No Painting Required: March 2021

Saturday, March 13, 2021

Explanatory Note:

I have had the pleasure and privilege of being a contributor to Slingshot, The Journal of The Society of Ancients, for a number of years. According to my records, between Issue 371 (July/August 2014) and Issue 332 (September/October 2020), my material, be it wargame report, “research paper,” book review, Guardroom letter/response, or other item, has appeared 32 times. (This number does not include the imaginative Armati report that appeared in the January 2010 issue. This figure represents roughly a quarter of the total number of articles and reports I have submitted to other magazines such as MWAN, Lone Warrior, Miniature Wargames, and Wargames Illustrated, to name several.)

In June of 2020, I was informed by the editor of this august publication that “I was the one contributor who supplies more material than could be incorporated into the journal. There needed to be a spread of contributors to avoid the perception of any single one becoming too dominant.” Confusingly as well as ironically, in the course of this email exchange, I was asked to write more articles like the one I submitted about war wagons. Coincidentally and tragically, during that same month, our family experienced a terrible if inevitable loss. In a state of grief, which, admittedly, is not the ideal state of mind to draft and send emails, I responded in the following manner: “Publish, don’t publish, create PDFs, don’t create PDFs. All due respect to your office, your talent and responsibilities as editor of Slingshot, I find it very difficult to muster a sufficient and suitable level of concern.”

It is now late March of 2021. Ever so slowly, my interest in ancient wargaming and writing about ancient wargaming has returned. In addition to several new ideas or projects, I have a few file folders full of articles that were submitted to Slingshot but declined for the reason(s) explained above.

The following is an article that was submitted to that excellent and long-running publication in February of 2018. Figuring that more than enough time has passed, and curious to see if this kind of material is of interest to the casual wargamer as well as staunch enthusiast of “all things having to do with warfare in the ancient era,” I thought I would make it the third official post on my blog.

While it was proofread again before posting, I did not bother to change some of the spelling from British-English back to American-English. I also did not bother to adjust the punctuation from English rules to American format and guidelines.

ZAMA EXHUMED,

RE-EXAMINED, AND RE-IMAGINED

It would, I think, be fair to remark that the 202 BC contest between Hannibal and Scipio has received a decent amount of coverage in the pages of Slingshot. The venerable CS Grant initiated the reporting with his simply titled “Zama” in Issue 35. Over 16 years would pass before the next article about the engagement appeared. In Issue 142, Paul McDonnell Staff analyzed the “Generalship at the Battle of Zama”. The first wargame reconstruction of the historic battle was published in Issue 145, when Richard Thomas and Andy Grainger provided their narrative account in “Zama Refought [with WRG 7th]”. The very next installment of Slingshot saw “Frightful Execution [Game of Elephants at Zama]”, offered by the younger and developing-as-a-professor Duncan Head. Following the example set by Mssrs. Thomas and Grainger, Justin Taylor, Thane Maxwell, and Mervyn Cartwright submitted narratives of their experiences with or at Zama. [1] Approximately 45 issues after Mr. Cartwright’s brief, Steven James returned, in Issue 241, to historical analysis with “Zama: The Infantry Battle Revisited”. Russ King followed right away in Issue 242 with “Hannibal in Zamaset - Clevedon Spring 2005”. The well-read-especially-with-respect-to-the-ancient-sources Patrick Waterson left his mark in Issue 262 with the palindrome-as-title “Amazed am I ere I made Zama”. Four months (or two issues) later, Mark Watson reviewed Brian Todd Carey’s book, Hannibal’s Last Battle: Zama & The Fall of Carthage. The contest between Hannibal and Scipio had the distinct honour of being selected as the engagement to be played on many tabletops with many sets of rules for Battle Day 2010. Narrative accounts of the success of this event, the seventh annual gathering at Sycamore Hall, were published in Issues 268, 271, 272, and 273. [2]

Though the pages of this august publication have been silent with respect to Zama and Zama related material for a span of approximately seven years, the various and interesting discussion threads on the Society’s multiple forums have not been quiet. Oddly enough, while lamenting as well as wondering about an evident and disconcertingly sudden lack of interest in “miniature” wargaming, in early February of 2018, I found myself suddenly interested in revisiting and refighting the battle of Zama. [3] On reviewing the previously mentioned Battle Day 2010 accounts, it was noted, obviously, that L’Art de la Guerre (often called ADLG) had not been one of the rule sets used. The idea of trying to rekindle my interest in ancient wargaming appealed, and greatly. The thought of producing another battle report also held a certain attraction. Even though Zama had already been selected as a Battle Day engagement, I figured that enough time had passed. While reacquainting myself with the academic analyses of Lazenby and Carey, and refreshing my memory by rereading the narrative of Polybius [4], I happened across a few posts while scanning the Forum discussion threads that drove me in a new direction. Instead of producing yet another battle report of yet another historical action fought (wargamed) using ADLG, I would attempt something different.

The Roy Boss Revision

In a June 21, 2013 post to the ‘Reserves and End Game Conditions’ discussion thread, Society member and former President Roy Boss wondered “why didn’t Hannibal use his elephants, or at least some of them on the flanks?” [5] In the first half of February 2018, in an attempt to answer this question, I set up an ADLG scenario. Map 1 depicts the look of my model battlefield prior to the first roll of command dice. Over the course of a few days, five complete turns were played. In the middle of the sixth turn, just before the Romans became the active or phasing side, I paused to take stock of the field and general situation.

On the Roman right, Tychaeus had met his end while fighting against Numidian infantry. His cavalry contingent had been overwhelmed by the superior numbers under the overall command of Masinissa. A little more than half of Masinissa’s squadrons were riding free on Hannibal’s left. They had not yet concentrated, so they posed no immediate threat to the invader of Italy’s second or third line. The rest of Masinissa’s horsemen were “playing tag” with a smaller number of pachyderms. (Several volleys of javelins had landed with effect as the Numidian cavalry dashed to and fro, avoiding the tusks and weight of the gray-skinned and smelly animals.) In the center of the flat and featureless plain, after a few turns of missile exchanges between the opposing lines of skirmishers (Mago’s Balearic slingers and Moorish archers did better, having the range on as well as better dice than the Velites), the Celts and Ligurians engaged the Hastati of both the Roman and Allied legions. To paraphrase a line from Shakespeare, the attack by the Celts and Ligurians was full of sound and fury but in the end, did essentially nothing to the orderly line of heavy infantry. The sole exception was the success of a single unit of Celts against some Hastati of the Allied legion posted on the left. A very small hole was punched in the Roman line, but there were no troops available to exploit the breech. For all intents and purposes, Mago only had his skirmishers left with which to annoy the enemy line. On the Roman left, things were not going at all well for Scipio and his subordinates. Dacamas and his small contingent of Numidians refused to face the heavier enemy horse as well as the much heavier enemy elephants. The squadrons of Italian cavalry under Laelius tried to hold the line but were not successful. At one point, Laelius abandoned his men to their fate, but he was soon caught up in the fight and met his end in a swirling contest of snorting horses, thrusting spears, and slashing swords. Shortly after this event, Dacamas recovered his courage and attacked a formation of Punic cavalry. His men did well at first, but the weight and numbers of the Carthaginian horsemen eventually told. Dacamas joined Laelius as one of the hundreds if not thousands of men sprawled face down in the dirt. Though the Punic cavalry were now rather less in number, they were beginning to threaten the Allied legion on this side of the field. Of more concern was the line of approximately 40 elephants lumbering towards that same formation. A mix of cavalry and elephants attacking an exposed flank did not bode well for Scipio’s heavy infantry, especially if they were engaged from the front by numerous ranks of Carthaginian and Libyan levy. Taking a break from thinking about how the rest of the scenario might go, how it might play out, I counted up the losses. In Hannibal’s army, 17 units were disordered, 38 units had been destroyed, and 2 leaders had been lost. This added up to approximately 93 demoralisation points. The army morale limit was calculated to be 116. On the Roman side of the plain, 16 units were disordered, 32 had been routed, and 3 leaders were no longer living. This added up to roughly 80 demoralisation points out of a determined total of 124. On further examination, it was found that a third of the routed Roman units had been light infantry formations - either Velites or Numidians. In contrast, the Carthaginians had lost about 90 percent of their first line. In addition, they had lost quite a few units of Numidian light cavalry as well as more than several units of Punic horse.

