A Pair of
Parthian Puzzles
Background & Development
On page 41 of the May 1995 issue (Number 179) of Slingshot, The Journal of the Society of Ancients, in a one-page piece titled “The Editor’s Hobby-Horse,” a fellow by the name of Michael C. Grant brought interested as well as casual readers up to date when he related the following:
In 1993 Matt Pickard sent in the details of a campaign involving Parthia, Seleucia
and neighbouring countries. The point of interest to me was that when it came to
battle, using the 6th Ed. WRG rules as it happened, over a period of time the
Parthians confronted the Seleucids on seven separate occasions AND ALWAYS
THRASHED THEM.
Michael extended an invitation to the readership “to set up one or two of these battles, to re-play them using any rules you wish, and to report the result in brief with a minimum of explanatory notes.” The gentleman (in the Editor’s curule chair for issues 167 to 181, then moving to the role of Secretary) provided additional details and a diagram so that interested individuals or groups could stage the original scenario “played on an 8 x 4 ft table of featureless terrain, with 15mm figures.” Roughly half of page 41 was dedicated to an ‘orders of battle text box,’ which contained map symbol identifiers as well as a description of the opposing forces in the specific languages of WRG 6th Ed. and DBM. The accompanying diagram (quite small but understandable) was introduced with the following instructions: “Please start with a deployment as close as you can to the map, because this is as the Parthians found the Seleucids in the first battle of the campaign.”
Four individuals responded to the open if somewhat late in being delivered invitation, and provided five summary reports - published in the July, September, and November issues - of refights played with several different sets of rules. Professor Philip Sabin was the first to pick up this figurative gauntlet gently thrown down by Editor Grant. The noted academic used the PHALANX rules to “play a simple solo scenario which featured 10 units of Parthians and 9 of Seleucids,” and was witness to bloody Parthian victory. Justin Taylor was next, providing two brief reports of contests played with the Alea Iacta Est rules. The Parthians notched two more wins, with the second game using free deployment. Justin noted that, “the Parthians have the advantage of mobility and massive firepower.” A fellow by the name of Kenneth Clark provided the editor and interested readers with the longest summary report - thus going against the request for “brevity” - wherein the Parthians won the field and day yet again, this time with the participants using WARGAME RULES FOR ANCIENT AND DARK AGE PERIODS. In Kenneth’s refight, the Parthians did not have the numerical/points advantage as they did in the original scenario. (Note: With 6th Ed. WRG, they had 25 percent more points; the diagram showed 21 Parthian units versus 15 Seleucid units.) It was further remarked that, “the lack of terrain was a decisive factor, as it permitted the Parthians to stretch the Seleucid line and then attack its weaker points.” Carl Luxford was the last person to ‘rsvp’ and/or take his turn on the Editor’s figurative hobby-horse. He reported to interested readers the results of a refight using MODIFIED DBA RULES. In the second longest summary and another “near run thing,” the Parthians emerged winners, extending their overall record, counting the seven victories reported by Matt, to a very impressive 12-0. I should add that the prolific and respected Jim Webster also weighed in on the topic, though he provided more of a ‘how I play Seleucids’ or suggestions on how to play them when using DBM as opposed to a summary account of a tabletop refight.
In his brief commentary about the original submission and the handful of reports, Michael surmised that the Parthian string of successful actions was likely due to “their superiority in numbers or the fact that the Seleucids were caught unawares.”
