revealed that the Seleucids were now at 95. The vast majority of these were due to destroyed or routed units. The dice had not been very kind to King Ptolemy IV, as his previous demoralisation total had spiked by almost 20 points. His army had lost 57 points in routed units and lost leaders. An additional 21 points came from disordered units. The Seleucids were very nearly at their tipping point. Given the overall condition of the field, it was decided to call the contest in favour of King Ptolemy and his army. A rather steep price had been paid to secure the victory, however. 

Remarks

According to the narrative of Polybius, Ptolemy’s win at Raphia was decisive and was attributed to the action of his phalanx as well as to the cavalry and mercenaries on his right wing. In terms of total losses, Ptolemy’s army was barely scratched. The formations under King Antiochus suffered five-times as many casualties, and several thousand more of his soldiers were captured. Strangely enough, the elephant arm of King Ptolemy’s force was completely wrecked. Though he won the field, Polybius informs that 16 of Ptolemy’s pachyderms were killed and that most of the remaining animals were captured. 

According to the narrative of Polybius, the course of the action on the plain of Raphia might be divided into three phases. First, there was the contest on the “kings’ wing”. This resulted in a local advantage for King Antiochus, as the panicking elephants on Ptolemy’s side disrupted the various formations of his left wing. Second, there was the contest between Echecrates and Themison on the other wing. In something of a reversal of what took place on the other wing, the cavalry led by Echecrates and the mercenaries under Phoxidas were able to overwhelm the Seleucids positioned opposite them. The third and final act of the Raphia play took place in the centre of the field. Here, the phalanxes of King Ptolemy, encouraged by the man himself (who had “retreated” here after the defeat of his left wing), were able to overcome the enemy formations. While my reconstruction did result in a similar outcome, I do not believe that the wargame victory secured by King Ptolemy can be called decisive. Further, I do not think that the action on my table top could be neatly divided into three distinct phases. To be certain, the fighting in my wargame reconstruction did commence on the “kings’ wing” and then develop on the other wing. To be sure, the contest between the opposing phalanxes did not begin until very late in the battle. However, on my table, these various contests seemed to blend into one larger engagement, into one general action. The historical account, again, suggests three distinct phases. Looking at my wargame in detail, regarding the struggle involving the various formations led by King Antiochus and King Ptolemy, the dice fell in favour of Ptolemy. This was especially evident in the performance of his elephant corps. Instead of his cavalry and infantry being discomforted by panicked friendly pachyderms, they were quite able to handle the few enemy animals that managed to make it through the screen to engage their line. More than half of Ptolemy’s elephants broke through the enemy line and gave chase to the cavalry of Antipater, thereby effectively removing this force from the battle. In stark contrast to the progress of the historical contest, King Antiochus became involved in a desperate melee where his guard cavalry was involved. As reported above, his engaged formation was attacked from the rear, and this resulted in his elimination as well as the complete destruction of the unit to which he was attached. Shifting the focus to the other wing, my reconstruction was different from the reported course of the historical battle. For example, there was no flanking move conducted by Echecrates and a supporting division of foot soldiers. On my table, the cavalry under Echecrates and Themison engaged in a fairly straightforward combat. This swirling melee resulted in the death of both officers. For another example, on this wing, the mercenaries under Phoxidas did more fighting against the troops led by Menedemus than they did against the Arab contingent. The Arabs made the mistake, evident only after the fact, unfortunately, of engaging a portion of the Egyptian phalanx. In brief summary, the opposing formations of cavalry and elephants in this sector spent themselves in various and prolonged melees, while the Egyptian heavy infantry pikemen, even though mediocre in rating, were able to push their way through the opposing ranks of Arab tribesmen. 