Though Masinissa’s squadrons had won their local battle, it was not very likely that they would be able to deliver a coup de grace against Hannibal’s left flank. Light cavalry versus a portion of the veteran infantry of the third line did not bode well for the squadrons of light cavalry. On the Roman left, the pachyderms were going to be a problem. The question was: Could they reach the flank and or rear of the heavy infantry before adjustments had been made or before a fresh assault had been launched on the mustered levy of Carthaginian and Libyan troops? Given the number of units that were currently disordered in Hannibal’s army, given the probability that mediocre levy units would not fare well against better trained Hastati and Principes, and given that Hannibal’s army was much closer to breaking than Scipio’s army was, it was decided to award the contest to the Romans. In this truncated exercise then, history had been repeated if not exactly replicated.

On further reflection, I wondered about the placement of the elephants. As indicated on Map 1, the commands or corps of elephants were deployed between cavalry contingents on each wing. The animals were not spread out as a screen across the entire frontage of these respective formations. They were not parceled into “penny packets” between units of cavalry. [6] Against the squadrons of Masinissa, the pachyderms did not do so well. They were peppered with javelins and goaded into following the scampering squadrons of light cavalry until they were essentially taken out of the fight. A portion of this elephant troop was engaged by light-medium infantry under Masinissa. If the elephants would have halted and wheeled to threaten the flank of the Roman heavy infantry, then they would have exposed themselves to flank and rear attacks conducted by the Numidian light cavalry. On the other flank, the elephants, by their very presence, seemed to have more of an impact. The men under Dacamas evaded, leaving the Italians to bear the brunt of the fighting. Though no elephants were engaged or directly involved in the fighting, it does appear that they did influence the process and the outcome. The combat power of this corps of elephants proved difficult to effectively employ, however, which gave time for the Roman infantry to do their work against Mago’s men and very probably, against the levy units of the second line. So, at the accepted risk of being attacked and or corrected in a Guardroom letter or post to a discussion thread, or worse, ignored, and acknowledging that the following is based on just one wargame (an admittedly incomplete tabletop contest at that), it appears that had Hannibal deployed his elephants equally on his flanks, this would have affected the cavalry battles, but would not have affected the ultimate outcome of the engagement. The legions would have cut down and or cut their way through the first two lines of Hannibal’s formation. The Triarii and the surviving Velites could have handled the presence of any pachyderms lumbering around the flanks or rear of the Roman battle line.

The Waterson Wrinkle

In a detailed post dated September 05, 2016 to the ‘DBx and Horses fear of Elephants’ discussion thread, Mr. Patrick Waterson ended his input with a parenthetical what if. He suggested the following: “Mago commanding at Zama and putting the elephants in reserve”. [7] This idea sparked my interest almost as much as the original question posed by Mr. Boss. Given that I would already have the functional armies and simple terrain, I decided that it would be worthwhile to wargame this scenario as well. The plan was not carried out, however, as my sparked interest soon sputtered after playing almost six turns of the previously described solo wargame. Even though I would not be setting up and playing what I labeled the “Waterson Wrinkle”, I could think it through; I could conduct a mental map exercise of how the “miniature” engagement might develop.

As there were no elephants to contend with, at least at the start of the engagement, Scipio would not have arranged his ranks to address or channel the threat posed by the enemy pachyderms. The Velites would have contended with the enemy light troops, and the Hastati and Principes would have dealt with the Celts and Ligurians in the first line and most likely, the units of levy in the second line. Given that Hannibal’s (sorry, Mago’s) cavalry were outnumbered, it could be assumed that a wargame reconstruction would produce fairly historical results on the flanks. To be certain, however, there is always the slight chance that the melee dice could go completely against the Italian cavalry and their more numerous Numidian allies. This improbable but possible turn of events would be a definite cause of concern for Scipio and his focused legionaries. The elephants in the fourth line, presumably less than 185 metres from the veteran formations of the third line, would have to divide their attention to the left and right flanks. Their role would be essentially defensive, in that they would prevent the enemy horse from attacking the flanks of each deployed line. As a result, they would not be able to contribute to the infantry struggle. Again, the assumption is (even if the men comprising the Allied legions are classed as mediocre or given a lower morale rating) that the Roman and Allied heavy infantry would be able to defeat the enemy foot. Granted, this would be an expensive and prolonged contest, but in the end, the bloodied Romans would almost certainly win. It seems that if Mago had been in command and if he decided to deploy the elephants in reserve, he would have taken the pachyderms out of the battle equation. It appears that the elephants would not be a significant factor in the fight.

The Vermina Variation

Initially, I thought I would wargame just one variation of Zama. The elephant deployment suggested by Mr. Waterson changed my schedule to two variations of Zama. While preparing to answer the query posed by Mr. Boss, I happened upon a second post written by Mr. Waterson. In the previously mentioned ‘Reserves and End Game Conditions’ discussion thread, Mr. Waterson, a seemingly ubiquitous presence in the Society forums, pondered Hannibal’s apparent failure to wait for the substantial Numidian reinforcements led by one Vermina, a son of Syphax. [8] Intrigued by this possibility, I decided to stage a third production of Zama. The production of Vermina’s combined force would not take a lot of time, and it would not require a substantial investment. I even had a working title for the brief narrative. I would call this scenario the “Vermina Variation”. However, as previously noted, my initial zeal for refighting Zama, or at least this imagined version of it, was suddenly subverted by a level of disinterest after only five and one-half turns of playing at ancient war on my smallish table. That particular problem set to the side (though I do wonder and worry if 2018 will prove a difficult year with respect to “traditional” wargaming activities and efforts), I thought about what might have happened. If Hannibal had managed to avoid a confrontation until the arrival of Vermina, it seems that an argument could be made for history being reversed, for the Second Punic War being extended and perhaps even won by Carthage. A counter argument could be advanced which holds that Scipio was not or would not be foolish enough to accept battle on these disadvantageous terms. He might have fortified his position and dared Hannibal to attack. I doubt, strongly, that Numidian light cavalry could do very much against a well-built Roman camp. Then again, Scipio might have delayed until additional reinforcements had arrived so that a staged struggle could have been fought. However, had Roman pride prevented him from being cautious as well as careful, it seems that Hannibal could have posted Vermina on one flank and then deployed the combined the troopers under Tychaeus along with the Punic horse on the other flank. It follows then, that Masinissa would have been outnumbered in both cavalry and infantry. The Italian cavalry most certainly would have been outnumbered. Though I have not wargamed this particular ahistorical adventure of Zama, I do imagine that Scipio’s legions would have been surrounded and slaughtered, or perhaps forced to surrender. I also imagine that the cost to Hannibal’s infantry would have been steep, just as it was in the historical engagement. The first two lines would have been bloodied if not defeated. The veterans in the third line would have been tasked with holding the Romans in place while thousands of Numidian and Punic cavalry swooped in for the kill.