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Three decades after this figurative invitation to a “Parthian-themed party” was published, I thought (as well as hoped) it might be engaging and entertaining to revisit as well as revise the original premise. [Full disclosure: This project actually marks my second return to “The Editor’s Hobby-Horse.” Please see the first ‘based loosely on’ report at https://nopaintingrequired.blogspot.com/search/label/Parthians%20Aplenty, which was posted on 05 February in 2023.] Anyway, with regard to the look of my tabletop, it would be as featureless as described. However, closer examination of the original map indicated that there was a small or medium-sized hill in the approximate center of the table. Well, perhaps a little closer to the Seleucid deployment zone(s). In terms of army strength, I would maintain or try to maintain the Parthian advantage. Instead of forcing each side to adhere to the original deployments (there could be a lengthy and well-accepted paper written about what is wrong with the positions of the Seleucid formations in the original contest), I imitated Justin Taylor’s second battle and allowed both sides to deploy as they desired - within the general parameters of the rules of course. Initially, I toyed with the idea of refighting this initial battle of Matt Pickard’s 1993 campaign with six or seven different sets of rules as I thought the exploration of Parthian horse archers and their ability to engage from a fair distance or closer in might be a nice companion piece to my last post about Classical Indian Archery, but reality conspired with limited resources to intervene. (Common sense also participated as a strong if also ‘silent partner.’) After further deliberation, it was decided that two solo scenarios of this Parthians versus Seleucids struggle would be staged.
The Armati “Jigsaw” of approximately 70 Pieces
Choosing from the rather limited but fairly historical options available in the Parthian list found on Page M of the ARMATI 2nd Edition rulebook, I prepared a comparatively large 15mm scale army by referencing the guidelines provided under ‘Bonus Unit Procedures’ on page 34. I would start with a core force of 10 units of Light Cavalry, ‘key’ and armed with bows, obviously, as well as 4 units of Cataphracts, also ‘key’ but armed with lances. With 200 points to spend on Bonus Units, I assigned 2 points to upgrade a unit of Light Cavalry and a unit of Cataphracts to veterans, thereby increasing their respective unit breakpoints to 3 and 4. (In doubling the army’s size, I was permitted to field 2 units of veterans instead of just 1.) With the remaining 198 points, I purchased the maximum numbers of ‘key’ Camel units, 2, and 6 more units of Cataphracts so that I would have some additional ‘punching power.’ An impressive collection of 15 more Light Cavalry units were purchased with the left over points. I briefly considered buying a single unit of Skirmishers or even classifying another unit of as veterans, but decided to leave the unused points alone. With regard to command and control, I would have 4 heavy divisions for the 10 units of Cataphracts and 2 units of Camels, and 12 light divisions for 25 units of Light Cavalry. The calculated breakpoint of this army was 14 ‘key’ units.
Turning to Page J in the Age of Empires section of the attached catalog, I drafted a smaller army from the Later Seleucid list. My core force would contain: 2 ‘key’ units of Argyraspides (PH - phalanx); 4 ‘key’ units of Heavy Infantry (PH); 4 units of Peltasts (Light Infantry); 2 units of bow-armed Skirmishers, and 2 ‘key’ units of Cataphracts armed with lances. In sharp contrast to the Parthians, my Bonus Unit allowance for this army was 150 points. Starting at the bottom of the extended list, I chose and paid for the following: 1 unit of Scythed Chariots; 2 Elephants (‘key’); 1 unit of bow-armed Light Cavalry; 3 units of Light Cavalry; 1 unit of Camels (‘key’); 2 units of Heavy Cavalry (‘key’); 2 units of spear-armed Heavy Cavalry (‘key’); 2 units of Galatians (‘key’); 1 unit of Light-Heavy Infantry (i.e., Thorakitai); 3 units of Skirmishers (javelins), and 1 more ‘key’ unit of Heavy Infantry (PH). With the 3 points left, 2 were spent on making a unit of Argyraspides and a unit of Heavy Cavalry (with spears) veterans. Looking at command and control for this eclectic force, there would be 6 heavy divisions and 8 light divisions. The army breakpoint was determined to be the loss of 9 ‘key’ units, so about two-thirds of the Parthians’ morale tipping point.
Mapping the Contest
Appreciating that some readers - very likely a majority - may be left wanting more of a photo-heavy or photo-supported report and resigned (for a number of decades now) to the fact that I have been unable to, or have simply chosen not to provide such ‘tasty fare,’ I thought I might direct that hungry group to the following blog post where their appetite for traditional historical miniature wargaming might be sated: https://caliban-somewhen.blogspot.com/2014/08/second-outing-for-parthians.html.