In the centre of my table top, while action was still taking place on both wings, the opposing phalanxes finally came to grips. As noted above, this fight went back and forth, and casualties as well as gaps were produced in both battle lines. This struggle was not completed however, as the larger contest had been essentially decided on the flanks. Again, in stark contrast to the historical record, there was no collapse of the Seleucid formations, and there was no pursuit by the rampaging units of Ptolemaic cavalry. As also remarked previously, my reconstruction was quite different from the actual battle with regard to the casualties suffered by both sides. When the wargame was ended, the Seleucids were just a few points away from their determined morale collapse. Their opponents were roughly 30 points away from their “morale tipping point”, but the Ptolemaic formations on my table top had certainly suffered more in this modern day interpretation than they did in the actual battle. The account provided by Polybius does not specify if any of the listed personalities were lost on the field. In my reconstruction, more than several leaders were killed in action, the most prominent of these was, of course, King Antiochus. 

Though I now have a couple of years of experience using L’Art de la Guerre, I am still a student of these rules. I am still learning the nuances and how to employ effective tactics; I am still poring over the latest version of the FAQs as well as studying the latest official amendments. In general, I think the rules did a pretty good job of handling my reconstruction of Raphia. It is, obviously, a very big battle. It can, for a solo wargamer, be something akin to a Herculean task in terms of preparation and playing time. (I did not complete an exact count, but I would estimate that each army had close to 100 units.) However, spread over the course of several days, and through 7-plus turns, I was able to manage and produce a historical result. As explained, my refight was not an exact reproduction of the battle. This was not my purpose; this was not my goal. It would be foolish of me to state that the wargame was mistake-free. Taking a critical look at strategy, I committed the blunder of moving the Arab contingent into melee. I also should have kept the Egyptian Levy out of harm’s way. My positioning of King Antiochus was neither ideal nor prudent. Even though I have some experience with ADLG, there are aspects of the rules that still trouble me. At one point in my reconstruction, a unit of Scythian light cavalry was caught from behind by heavier enemy units of horse. The light cavalry troopers were not able to disengage, and so, were destroyed. This struck me as a bit unusual, given the comparative speed or rate of movement of the involved units. It seemed to me that light cavalry and similar units should at least have a chance of disengaging from a losing melee, even if they are assaulted from the flank or rear. On a few occasions, units were flanked by enemy formations who had managed to move past the imaginary front line of the engaged formation. Per the rules, flanked units are allowed to reorient themselves. This provision still strikes me as artificial as well as historically inaccurate. I will have to do additional research, however, in order to support my case. At the same time, however, I can understand that certain mechanics do help the game to move along. I can see that certain processes make the sub-phases of a turn simpler and smoother. As the melees between opposing units of guard cavalry developed, I found myself missing the fatigue rules that are an integral part of Armati 2nd Edition. I was also reminded of the attraction of fatigue when the phalanx formations clashed during the later stages of the battle. Along with these comparatively minor and admittedly subjective concerns, I found myself wondering about the command and control rules used in ADLG. In these rules, there does not seem to be as much friction or potential for friction as there is in other sets of rules. Yes, I understand that one does have to make decisions about who or what to move and who or what to rally as the larger action progresses, but with general movement, there never seems to be any worry or anxiety about troops not doing what you want them to do. On this particular point, I am thinking of To The Strongest!, Armati, Hail Caesar, and DBM/DBMM. These rules, it seems to me, provide for  more of a chance of or occurrence of “battlefield friction”. More experienced players of ADLG will, no doubt, object to and or perhaps even provide further explanation about these points. I look forward to reading their comments and learning from them. In a similar vein, I am fairly sure that some readers might take exception to this interpretation of Raphia. 