Reflection

Ideally, I would have liked - very much it should go without saying, really - to complete the three planned wargames. If I would have managed one scenario a month, I could have occupied myself with wargaming and writing until the announcement for Battle Day 2019 was made. Perhaps this early April communication will truly inspire me to get back into the “solo wargaming saddle”? Time will tell, as they say. To be certain, I was rather disappointed by the way things turned out. On the one hand, I suppose I could draw some kind of comparison or attempt to manufacture some kind of rationalisation between this latest unsuccessful effort and the “mountains of lead” owned by some members of this wonderful and worldwide hobby. Like these aspiring or accomplished miniature modelers and artists, I find myself interested in or drawn to a particular battle or war and then collect an amount of information and then spend an amount of time making the necessary preparations. However, once the “pretend shooting starts” . . . The level of interest, at least lately, decreases to the point where I find it difficult to remain interested or worse, find that I am no longer interested in the particular battle or war. I have read many anecdotes from wargamers lamenting the size of their “lead mountain”. Some wargamers even remark (usually with a self-deprecating sense of humour) about their habit or practice of adding to their “pewter or plastic peak” instead of trying to reducing its height and mass. Anyway.

I wonder what three battle reports about ahistorical Zama scenarios would have added to the pages of Slingshot, presuming of course, that the finished narrative had been accepted by the esteemed editor. As related in the opening paragraphs, Zama has received a fair amount of coverage in this journal. Would three fictional accounts have added anything substantial to this body of work? Would three fictional accounts have appealed to the general readership? It seems quite easy to answer the first question with “probably not”. As for the second query, the shorter response of “maybe” seems to suffice, even if it does straddle the line of a firm answer. What about the mental exercises described in this submission? Will they add anything? Will they appeal? At the risk of appearing desperate to engage the readership for a response or to initiate a possible discussion thread, I will leave these questions unanswered. I find it somewhat curious. Though my wargaming activity has experienced something like a severe stock market “correction”, this development has not resulted, at least so far, thankfully, in a reduction of my ability to produce material for consideration and review by the aforementioned admired and appreciated editor.

Even though I did not complete the planned wargame, at least according to the victory conditions defined in the chosen set of rules, I was able to develop a plausible answer to the original question asked by Mr. Boss. Based on my experience and assessment, elephants on the flanks at Zama would not have secured a win for Hannibal. Even though I did not set up the “Waterson Wrinkle”, it seems to me that Mago would not have won at Zama had he deployed his elephants in reserve. Certainly, his pachyderms would have given the squadrons of Numidian and Italian horse fits, but the field would still have been won by Scipio. And even though I did not set up the “Vermina Variation”, it seems reasonable to conclude that if Scipio had engaged the enemy when so outnumbered in the cavalry arm, he and his men would have met their bloody end somewhere on a scrub-decorated plain within a day’s ride of Carthage.

It would be foolish of me, as well as counter-productive, to dwell on the negative(s). Yes, it appears that I am currently in something of a solo-wargaming “slump”. While disappointing and frustrating, the present inability to command troops and roll dice, at least until a clear victory has been achieved, has not impacted my writing. In exhuming, re-examining, and re-imagining Zama, I had a chance to revisit some of my earlier work. I also had a chance to reacquaint myself with the work of Professor Lazenby and others. I had the opportunity to search the Internet to see how other wargamers approached the battle. [10] As related above, I also had a chance to do some thinking. At some point, probably not this year and probably not next year, I would like to refight Zama. Perhaps, instead of focusing on just the fictional versions suggested by Mssrs. Boss and Waterson, I could stage several scenarios? I could refight the original engagement, perhaps using a new set of rules that is taking the ancient wargaming community by storm, and then wargame the variations. The resulting narrative would be a simple if also rather lengthy essay wherein I compared and contrasted the various versions as well as commented on the rules. Again, as they say, time will tell.

Notes

1. In Issue 176, Justin Taylor authored “Zama Refought with ‘Alea Iacta Est’”. In Issue 177, Thane Maxwell wrote “Refighting Zama [with DBM]. And in Issue 195, Mervyn Cartwright gave readers “Zama Refought at Pontlliw”.

2. A partial list of attendants providing reports of the day would include: Richard Lockwood, Mark Fry, Toby Partridge, David Mather, Adam Hayes, and John Hills. Additional information about the various approaches can be found at http://balagan.info/wargaming-the-battle-of-zama.

3. During the summer of 2009, having stumbled across the news of Battle Day 2010 while perusing items in the Armati Yahoo! Forum, I decided to stage a solo version of the engagement. The finished battle report was published in two parts and appeared in the February and March 2010 issues of Miniature Wargames magazine.

4. See pages 216-227 of Hannibal’s War: A Military History of the Second Punic War, written by J. F. Lazenby. See pages 115-125 of Hannibal’s Last Battle: Zama & The Fall of Carthage, written by Brian Todd Carey. Page 121 of Warfare in the Classical World offers two diagrams, a wargamer-friendly order of battle, and a brief summary of the major events in the battle. Online translations of the account written by Polybius were found here http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/15*.html and here http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D15%3Achapter%3D12. I found that I preferred the former interpretation or link.

5. See Reply #28.

6. Like many other rule sets for ancient wargaming, L’Art de la Guerre does not permit players to group elephants with cavalry.

7. See Reply #11.

8. See Reply #34.

9. Readers are invited to check out the following links: https://www.vislardica.com/vb-sc-zama/, http://legio-wargames.com/zama-battle-report/4540338491, and http://lonelygamers.blogspot.com/2008/03/wab-battle-of-zama.html. Of course, readers are also invited to conduct their own searches of the Internet using the key words ‘Zama wargame’, ‘wargaming Zama’, or ‘Zama in miniature’.

Wednesday, March 10, 2021

Explanatory Note:

The following is an article that was submitted to that excellent and long-running publication in January of 2018. Figuring that more than enough time has passed, and curious to see if this kind of material is of interest to the casual wargamer as well as staunch enthusiast of “all things having to do with warfare in the ancient era,” I thought I would make it the second official post on my blog.