Remarks
With 25 units of Light Cavalry armed with bows, and with a lot of luck as well as good positioning, the Parthians could have inflicted 25 ‘kills’ against targeted enemy units in each turn of this engagement. Well, once they were in range. This significantly low-probability string of successful volleys would only require the Parthian Horse Archers to roll better than the Seleucid units did (accepting the addition of the targeted unit’s protection factor). If all of the targets selected had been enemy Heavy Infantry, units with 4 break points, then 25 ‘kills’ would have destroyed half a dozen units and likely severely discouraged if not depressed the Seleucid general as a result. (Such effective fire would also have made for a very short wargame.) However, in trying to make use of the advantages of Light Cavalry with bows as depicted under the ARMATI rules, I was not able to coordinate the numerous formations of Parthians so that I could concentrate their arrow volleys. Even if I had managed this, I would have been subject to the ‘dice gods’ which, as related or intimated in the captions above, did not ‘look down with favor’ on my efforts. It seems safe to suggest that I have much to learn with respect to commanding a Parthian army on a tabletop, regardless of how it may be modeled. With special regard to the rules used in this revised reconstruction of that long-ago first campaign battle, I need to figure out how to make better use of its mobility and missile power, while making sure I limit its risk, as Parthian Light Cavalry are rather fragile.
On further reflection (the tabletop battle was finished a couple of days ago as I type the lines of this paragraph), I am wondering if my starting deployment should have been different. For example, would my Parthians have done better or gotten the job done faster if I had weighted one flank or another? I am also wondering about the composition of my army. Should I have ignored the camels and purchased more Cataphracts? Should I have been more aggressive with the Cataphracts? If I had charged the main formation of the enemy, this would have scared away the skirmishers and assorted troops; it would have tied down the Seleucid foot and by extension, forced the mounted units to stay close. On the question of arrow accuracy, I am wondering what - if anything - can be done to improve my die rolling.
The scenario was played without using many of the rule variants to ARMATI. (I should try and find out if there has been any progress or final decisions made on the original variants, and if there is a replacement group or website for the former Yahoo! platform.)
I did have skirmisher and light infantry stands that were equal in tabletop footprint to other troop types, however. I also fielded a general and a subordinate commander in each army. Both personalities were essentially the same, though the general was worth more in terms of ‘key unit’ value. Given the amount of arrows that were loosed, I also wondered if I should have made revisions to the listed range of this weapon. (Cavalry bows have an 18 inch range, while infantry with bows can shoot 24 inches. I should add that with 15mm scale, these distances are actually 12 and 16 standard inches.) Accepting that my die rolling was less than it could have been, I wonder if a long range and short range modifier might have been a prudent or even historically valid amendment? Along that same line, I wondered if the protection factor should have been removed from Seleucid units who were shot at from behind? As Parthian Light Cavalry were able to work their way around the Seleucids, a number of units came under arrow volleys from the flank as well as the rear. Given that a targeted unit’s attention and shields (if carried) are to the front, it seems that any protection factor should be removed or at least much reduced. In addition, I wondered if Parthian Horse Archers should be allowed to shoot at the rear ranks of enemy units that are engaged in melee. I recall a few occasions in this solo scenario of being tempted to charge into the backs of Seleucid pikemen or even Galatian warriors, as their melee values in this circumstance would have been zero. However, the Parthian Light Cavalry have a melee value of 1, so it presents something of a risk. It seems that having enemy in the rear, whether in shooting distance or movement range, should have some sort of morale impact. Perhaps reducing the melee die roll of the affected unit by 1 or 2 in melee rounds when this is the case?
In the rules as written (Section 8.2 on page 27), it appears that routed Light Cavalry can cause friends to check morale if within a certain distance of the broken unit. I worried about this when that single unit of Horse Archers was caught between the main force of Cataphracts and the Seleucid line of pikemen, elephants and Galatians. Further checking informed that this circumstance was addressed in one of the rule variants. Had this amendment been used, I think my deployment would have been quite different. I might have concentrated some Horse Archers in a wider screen for the supporting Cataphracts. (As a related aside, it seems that interpenetration of friendly units might also be considered. I seem to recall an ARMATI Battle Day report or two where this amendment was utilized. Anyway.) These Light Cavalry might have handled the enemy skirmisher screen, as well as inflicted some much needed hits/‘kills’ on the enemy elephants. These animals did some damage to the Parthian Cataphracts. Fortunately, it was late in the battle, so the panicked horses and their riders were able to hang on until the contest had been decided elsewhere.