More experienced and knowledgeable practitioners of ancient wargaming will probably take exception to my orders of battle. These accomplished gentlemen might also object to the way I chose to model the various formations as well as wargame the battle. I readily admit that there was a certain amount of guesswork involved when it came to building the opposing armies. For example, I decided to keep the peltasts under Socrates as light-medium infantry armed with javelins as opposed to arming them with pikes. Given the reported skirmishing that took place in the days before the general engagement, I decided to give a few units of light cavalry to each side. The composition of the large phalanxes employed by each king was also a matter of educated guessing. Generally speaking and understanding that I will very probably be corrected, I think I did more right than wrong in preparing and playing this wargame. While cleaning up my table (the wargame was completed on the same day as Paraetacene was being staged on more than several tables at Sycamore Hall - the annual Battle Day event hosted by The Society of Ancients), I thought about revisiting Raphia with a different set of rules at some point in this year or the next. I wondered how an Armati version of this massive battle might play. I also wondered if I could fabricate some type of homegrown set of rules, wherein one “figure” or strength point represented 100 actual soldiers. In this way, the guard cavalry on the far left of King Ptolemy’s line would have 7 “figures” or strength points and the “Silver Shields” on the Seleucid side of the dry and dusty plain would have 100 “figures” or strength points organized in 5 units of 20 perhaps. At the same time, I also wondered about using Hail Caesar. Yes, yes, I know. It’s already been done. However, I have not had the pleasure or privilege. 

Sources and Suggested Reading

The translation of the narrative account written by Polybius was found here: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/5*.html. My attention was focused on the wargamer-friendly information provided in Chapters 65, 79, and 82-85. It occurred to me that an interesting and potentially exciting skirmish-level game could be developed revolving around the attempt of Theodotus the Aetolian to assassinate Ptolemy IV while the Successor king was sleeping in his command tent. With regard to drafting the orders of battle, I used the respective army lists found on pages 102 and 103 of the L’Art de la Guerre rule book. This information was supplemented by the material found on pages 20 and 21 of Book 2 of the D.B.M. Army Lists. I also looked at the Early Ptolemaic and Early Seleucid lists provided in the Extra IMPETVS 4 supplement. The decision to give the Ptolemaic army a number of Indian elephants was the result of reading “Elephants at Raphia: Reinterpreting Polybius 5.84-85”. This paper appeared in Classical Quarterly 57 on pages 306-311. The author was Michael B. Charles of Queensland University of Technology, Australia. (See https://eprints.qut.edu.au/9144/1/9144a.pdf.) The diagrams, order of battle, and explanatory summary on page 93 of Warfare in the Classical World were also studied. It was interesting to compare this interpretation, especially the opposing deployments, to the narrative account of Polybius. 

Typing the key words “wargaming Raphia” into Google returned 25,600 results in .53 seconds. Obviously, I did not study all of them. I did, however, stumble across Professor Sabin’s treatment of Raphia in his excellent book, Lost Battles: Recreating the Great Clashes of the Ancient World. This chapter was read with great interest. I also enjoyed reading Mr. Michael Park’s article, “Climax of the Syrian Wars: The battle of Raphia, 217 BC”. This analysis was published in the November-December 2010 issue of Ancient Warfare magazine. This material is also available at Academia.edu. Two additional articles were discovered that I would recommend to interested readers. These can be viewed at

http://www.arsbellica.it/pagine/antica/Raphia/Raphia_eng.html and http://www.burnpit.us/2015/06/battle-raphia-egyptian-army-defeats-seleucid-invaders, respectively.

Post Script:

Nearly three years after drafting and editing this narrative, I was able to secure the “Golden Years of Slingshot memory Stick: 1965-2015,” and so, was able to do a close reading of Mr. Boehm’s two-part article. (Note: The formal title of Mr. is used as a general term of respect. I have never met the gentleman and feel more than a little awkward or uncomfortable in using his first name.) A quick comparison/contrast was done. Though he does not state it directly, one could infer that all the player-generals involved in his enterprise enjoyed the experience. If I did not make it clear, my refight of Raphia was also quite enjoyable. Both efforts, even though they were separated by almost four decades, saw a repeat of history on the respective tabletops. To state the obvious, Mr. Boehm and his colleagues used WRG 6th Edition rules and miniature figures. I employed the ADLG rules and did not use any miniature figures whatsoever. As to the orders of battle, it appears I fell into an ancient trap with regard to the size of the phalanx on the Ptolemaic side of the battlefield. This mistake is duly noted. If, at some future date, I attempt to stage another refight of Raphia using a different set of rules, I will be sure to take the excellent analysis and arguments made by Mr. Boehm into account.