INVESTIGATING

INTERPRETATIONS OF IDISTAVISO

According to my research, the 16 AD battle of Idistaviso, wherein a Roman army under the command of Germanicus defeated an alliance of fierce Germanic tribesmen led by Arminius, has been wargamed three times. Evidently, the first recorded reconstruction occurred at SALUTE in 2003, when Mr. Robert Avery presented his “Unleash Hell!” scenario to a group of what I am quite certain was appreciative attendees. [1] The second miniature model, staged using Mr. Priestley’s colourful Hail Caesar rules, took place in a basement in 2012. [2] I had the pleasure of solo wargaming the third and possibly most recent refight of the historical engagement in late March of 2013 using the Armati rules. [3] To be certain, these findings are not definitive. My research was not at all scientific but it was somewhat methodical. I typed variations of “wargame Idistaviso” into a search engine and scanned the first few pages of the hundreds of results that were returned within a fraction of a second. I would not be at all surprised to learn that Idistaviso has been wargamed many more times, including prior to 2003, but for some reason or reasons, was not posted on a blog or to a similar platform. [4] I was not at all surprised to find a common thread for the three examples found or recalled in the course of my research. Each reconstruction of the historic battle was based on or relied rather heavily upon the information provided by Mr. Warry and his associates on page 192 of Warfare in the Classical World. [5] I am confident that all readers of this article will agree that the information provided on page 192 by Mr. Warry and his associates is very wargamer-friendly. There is a detailed map depicting the terrain of the battlefield as well as diagramming the deployments and general movements of the opposing armies. There are also fairly detailed orders of battle, though admittedly, more information is provided for the Roman formations than for the Germanic warbands. [6] To be sure, for those individuals or groups of individuals interested in staging a refight of the 16 AD battle of Idistaviso, the interpretation offered by Mr. Warry and his associates presents the simplest course. However, it is not the only interpretation. I happened upon three other versions of the historical contest during the course of my research. These primarily visual accounts are different from the interpretation found on page 192 of Warfare. All four accounts, however, are based on the brief narrative description of the action that comes down to us from the stylus of Tacitus. [7]

In this article, I shall attempt to compare and contrast the various modern interpretations with the account provided by the Roman historian. I shall focus my attention on three main areas. First, I will consider the terrain of Idistaviso. Then, I will examine the composition and deployment of the opposing armies. My third and final point of focus will be the chronological course of the battle. In this section, I will attempt to discover or understand just what happened on that fateful day in 16 AD. After comparing and contrasting the various modern accounts with the ancient source material, I will offer a “working scenario” for refighting the battle using the L’Art de la Guerre rules. This might be counted as another interpretation. I will endeavor to wrap things up with a few final remarks as well as a recommended or suggested reading list.

Surveying the Terrain

Tacitus provides a general description of the nature of the ground, but he does not offer any wargaming-friendly specifics or relationships of one feature to another that would permit an accurate and easy model to be built on a table top. In Chapter 16 of Book 2 of The Annals, he identifies the plain as Idistaviso, and describes it as, “Lying between the Weser and the hills, winding along irregularly, with here a concession from the river and there an encroachment by some mountain-spur”. There is an additional feature present. Tacitus explains that, “Behind rose the forest, lifting its branches high in air, leaving the ground clear between the trunks”. These two sentences are the extent of the ancient author’s description of the terrain. In general, the modern maps reflect the natural look of the field provided by Tacitus. However, the positions of the Weser River and the forest vary.

In the Warry diagram for instance, the Weser River borders one edge of the field. It also flows behind a large portion of the German deployment area. In contrast, the full-colour and labeled in Italian maps found on Wikipedia and Wikiwand, show the Weser River being some distance from the actual or proposed site of the battle. [8] The map provided in Chapter 4 of Lindsay Powell’s 2013 Pen and Sword book, Germanicus: The Magnificent Life and Mysterious Death of Rome’s Most Popular General, is a black and white version of these colour interpretations. [9] On the plus side, the labels are in English, and there is also a compass rose. This directional aide was not included in any of the previous diagrams. In the minus column, however, there is no ground scale provided. A fifth map was found in Dr. Ilkka Syvanne’s presentation “Campaigns of Germanicus, 13-16 AD”. [10 ] In this diagram, the Weser River is very close to the battlefield. Indeed, it may be said that the Weser River forms the left flank of the Roman army. With regard to the forest mentioned by Tacitus, the Warry map depicts a “Great Forest” taking up almost an entire edge of the battlefield. Using the ground scale provided, the dimensions of this forest were determined to be roughly 2.5 kilometres long by 1 kilometre wide. On the Wikipedia and Wikiwand maps, there is more woodland, but the important growth seems to form a natural and broad cul-de-sac in which the German tribes deploy. The same observation can be made for the black and white diagram found in Chapter 4 of Mr. Powell’s work. In Dr. Syvanne’s report, the forest forms two sides of a three-sided box. (The Weser River is the first side of this natural box.) In stark contrast to the other interpretations, the colour map in “Campaigns of Germanicus” shows a rather narrow gap or entry way to the plain of Idistaviso. Of the five battlefield maps studied, the Warry diagram was the only one that showed a large and somewhat eggplant shaped hill. (The height of this elevation is not specified, but there are four contour lines. As to dimensions, the hill is about 1.8 kilometres long and varies between 1 and 1.2 kilometres wide.) The hill is very near to the woods, in fact, a part of the hill butts up against the tree line. Even with the “Great Forest” and the large hill, there is still a stretch of open ground about 1.5 kilometres wide between the Weser and the first contour line of the eggplant shaped hill.

Arranging the Troops

If the reader will permit me, I should like to consider the deployment of the Germanic warriors first and then examine the positions of the Roman formations. According to Tacitus, “The barbarian line was posted on the level and along the skirts of the wood: the Cherusci alone were planted on the hill-tops, ready to charge from the height when the Romans engaged”. There is no reference to which tribe or warband was placed where, and there is no indication of the length or depth of the barbarian line. I interpreted “skirts of the wood” to mean on the outer edge of the tree line. These men were neither “in” the woods nor were they “out” of the woods; they were somewhere in between. The Cherusci were deployed on the hilltops, plural, so it seems that there were two or perhaps more elevated positions for this specific contingent of warriors. But again, there is no information provided as to the location of these hilltops. Later in his narrative, Tacitus explains that, “The troops who had held the forest, rushed into the open; those who had been stationed in the plain, dove into the forest. Midway between both, the Cherusci were being pushed from the hills —”. Here, it seems that Tacitus contradicts himself a little. The troops deployed “along the skirts of the wood” are now “holding the wood”. The interaction between the various parts of the barbarian line suggests at least a couple of deployments. First, there is the linear arrangement. The German tribesmen were arranged from left to right, with the Cherusci warriors on two or more hills within this line of battle. Some portion of this line, either the left or right wing rested along the tree line. The second arrangement is one of depth. The first line of barbarians occupies the open and flat plain. The second line consists of the Cherusci. This would not be a solid line, as these groups of warriors would be isolated, as Tacitus reports, on various hilltops. The third line has barbarians standing in front of or just inside of the tree line. This second, in-depth deployment suggests that the woods were behind the Germanic host.

Of the various modern accounts and maps studied, the Warry diagram is the only one to depict the Germans drawn up in a slightly curved line. (The formation looks a bit like a smile.) The Warry diagram is also the only one to include an order of battle in which numbers, or estimated numbers of troop types, are provided. In this schematic, the left flank of the slightly curved German line rests on the Weser River. A good portion of the line covers a large hill. This part of the line is labeled as “Arminius and Cherusci”, so it appears to be following the narrative of Tacitus on this particular point. The right flank of the German line extends into the “Great Forest”. From wing to wing, the German line covers approximately 3 kilometres. About .5 of a kilometre of this frontage extends into the woods on the right flank. If one accepts the higher figure of 50,000 tribesmen, and one estimates a depth of 8 ranks for the warbands, then there would be approximately 2,075 warriors massed in the front line of each kilometre. This produces an unusually tight fighting space of just .48 metres per warrior, so perhaps a depth of 12 ranks or even more would be a better estimate? Then again, one could also take the lower estimate of 40,000 tribesmen. This number would reduce the frontage per kilometre to approximately 1,700 warriors, if using a depth of 8 ranks. The resulting fighting space per warrior still seems very small or tight, however.