Returning to the mobility of Light Cavalry under these rules, I wondered why their wheeling ability was equal to that of foot formations. Understanding that cavalry are men on horseback, it seems to me that, especially with regard to the presumably more flexible and fluid Light Cavalry formations, these troopers should be able to make right or left turns faster than a phalanx, shieldwall, or unit of foot archers. I would be curious to see what impact a 4-inch wheel (without becoming unformed) for cavalry would have on a wargame played with ARMATI.
To be certain, the majority of this ‘analysis’ has been about the need for personal improvement in commanding Parthians and some discussion about what rule variants to use or additional amendments to draft and test. To be sure, I also have much to learn when it comes to leading a Seleucid army on the tabletop, especially when facing an all-mounted and very mobile force like Parthians. While traditional or even historical, it appears that my deployment did not serve me very well. For as much as I have thought about it, I wonder if a box-like formation or ‘moving square’ might have been better. It appears that I could have drawn up my phalangites in the front, screened by skirmishers perhaps. I could have positioned light infantry and related types on the left and right. My mounted arm could have been positioned in the rear, safe from all those arrows, until it was time to let them out so that the pesky Parthians could be pursued and then punished when or if caught. It appears that my basic plan of marching straight at them with the long line of pikemen, elephants, and warriors worked well enough. However, contact was made too late to make any real difference. How then, does one counter Horse Archers effectively? I shall have to think on this problem.
The GRAND TRIUMPH! “Jigsaw” of approximately 89 Pieces
Setting aside the question of why Horse Bow could not be designated as a General’s or sub-general’s troop type, I purchased 9 units of Cataphracts from the Parthian (250 BC to 225 AD) list available for free at https://meshwesh.wgcwar.com/home. Having 144 points remaining out of an initial ‘allowance’ of 180, I proceeded to stockpile Horse Bow stands or units. Thirty-six of these fast-moving and harassing troop types were paid for. Designating 4 of the Cataphract units as ‘general stands’ (1 main and 3 subordinates), I proceeded to divide the remaining 41 units into several all-mounted commands. Two of these were primarily Horse Bow divisions, while the other two had a smattering of Cataphracts to support the ‘mobile missile launchers.’
For the opposition, I consulted the Seleucid (280 BC to 167 BC) army list found at the same site. Estimating the calendar year to be around 202 BC, and operating with a budget of 144 points (the usual size for a large battle with these rules, but approximately 25 percent less than the Parthian strength), I selected the following troop types: 6 units of Knights (Companions, etc.); 3 units of Cataphracts; 2 units of Javelin Cavalry (Tarentines, etc.); 1 unit of Horse Bow (Medians, etc.); 18 units of Pike (Phalanx); 2 units of Raiders (Thureophoroi); 3 units of Skirmishers (Asiatics); 2 units of Horde (Massed Levy); 3 units of Light Foot (various Anatolian light infantry); 1 unit of Elephants; 1 unit of Javelin Cavalry (Galatians), and 2 units of Warriors (Galatians).
Mapping the Contest
Remarks
Checking the word count for the previous set of remarks, it was noted that the total came in at approximately 1,300. Granting that an argument or criticism could be made that this number was rather more than necessary, I will strive to limit myself to a fewer words here. The format and content of that first set of remarks seems satisfactory however, so I will attempt to repeat that ‘process’ in this section.
If my totals are correct, I had command of 11 more stands of Parthian light cavalry in this second engagement. I confess it was both strange and something of a relief to not have to roll a die or dice for the arrow volley effects of 36 units of Horse Bow during the course of a turn or turns. Under the TRIUMPH! rules, Horse Bow stands do not have the ability to engage the enemy from a distance with ranged fire. Their combat ability or interaction with other troop types is very much abstracted. Following, please see the Horse Bow paragraph, transcribed from page 51 of Appendix D: Troop Type Descriptions:
Open Order, 4 Points - Cavalry fighting with bows from horseback, usually with
large ammunition supplies. Effective against other horse; less effetive against
close order foot but at little risk from them because of their ability to engage from
beyond thrown weapon range. Examples are Skythians, Huns. Magyars, most
Mongols, and many more.
On the TRIUMPH! QRS, Horse Bow units have a +2 melee factor versus Foot, and a +3 factor versus Mounted. This troop type is one of the fastest in the rules, having a movement rate of 8, so twice the speed of Elephants or Warband, to cite just two other examples of troop types. In many instances when Horse Bow are doubled in combat, they will make an evade or panic move instead of being destroyed and removed from play. Despite this sharp contrast in how Parthian light cavalry are represented and how they are used on the miniature or model battlefield, there were no serious problems experienced in making the transition from one ruleset to another.
With regard to the way each army was deployed, I think the numerical advantage of the Parthians was quite evident from the outset. This ‘pre-double envelopment’ was offset by the comparatively weak strength Horse Bow elements had when facing and fighting enemy foot formations. To be sure, the ‘to and fro’ or ‘approach, let fly, and withdraw’ style of combat was perhaps better depicted on the TRIUMPH! tabletop, but the lack of any visible casualties or unit degradation was, again, a bit strange. Being somewhat rusty with this particular set of rules, I had to consult my PDF copy a few times during the proceedings. I also availed myself of the numerous helpful tutorials and other videos available at https://www.youtube.com/@triumphancientandmedievalw3229. There were no rule amendments drafted for the scenario. Given my tendency to tinker with vetted sets of rules, I do wonder what impact a Horse Bow sub-general might have, and I do wonder if some version of the ‘shower shooting’ battle card might be considered.
To continue this loosely-structured comparison, I found the command and control procedures as well as the movement rules much more flexible. Granted, I was subject to the whims of the d6 when rolling for command pips for each corps or division, but with largish groups of Horse Bow or Horse Bow and Cataphracts, the occasional result of 1 or 2 did not make me want to pull my hair out. Individual or small groups of Horse Bow could also move about very easily, as they were not constrained by wheeling limitations or penalized by complex moves, etc. If a close combat went against a unit of Horse Bow, there was no real worry about the rout or panic affecting neighboring units. The accumulated effect of morale loss or collapse is modeled through corps or divisional demoralization. This is what happened to the Seleucid right wing, again, somewhat surprisingly, in the shortened contest.
Turning very briefly to my command abilities, it seems safe to suggest that numbers were on my side when riding around as the Parthian army general. I did not have to worry very much about my formations being pushed off the field by a Seleucid ‘broom.’ Instead, I had to figure out how best to use the advantage of mobility to attack targeted enemy units from the front as well as flank or front and rear in order to improve the odds of a kill. On further reflection, I suppose the threat of my greater numbers meant something, but it would have been nice to better manage and move these plentiful Horse Bow stands into physical contact with the enemy lines. Switching to look at things from the Seleucid general’s point of view, I continue to struggle with how best to counter a force composed primarily of light cavalry armed with bows. Being outnumbered from the start made me skeptical of condensing my battleline, or placing much of the cavalry as a mobile reserve, while presenting a wall of pikes to the front. Around the third turn or so, it occurred to me that I could have or should have arranged my pikemen in a single line instead of a supported formation. This deployment might have given me more of a footprint, thereby preventing or at least delaying the envelopment on one flank. To my frustration, albeit minor in the greater scheme of things, a workable solution to this problem remains elusive.
Additional Comments
As I began this post with a quote from Michael C. Grant’s one-page “Editorial,” it seems only appropriate to begin the final section of this post with the second part of his introductory paragraph. The gentleman wrote: “To be sure, army point count sometimes favored the victors, as did the varying experience of the commanders, but this hardly explains the extent of seven Seleucid defeats. Many Parthian generals today find it difficult to win.”