In the Wikipedia and Wikiwand maps, the barbarians are deployed in two very straight lines. The vast majority of their troops are arranged in a kind of natural cul-de-sac; there are woods to the right, left, and rear of the German tribesmen. The first, thin line of warriors (perhaps skirmishers or light troops?) stretches for approximately 4 kilometres, if my measurement is correct. The main formation covers just a little more than 3 kilometres. In the wood line, roughly a kilometre away from the end of the left flank of the skirmisher line, there is a third group of Germans. Evidently, these are the Cherusci. There are no hilltops present, however. According to the arrows on the map, this ambushing force charges into or against the exposed right flank of the first lines of the Roman formation. The black and white diagram provided in Mr. Powell’s study of Germanicus shows a similar deployment. However, there is no hidden formation of Germanic warriors. The leader of the tribal alliance is shown as positioned in the center of the main barbarian formation. Here, apparently, the details contained in the ancient narrative are ignored, for there is no indication of the location of the Cherusci, and there are no hills. On the plus side, a compass rose is provided. The right flank of the barbarian line points north-northwest, and the left flank of the line points south-southwest. So, the German deployment is angled. If their main line was the hour hand of a clock, it would be pointing to the 1. In the Wikipedia, Wikiwand, and Powell portrayals of the battlefield, the vast majority of the barbarian army is deployed on a flat and featureless plain. This is not the case in the map offered by Dr. Syvanne.

On page or slide 43 of “Campaigns of Germanicus”, the barbarian host is divided. Approximately one-third of the alliance hides in the woods, along with half of their cavalry (a troop type not depicted on any of the other maps, and a troop type not mentioned by Tacitus). The remainder of the army is positioned some distance away and in front of a tree line. This formation contains infantry flanked by smaller formations of horse. There is no indication of a forward line of skirmishers or light troops. In direct contrast to the Warry diagram, the Weser River protects the right flank of the German line in this interpretation, while the wood line protects the left flank. Here again, however, the hilltops which the Cherusci were reported to have occupied are absent.

Shifting the focus to the other side of the ancient battlefield, Tacitus details the Roman deployment in the following manner:

Our army advanced in the following order: in the van, the auxiliary Gauls and

Germans with the unmounted archers behind; next, four legions, and the Caesar

with two praetorian cohorts and the flower of the cavalry; then, four other

legions, the light-armed troops with the mounted archers and the rest of the

allied cohorts. The men were alert and ready, so arranged that the order of

march could come to a halt in line of battle.

Sketching a very rough diagram while rereading this description, I determined that there were at least 5 and perhaps as many as 7 lines in the Roman deployment. The interesting and or confusing sentence is the last one, where an “order of march can halt in line of battle”. This suggests to me that the Roman army was advancing on a broad front as opposed to along a road or roads in column.

The map on page 192 of Warfare depicts the Roman army of Germanicus in just 3 lines. The first line contains a mix of “Gallic, Batavian, German and Swiss auxiliaries”. Its right flank rests on the Weser, and its left flank rests against the tree line. As to length, this formation of auxiliary troops stretches for approximately 2.5 kilometres. Curiously and interestingly, a formation of heavy cavalry extends this first line. These horsemen are deployed inside of the “Great Forest”. The frontage of their formation is .5 of a kilometre. So, the first line of the Roman army matches the length of the barbarian mass. There is a “cloud” of archers and slingers behind the center of this first line. I hesitate to call this a second line of troops, however. While it may be suggested that Warry has the first line correct, at least according to Tacitus, the addition of slingers to the “unmounted archers” is interesting. It is also interesting and curious that missile troops would be positioned behind front line units. The archers may have been able to fire indirectly, but slingers would not be able to do so. The second line on the Warry diagram has Germanicus in the center with 2 legions on each wing. This formation covers approximately 2 kilometres of the plain. Again, its left flank is extended by a formation of heavy cavalry positioned inside of the “Great Forest”. The overall length of this second line is about 2.3 kilometres. The third line on this map has “detachments of 4 legions” in the center, auxiliaries on the wings, and then light troops on the outer edges. This line extends for something like 1.7 kilometres. Again, cavalry is posted on the left flank of this final or reserve formation. This time, however, these are light horse. While it may be remarked that light cavalry being deployed inside of a wood is not as startling as heavy cavalry being there, to me at least, this still impresses as atypical, as unusual. As referenced in the examination of the barbarian deployment, the Warry schematic is the only source to include numbers. Going down the list, Germanicus had the following at his disposal: 1,000 Praetorians; about 28,000 heavy infantry distributed across 8 legions; 30,000 auxiliary troops; between 4 and 6,000 Allied German tribesmen; 6,000 heavy cavalry, and between 1 and 2,000 light cavalry, some of these being horse archers. Arminius and his alliance were outnumbered. They were especially outmatched in cavalry.

The Wikipedia, Wikiwand, and Powell maps seem to mirror the description provided by Tacitus better than the Warry diagram. In all of these representations, the Roman army is arranged in 7 lines. The first line of this deep formation is made up of archers, so it appears that the modern researchers are correcting the placement of the missile troops. Based on my measurement, the frontage of each line of the Roman formation appears to extend for 3 kilometres. I would guess, then, that these lines included formations that were deployed with different rank depths. For example, the skirmishing archers in the front line were probably not deployed like the heavy infantry of the legions. The second line is composed of auxiliary cohorts. These include the “Galli, Raeti, and Vindelici”. The third line of this impressive array includes 4 legions. The diagram shows gaps between these formations. There are no gaps present in the line of archers or cohorts of the auxiliary troops. Germanicus is in the center of the fourth line. He is flanked by the Praetorian infantry. These in turn, are flanked by the cavalry. Evidently, the right wing of Roman horse was commanded by a fellow named Stertinius, while the left flank squadrons were led by a fellow named Aemilius. If the numbers suggested by the Warry information are accepted, then it seems that each wing of Roman cavalry contained 3 to 4,000 men. Taking the smaller number and estimating a formation depth of 8 riders and then estimating a frontage per trooper of 6 metres, calculations show that 3,000 Roman cavalry would have a footprint (or hoof print) of approximately 2.25 kilometres. Two of these formations would require 4.5 kilometres of ground, and this estimate does not include the much smaller frontage occupied by the 2 cohorts of Praetorians. Using the ground scale provided on the colour version of these maps, it appears that the Roman cavalry are crowded into a space that would be too small for them. A second line of 4 legions follows the line where Germanicus rides alongside or behind the Praetorians. These heavy infantry are supported by a thin line of horse archers and slingers. The reserve line of the Roman deployment is composed of allied cohorts. In contrast to these similar interpretations, the diagram provided by Dr. Syvanne appears to take the “order of march” reference from Tacitus literally.