In my two amateur as well as non-traditional refights of this campaign battle, the army point differential did favor the Parthians, though much more in the second contest than in the first. I think I have remarked sufficiently on my abilities - such as they are - in the dual roles of Parthian and Seleucid generals and their subordinate officers. Adding these two wins to the known record, the Parthians are now 14-0. As I do not have information about the other six battles between Seleucids and Parthians Matt and his associates played in their campaign, I cannot offer a more informed assessment as to the reason or reasons why the Parthians won consistently. Numerical advantage certainly was a factor in these ARMATI and GRAND TRIUMPH! reconstructions. Regarding the observation about the level of difficulty for Parthian player-generals to win, I suppose allowance must be made for the time period and rulesets available when the article was written. I wonder if 6, 8, or even 10 modern sets of rules (say from 2018 to present) were tested with this same scenario if the Parthian domination would continue unchecked, or if the Seleucids might find away to defeat their evidently competent and confident enemy?
Michael requested interested parties to “report the result in brief with a minimum of explanatory notes.” Well, as per usual, it seems that I have typed more than absolutely necessary here. It seems that in this specific or ‘wordiness’ regard, that I am following in the footsteps of Kenneth Clark. Perhaps my reports might be condensed to just the maps and captions? Without additional context, however, I very much doubt that these simple ‘visual narratives’ would make a lot of sense.
On something of a related note, I happened to stumble upon a battle report from the desk of a Chris Kay that was published in the March 1982 issue of (Number 100) of Slingshot. This summary ran just two-thirds of a page, but was succinct and sufficient in my opinion. “SARMATIANS v TRAJANIC ROMANS” contained just 17 lines of text in 3 paragraphs. The accompanying map was black and white, very nicely drawn, and showed deployments, movements, terrain, as well as other pertinent information. At some point, I should like to be able to do something like this. In fact, for the recently completed solo actions, I wondered how or even if I might have met Michael C. Grant’s clearly stated parameters. Given the small size of Chris’s wargame (there were 8 units of Sarmatians and 8 units of Romans; some early version of WRG was likely employed), I doubt that my doubled ARMATI wargame and modified GRAND TRIUMPH! scenario could have been pared down to fit into two pages, let alone two-thirds of a page - half of which was a map.
This diversion into a different comparison-contrast consideration made me think about Aaron Bell’s excellent post, “A (Slightly Revised) Taxonomy of Battle Reports,” which the well-known figure in the hobby published in mid September of 2018. [See https://prufrockian-gleanings.blogspot.com/2018/09/a-taxonomy-of-battle-reports.html.] In reviewing the various classifications offered, it occurred to me that I could file this present effort under the ‘hybrid species’ of “Solo-Informative-Diagrammatic report,” as the two actions were played solo; the intention was to convey at least some information regarding inspiration, context, and rule mechanisms, and much of the actual narrative would be achieved by combining simple diagrams with extended captions.
A line or three about source material. “Horse Archer Units in Armati,” written by Roy Boss and published in the September/October 2022 issue (Number 342) of Slingshot, was read a few times. I tried to employ some of the tactical tips the venerable gentleman provided, but as previously admitted, much more practice is needed. In the same publication, but in the July 2004 issue (Number 235), I studied Part Two of Graham Bryson’s “Glasgow ARMATI Tournament 22-23 Nov 2003” article. Roy Boss featured here as well, commanding Achaemenid Persians in a championship battle against Skythians led by Bill Wilson. Roy came out on top by successfully denying the enemy’s flanking attempt as well as being helped by some pretty dismal Skythian archery. Anyway, in his ‘analysis and comment,’ Graham made a number of observations, one of these being: “Light horse is flexible, but fragile - and they can’t run for ever.” I saw this during my ARMATI refight. This was not an issue during the second scenario, as Horse Bow units can freely gallop here and there, and for quite some time. This contrast made me wonder about the historical accuracy of the respective representations of the recognized troop type. This pondering happened to coincide with portions of a discussion thread between two long-standing and respected members of The Society of Ancients.