Because of the narrow entry way into the plain of Idistaviso, Dr. Syvanne condenses the Roman formation into a kind of marching square. The German and Gallic auxiliaries are well forward of the main body, and they are supported or followed by archers. The legions, or parts of legions, form a box or hollow square, with Germanicus, the Praetorians, and some picked cavalry on the inside. Horse archers hover around the back of the square, and the remainder of the army, the rest of the auxiliary cohorts follow. There are no numbers provided in this treatment; there is no compass rose, and there is no ground scale provided on this map. It appears quite evident, however, that the Roman formation was rather more tightly packed than the deployments depicted in the other interpretations that were studied.

Summaries of the Struggle

Regarding the course of the engagement, Tacitus is not much more forthcoming than he was with his description of the landscape, but he does provide a few details of the major episodes. Writing in Chapter 17, the Roman historian explains: “On sighting the Cheruscan bands, whose wild hardihood had led them to dash forward, the prince ordered his best cavalry to charge the flank; Stertinius with the remaining squadrons was to ride around and attack the rear, while he himself would not be wanting when the time came”. Unpacking this long sentence, it might be suggested that the Cherusci warriors were in hiding until they could not control their impetuous nature, or Arminius could not control their impetuous nature. One assumes that the “best cavalry” engaged the flank of this barbarian onslaught. The action of Stertinius seems like it may have been preplanned. Then again, if his attack was also aimed against the Cherusci, how could the cavalry “ride around and attack the rear” on a plain that was filled with German warriors? The Roman squadrons would open themselves up to a flank attack by the barbarians.

Tacitus continues his narrative, explaining how “eight eagles” distracted as well as lifted up the spirits of Germanicus and his soldiers. The Roman general ordered his auxiliaries and legions forward. The ancient author explains what happened next: “At the same moment the line of infantry charged and the advanced cavalry broke into the rear and flanks. Thus, remarkably enough, two columns of the enemy were following directly opposed lines of flight—the troops who had held the forest, rushing into the open; those who had been stationed in the plain, diving into the forest”. The adjective used to describe the cavalry in the first sentence of this quote suggests, again, some preplanning and reinforces the action(s) of Stertinius and his squadrons. It does seem that the Romans were able to conduct a perfect envelopment or pincer move against the apparently static German lines. The impact on the enemy’s morale is obvious. The Germans quickly collapsed. One can picture both broken formations almost running into each other in their collective state of panic. While all of this was going on, Tacitus relates that, “The Cherusci were being pushed from the hills”. Arminius and another German leader, Inguiomerus, were in the thick of the confused melee but managed to escape due to the treachery of the Chauci, a German tribe fighting for the Romans. The timing of the following episode is not exactly clear, but Tacitus reports that Arminius was a fierce leader and warrior. “Arminius”, the ancient writer explains, “was striking, shouting, bleeding, in his effort to maintain the struggle. He had flung himself on the archers, and would have broken through at that point, had not the Raetian, Vindelician, and Gallic cohorts opposed their standards”. This supreme personal effort was in vain, however, as the Roman historian reports that the majority of the barbarians “were butchered in crowds”. He continues, explaining how “Numbers were overwhelmed in an attempt to swim the Weser, while others were shot down or chopped down from the trees in which they had sought ignominious refuge”. Tacitus ends his description with two lines that would, I imagine, bring a smile to any Roman citizen’s lips. In Chapter 18, he remarks: “It was a brilliant, and to us not a bloody, victory. The enemy were slaughtered from the fifth hour of daylight to nightfall, and for ten miles the ground was littered with corpses and weapons”.

Given the nature of the ground as described by Tacitus himself, I have trouble believing that last statement. Based on my study of the engagement, I think that most of the fighting took place in the open. For there to have been “ten miles of ground littered with corpses and weapons”, the battle and especially the subsequent pursuit would have had to cross some fairly difficult ground. The statement sounds a bit biased toward the military might of Rome. It almost reads as Roman propaganda. Going back to the attack on the Roman archers, this description reinforces the Wikipedia, Wikiwand, and Powell maps. It does not lend support to the Warry interpretation or the case made by Dr. Syvanne. In summary, the description handed down from Tacitus does contain some detail and does provide some idea of the chronology of the action, but it is in need of a major rewrite. If only Tacitus had written about this contest with the same attention to detail he took in narrating Mons Graupius; if only a historian of a similar caliber to Diodorus had written a Paraetacene-like account of Idistaviso. [11]

The explanatory summary on page 192 of Warfare is, essentially, a summary of the narrative provided by Tacitus. In conjunction with the wargamer-friendly map, this modern treatment leads one to believe that all of the fighting - or at least the vast majority of it - was done by the first line, was left to the “Gallic, Batavian, German and Swiss auxiliaries”. The deployment of Roman heavy cavalry in the woods does not seem right, even though these horsemen, reportedly, played a pivotal role in the contest. In stark contrast to this interpretation, there are only directional arrows on the Wikipedia and Wikiwand maps. There are no captions; there is no explanation.

The black and white diagram provided by Mr. Powell divides the battle into half-a-dozen sequential episodes. This chronology is worth reviewing in detail. Just as Tacitus informed, the Powell summary has the “Germans opening the battle with a charge at the centre of the Roman line”. This matches the “wild hardihood of the Cheruscan bands” previously mentioned. The second phase sees the “Roman cavalry under Stertinius attacking the German flanks and rear”. As with the opening phase, this episode also matches the original narrative. However, the diagram does not appear to follow the explanation. In the Powell diagram, Stertinius is on the right of the Roman line and Aemilius is on the left. They have some open space within which to manoeuvre but, due to the nature of the terrain as depicted on this map, the Roman horse cannot get around or behind the main German line. If however, the barbarians surged forward to make a general attack, then perhaps a flanking move would have been possible. Given the estimated number of tribesmen present, it seems to me that these warriors would have flowed around the edges of the first line of Romans and therefore, presented no flanking opportunity to the Roman cavalry. In the third phase of the engagement, “Germanicus led a counterattack against the German line with auxiliaries and legionaries”. At this stage of the action, it seems safe to say or suggest that the fighting was general, that there was fighting all along the line. However, in the fourth phase, the Powell caption informs, “Arminius leads the charge against the Roman archers”. If the archers were in the first line at the start of the contest, it would make tactical sense for them to withdraw or evade when the heavier formations of both sides started moving toward each other. If the legionaries, auxiliaries, and warbands were fully engaged, why would Arminius want to lead a charge against the Roman archers? The legionaries and or Germanicus himself seem like a better, or more important, high-value target. In the fifth phase of the battle, the “Gallic, Raetian and Vindelician auxiliaries rescue the archers”. Here again, I have to wonder about the importance of the Roman archers. I also have to wonder if we can, given a rather sparse source material and the chaos of battle, establish a coherent and acceptable picture of what happened on that day. This line of thinking is perhaps best left for the final remarks section of this article or for the subject of another submission, perhaps written by a Society member with more knowledge and experience. The battle, at least as interpreted by Mr. Powell, ends on a familiar note. The final phase echoes the narrative written by Tacitus. It reads: “The Romans drive the Germanic alliance troops off the battlefield, Arminius and Inguiomerus among them”.

In Dr. Syvanne’s interpretation, the course of the engagement is summarized in just 4 phases. The action opens with the ambush of the auxiliaries by the Cherusci. This reinforces the characterization made by Tacitus and supports the argument that Arminius did not have effective command and control over them. According to Dr. Syvanne’s diagram, the ambush was launched with cavalry. By my study of the diagram, it appears that this charge or attack falls on the flank of the auxiliaries and the archer supports. In fact, it could be suggested that the archers are engaged at the same time as the auxiliaries, unless the advance Roman formation pivots in place to face the oncoming enemy cavalry. The barbarian infantry, apparently, moved up as supports, but there is no concrete evidence that these warriors were a part of the local fight. In the second phase of the contest, “Germanicus sends his picked cavalry against the enemy’s flank”. This is simply a rephrasing of Tacitus. Studying the diagram, it does seem that the Roman horse could catch the German horse in the flank. If the German foot were also a part of this ambush, it is entirely possible that these men might also have been taken in the flank. The third phase of Dr. Syvanne’s model of Idistaviso sees Stertinius and his horse archers executing a wide flanking move, advancing through wooded terrain, and coming up behind the Cherusci warriors. In the thick of this fighting, the fourth stage of the battle sees Arminius making his escape through the Chauci auxiliaries. Reviewing this diagram and captions, I am left to wonder why the legions as well as the majority of the barbarians do not participate. There are no directional arrows indicating that the Germanic tribes stationed in front of the wood line moved forward to keep the Roman army bottled up in that narrow gap. There was also no indication that the Roman army deployed in a proper or traditional battle formation. The majority of the fighting in this interpretation appears to have taken place between the auxiliaries, archers, cavalry, and the Cherusci. I was also puzzled by the directional arrow which indicated Arminius fleeing to the river bank instead of toward the unengaged and friendly line of other Germanic tribes.

Idistaviso with ADLG

To review, my “research” found online evidence that the 16 AD contest between the army of Germanicus and the tribal alliance led by Arminius has been wargamed three times. To reiterate, the rules used for these historical refights were Vis Bellica, Hail Caesar, and Armati. To reinforce, I find it rather difficult to accept that in the history of ancient miniature wargaming, the battle of Idistaviso has only been played a few times.

L’Art de la Guerre (ADLG) is a relative newcomer to the large, varied, and wonderful stable of ancient wargaming rules. As a member of one of the Yahoo Forums dedicated to these rules, I have been assured that ADLG can handle refights of historical battles. Apart from my own very amateur and completely nontraditional efforts, I have not seen much evidence in support of this claim. Evidently, the emphasis of ADLG players seems to be competition play and or “one-off” games. There is certainly nothing wrong with this approach. I am going to take a chance here and guess that the historical engagement of Idistaviso has not been staged using L’Art de la Guerre. I confess that I am tempted to repeat or even try to reverse history on my smallish table by using ADLG to refight the battle. Perhaps at some time in the future I will do so. Perhaps I will prepare a narrative of that experience for consideration by our esteemed editor. For now, however, I would simply like to provide some ideas about how Idistaviso could be wargamed using these “new” rules.

Instead of choosing one of the several studied landscapes to replicate on my table top, I would combine the Powell battlefield with the large hill depicted in the Warry diagram. However, I would not make the hill quite so large. In fact, I would probably set up a couple of smaller hills in the approximate center of the German deployment area. These hills would be decorated with patches of scrub as well as small concentrations of trees. There would be many more trees all along the rear of the barbarian line as well as to their left and right. Typically, woods in ADLG are classed as difficult ground/terrain. As one might imagine or expect, cavalry operating in difficult terrain are at a significant disadvantage when it comes to movement and melee. Taking Tacitus at his word, I would adjust the classification of woods to rough ground. There would still be penalties for mounted troops, but these penalties would not be so severe. The Weser River would not be modeled on my table. To represent the sometimes open nature of the plain of Idistaviso, the vast majority of the playing surface would be flat and green.

Turning to the topic of troops, obviously, I would rely primarily on the orders of battle provided on page 192 of Warfare. Reviewing the unit scale established on page 6 of the rules, I would respectfully suggest that one use the smaller scale, which has a unit of heavy infantry representing 500 men, a unit of light infantry representing 250 men, and a unit of cavalry representing 125 riders and their horses. It is not my intention to provide complete orders of battle here, but I will offer several examples. For the approximately 28,000 legionaries, one would need to prepare 56 bases or stands of heavy swordsmen with armour and the impact bonus. Reportedly, there were 8 legions present on the field, so one could do the division and create 8 legions containing 7 bases or stands of heavy infantry each. Instead of an odd number of stands, one might establish 4 legions of 8 bases each and 4 legions with 6 bases each. These smaller legions could operate as a single command or corps. [12] Regarding the commanders for these 8 legions or parts of legions, one could integrate the officer into a stand of heavy infantry or keep the officer separate so that he can move around and add his melee bonus to a particularly hard-pressed part of the line. Modeling the 30,000 auxiliaries under the command of Germanicus involves a little more guesswork. Four separate contingents are identified on the Warry map. Additional names are found on the Powell diagram. [13] Studying the Early Imperial Roman list (Number 84 on page 126) of the colourful and thick rule book, it was noted that auxiliaries are represented by a couple of troop types. The first is medium swordsmen with the impact bonus. These may have archers in support; they may also be upgraded to elite units. The second type is auxiliary archers. If the heavy infantry unit scale is applied to these medium infantry and light-medium infantry formations, then 60 bases need to be prepared to represent the auxiliary units employed by Germanicus. Given that there are 4 contingents identified on the Warry map, one could assemble 15 bases of auxiliaries for each contingent. If a generic category of “allied cohorts” is added to these contingents, and if the archers are separated as another group of auxiliaries, then there are 6 contingents. This approach would provide 10 bases or stands for each subgroup in the Roman army. This method appeals to me. I think it makes sense. I would classify the Batavian auxiliaries as elite troops or cohorts. If I reduced each contingent to a strength of 8 stands, then I could add 24 stands of light infantry or skirmishers to the mix. This would permit me to represent the archers and slingers that are depicted on a couple of the diagrams that were reviewed. For the Roman cavalry, at least the heavy horse, the Warry information states that there were 6,000 men on the field. At a representative scale of 1:125, this force would require 48 stands of miniatures. Dividing this number between Stertinius and Aemilius would give each subordinate 24 stands. These cavalry could be deployed in 2 corps or groups of 12 units each. The majority of these should be Equites Alares, I think, and classed as medium cavalry. Perhaps a few could be heavy cavalry, and perhaps a smaller number of the total could be rated as elite. Shifting the focus to the other side of the plain of Idistaviso, I would opt for more German warriors rather than less, so I would prepare the miniature equivalent of 50,000 men. At the chosen unit scale, this would require 100 bases or stands of hairy and scary-looking fighters. According to Tacitus, there were Cheruscan warbands present. What is not known, however, is how many of these tribal warriors were present on the field or hilltops. Evidently, Arminius led an alliance of tribes. How many tribes were present and how many warriors made up each contingent? The German list (Number 90 on page 130) identifies Batavians or Cherusci and Other German Tribes. The Batavians and Cherusci are classified as impetuous medium swordsmen. They may be upgraded to elite status. The Other German Tribes are classified as impetuous heavy swordsmen. These, too, may be upgraded to elite status. If I decide to represent the Cherusci with 12 stands of elite impetuous medium swordsmen, that would leave me with 88 stands to represent the Other German Tribes. To keep things simple, I think I would create or establish 8 tribes working with Arminius. This would give me 11 stands of impetuous heavy swordsmen for each tribe. The chieftains of each contingent would be attached to a stand. This individual stand would be upgraded to elite status.