Without meaning to quote either accomplished gentleman out of context, in an electronic ‘conversation’ taking place on 06 February, Justin Swanton remarked: “In any case when it comes to historicity in Ancients do any two players agree on what was historical?” He also offered the following: “A wargame is always a game before being a history lesson. We shouldn’t take it too seriously.” Anthony Clipsom weighed in, answering the perceived rhetorical or unintentional ‘wind up’ question with: “As to historical disputes, much depends on detail.” This esteemed gentleman then offered a summary of the current understanding of the Battle of Hastings as an example. In another reply, if I understood him correctly, Anthony agreed with Justin and quoted the South African’s own words back to him, stating: “You’ve written elsewhere about wargames as creative fiction and your “based on a true story” goes with that . . . I have no problem with that.”
[Note: At the acknowledged risk of confusing the reader by adding a further tangential reference - hence the brackets, in his brief remarks regarding my post about ‘Classical Indian Archery,’ Anthony reminded me of Nick Harbud’s study of arrows and bows in an old issue of Slingshot. “Behind the Curve: Archery in Wargames” [pages 24-30 in the January/February 2015 issue (Number 298)], was read twice and much enjoyed. Unfortunately, there was nothing in there about horse archers specifically, but the questions and debates about ranges, effectiveness, and rates of fire were relevant as well as thought provoking.]
Being quite out of my depth when these two are in the forum, I guess I will start with the idea of “wargames as creative fiction.” Even though my refights were simple adaptations of Matt Pickard’s original campaign battle, there was a degree of creativity involved, and the resulting accounts, though in the format of diagrams with captions, qualify as a type of creative fiction. As to the other points . . . The Parthians and Seleucids were historical entities. There are records. Granted, I am not well versed in these ancient entities or in the dozens of academic papers written about them. However, as is often said, “the devil is in the details.” So, how should Parthian horse archers be modeled on a tabletop? Should they have the ability to engage enemy units from a distance, or should they be required to engage in an even more abstract fashion? Where can one find common ground when it comes to wargaming battles involving Parthians and Seleucids? Is it historically valid to have both armies of equal size (i.e., have the same number of points)? How does one effectively lead an all-mounted force against a combined-arms force? How does one effectively lead a combined-arms force, though somewhat heavy on the pike phalanx and other slow-moving foot, against an all-mounted force containing hundreds if not thousands of men armed with bows and arrows?
On more of a related note, during my ‘research’ for the previous post and again as I drafted and revised this current project, I found myself thumbing through the heavily annotated as well as dog-eared pages of THE ROMAN ARMY AT WAR 100 BC—AD 200, by Professor Adrian K. Goldsworthy. In the ‘Skirmishing and Missile Exchange’ section of Chapter 5, “The Unit’s Battle,” I re-read the following:
Yet at Carrhae, around 10,000 horse-archers fired at a very dense body of Roman
foot for most of a day, at least once replenishing their ammunition. The result
was 4,000 Roman wounded, some of whom may have been injured in hand-to-
hand combat (Plutarch, Crassus 28). [187]
I went into ‘question mode’ again. Did all of these approximately 10,000 horse-archers engage in the firing of arrows at the Romans? If so, what might the rate of fire have been? How many missiles were delivered per hour? How many arrows in total were directed at the Roman army? There is an approximation of the number of wounded as a result of this apparent deluge of arrows, but can we get close to an estimate of percentage of hits for the number of missiles that were loosed?
Further scanning of this section resulted in rediscovering this passage on page 184:
A horse-archer normally used a less-powerful bow than a foot archer, and thus
had a shorter range. This is because the archer standing on his own feet can
achieve better balance than a man on horseback, so the strength and weight of his
whole body contributes to the bow shot. A horse-archer has to rely upon the
strength of his torso and arms.
Returning to the excerpts from Justin and Anthony as well as to my experience in these recently completed refights, it appears that this passage might provide evidence for reducing the range of Parthians under ARMATI, but also allowing Horse Bow to have some kind of range under TRIUMPH! Given the apparent lack of power, perhaps some kind of disorder or morale marker would be more historically accurate or realistic than noting casualties or simply removing the targeted unit from the tabletop. At the risk of tilting at a windmill, of opening up (re-opening?) a proverbial can of worms, or of restating the obvious, I wonder if a tabletop battle can combine the interesting or relevant aspects of a history lesson and the engaging procedures of a game in equal, entertaining, as well as educational measures?