Once the armies had been prepared, I would deploy them following the Powell diagram. The two or three gentle hills would be placed within the barbarian deployment zone. These elevations would be reserved for the Cherusci warriors. I would wargame the battle using the rules as written with one adjustment. I would make the morale points for the opposing commanders 3 or 4 times the listed value. In this way, the loss of Arminius (valued at either 12 or 16 points) would be a tremendous blow to the morale of the Germanic alliance.

Final Remarks

While researching this article, I happened upon the following assessment from the noted and prolific German historian Hans Delbrück:

I refer therefore the two great battles of Idistaviso and on the Angrivarius Wall in

the realm of the fable. The Roman narrative is not enough to give credible

testimony to us, since the consequences do not confirm it and all factual

considerations speak against it. It may have been small battles. It has been

suggested that the direct or indirect source of Tacitus for these Germanicus

campaigns was a poem, and I confess that this supposition has a great

deal of probability for me. [14]

Perhaps this criticism explains the paucity of wargame reports found on the Internet? Perhaps this dismissal explains the scarcity of articles about Idistaviso in traditional wargaming publications? [15]

Lindsay Powell is less critical in his assessment of the ancient historian. In Chapter 4 of Germanicus: The Magnificent Life and Mysterious Death of Rome’s Most Popular General, he notes, “The account provided by Tacitus is the only narrative that we have”. Mr. Powell does admit however, that, “Tacitus was not strong on tactical detail, and left us with a series of stylized highlights”. As a result, referencing the narrative of Tacitus presents a number of problems for those interested in trying to stage a refight of Idistaviso on their table tops. Referencing the several modern accounts addresses some of these problems but opens the door to others. Consequently, a realistic refight of the 16 AD battle of Idistaviso is not possible. We do not know the exact location of the ancient battlefield, so we cannot replicate its landscape on the table top. The description offered by Tacitus is rather vague. The description offered by Tacitus is, therefore, open to interpretation. Four versions of the battlefield have been advanced. Courtesy of the Warry orders of battle, we do know more about the numbers and types of troops involved, but again, this information needs to be confirmed and in its current form is insufficient if the goal is a realistic refight of the historical engagement. The common sense guidelines found on page 10 of Mr. Donald Featherstone’s Battle Notes for Wargamers, clearly state: “To refight any historical battle realistically, the terrain must closely resemble both in scale and appearance the area over which the original conflict raged and the troops accurately represent the original forces”.

In my first trip to the plain of Idistaviso, I used the terrain and orders of battle provided on page 192 of Warfare. I used the Armati rules to wargame an interpretation of the historical battle. (In this version, the Roman cavalry were not deployed inside of the “Great Forest”.) As I recall, the wargame was enjoyable. It is five years later, and I have just completed my second trip to that plain located somewhere along or near the Weser River. Though no traditional wargame was staged, I also found this trip into the past enjoyable as well as quite educational. Before 2018 ends, I might attempt a third trip to the plain of Idistaviso. If I am able to manage this at some point during the next 11 months, I shall strive to document this working vacation so that I can share it with the respected and valued reader.

Suggested Reading

Besides the links provided and sources referenced in the Notes section, I would recommend the following sites to interested readers. The first, https://ludwigheinrichdyck.wordpress.com/tag/battle-of-the-idistaviso-plain/, provides background and context to the 16 AD engagement. The second, http://www.johnstack.me/images/news/Battle_of_Idistaviso_JohnStack.pdf, is historical fiction. Yes, I realize that many readers might turn their noses up at this, but I found the story rather good. If anything, it certainly puts one in the middle of the action instead of hovering, like some kind of very well informed deity, over painted miniatures on a decorated table. Interested readers are also encouraged to type “battle of Idistaviso” into their preferred search engine and then spend as much time as they like surveying and selecting from the hundreds of results that are returned in a fraction of a second.

Notes

1. See https://www.vislardica.com/vb-sc-idistaviso/.

2. See http://rabbitsinmybasement.blogspot.com/2012/02/idistaviso-ad-16-with-hail-caesar.html.

3. See http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=300469.

4. For example, in the course of my research, I happened across this document or site:

legio-wargames.com/download/i/mark_dl/u/4007474483/.../idistaviso.pdf. Though not specifically identified as his work, my guess is that this material is from the desk of noted author and wargamer, Mr. Simon MacDowall. My research focused on miniature reconstructions. A board game version of Idistaviso was found here: https://www.commandsandcolors.net/ancients/maps/80-germanic-wars-augustus-to-nero-27-bc-68-ad/571-ac27-weser-river-16-ad.html.

5. A screenshot of this page can be viewed here: http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=300469. The orders of battle and notes in the previous note also seem to be based, in large part, on the information found on this page.

6. I was unable to determine the source(s) of the numbers provided by Mr. Warry and his associates. Consequently, I could not confirm or corroborate the numbers for either the Roman army or the alliance of Germanic tribes.

7. Translations of the relevant chapters of Book 2 of The Annals were found online. The first translation was found at: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/2A*.html. The second translation was found at: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Annals_(Tacitus)/Book_2. I preferred and so relied upon the 1931 Loeb Edition.

For a very brief biography of Cornelius Tacitus, born circa 56 AD, see page 117 of Professor Brian Campbell’s Greek and Roman Military Writers - Selected Readings.

8. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Idistaviso and http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Battle_of_Idistaviso. The map on the Wikiwand site is much easier to manipulate, much easier to see at magnification.

9. See Map 9 in “Up Against the Angrivarian Wall, 15-16 CE”, at https://erenow.com/biographies/germanicus-the-magnificent-life-and-mysterious-death/7.html.

10. A pdf of the professor’s presentation can be found here: http://www.academia.edu/6074891/Campaigns_of_Germanicus_13-16_AD.

11. See page 116 of Greek and Roman Military Writers - Selected Readings.

12. Under the ‘Groups of Units’ section of the rules, a bullet point at the bottom left of page 10 states: “A group cannot have a frontage of more than six units wide”.

13. A quick search for definitions of “Raeti” and “Vindelici” conducted on the morning of January 21, 2018, suggested that both names refer to regions or tribes that were north of the Po Valley, so these may have been geographical regions or tribes of Germania.

14. See Hans Delbrück : History of the art of war in the context of political history. 3. newly worked edition. Part 2, 1st book, Stilke, Berlin 1921 , pp. 110-119 (online at zeno.org, retrieved on June 7, 2010).

15. I am not aware of any Idistaviso-related article being published in the pages of Miniature Wargames, Wargames Illustrated, or Miniature Wargames with Battlegames magazine. I have no knowledge about archived or current content of either Ancient Warfare or Wargames, Soldiers & Strategy. In the “wargaming press”, it seems that more coverage has been given to the campaign and battle/massacre of Teutoburg Forest. A search of the Slingshot Index did not yield any results when “Idistaviso” was typed in the search window. Typing “Tacitus”, “Germanicus”, and other key words did produce a couple of results, however. See the following articles: Tacitus in Germany [Long Bridges, 15 AD] (130/32-35, Andy Grainger), and Reasons for Germanicus’ Recall from the Rhine Frontier (77/30-34, David Blanchard).