In the Shadows 

of Chalons

Three options were under consideration. The first solo scenario would be based on the historical battle of Quatre Bras. This adaptation was tentatively titled ‘The Quarrel for Quattro Strade,’ as over the years, I have developed a soft spot for alliteration in titles, and would feature representative forces drawn from the Early Renaissance (1) pages of the ADVANCED ARMATI rulebook. In general, three Italian City State armies, supported by two Swiss (15th century) armies, would meet four Burgundian armies who were, as might be imagined - given my preference for ‘bigger battles,’ reinforced by two different Italian City State armies. A measure of redemption was the underlying goal of this scenario, as a previous Italian Wars experiment or interlude had proved somewhat disappointing. The second scenario that would also be played by myself/against myself, advanced the calendar to the Later Renaissance (2) section and lists of this same rulebook. For this fictional contest, French Huguenots would meet Spanish (16th century) forces in a simpler yet still rather sizeable engagement. Drawing some inspiration from David Kay (as well as being more than a little envious of his talents), I thought I might try something similar to the recent as well as very large if also anachronistic contest he presented to Society of Ancients members. This battle saw quite the collection of 6mm Roman legionaries and auxiliary formations tangle with an alliance of Greek city-state hoplites supported by cavalry and light troops. While strong cases could be presented for each of these projects, I imagine it will come as no great surprise to the handful of readers when they are informed that an entirely different option was conceived and then acted upon. As the title of this post suggests, this unlisted option, this out-of-nowhere - something like a ‘dark horse’ of a project, would have something to do with the historical battle of Chalons. To be clear, this would not be a refight or a carefully supported interpretation of that 451 AD/CE contest. (For inspiration and reference, I reviewed the engaging and excellent content of the July-August 2013 issue of Slingshot, wherein numerous reports of Battle Day 2013 were published.) Instead, this scenario would afford me the opportunity to see if I could manage a really big battle using the TRIUMPH! or GRAND TRIUMPH! rules. This improvised project would also give me a chance to try out the recent rule revisions. (These were not extensive, but limited in scope as well as carefully considered and explained.) Finally, this design-as-I-went scenario would provide me a testing ground for some ‘house rules’ regarding demoralization.  

Preparations

Instead of following the procedures for determining what the tabletop would look like, I decided to keep things fairly simple. The terrain for this fictional field of battle would be essentially flat and featureless. However, there would be a single gentle hill (two-tiers in height) located in the approximate center of the table. In addition, there would be three areas categorized as elevated ground or rises. These were not features in the strict sense. They were simply places on my fictional battlefield where the ground was not completely flat. These rises would not confer any melee advantage(s) or interfere with movement of troops; they were fabricated and positioned in order to break up an otherwise arguably boring and visually unappealing model of what a vast plain might look like in what is now western Europe during the latter half of the fifth century.

Interested in seeing how large of a battle I could effectively manage, I built two alliances. Each of these tentative coalitions would contain four armies or contingents. On the Huns’ side of the tabletop, there were: Gepids, Ostrogoths, Alemanni, and of course, a good number of those fearsome horse archers. On the Patrician Roman side of the tabletop there were: Burgundi, Visigoths, Early Franks, and a fairly large contingent of Romans or troop types associated with and or in the employ of what remained of the once great empire. Typically, a friendly game of TRIUMPH! sees two 48-point armies engaging in battle. In a GRAND TRIUMPH! scenario, observers will see two 144-point armies fight for possession of the determined battlefield. For this solo wargame, I would prepare Hun and Roman armies adding up to approximately 144 points. These formations would be supported by three ‘allied’ armies containing around 96 points each. Simple addition produced 432 points as an estimated total strength for each alliance. It seems safe to remark that this is an unusual if not bordering on ridiculous point total for a GRAND TRIUMPH! scenario.  

This would be my first contest wherein I employed the handful of amendments made to Version 1.1 of the TRIUMPH! rules. Studying the ‘rules sticker’ and discussion notes, it appeared that only the bullet points concerning Bow Levy slightly improved movement rate, Rabble being able to pass through, and the Pursuit and Fall-Back modification would be applicable to this possibly too large and again, fictional contest.  

Finding myself unhappy with or unsure of the original Demoralization rules, I thought I might tinker with these and see what happened. To a large degree, they were left as written. However, the following bullet points were drafted for testing in this ‘big laboratory’:

> units in demoralized groups that are outside of 8 MU (adjusted command radius) or not given orders are “frozen in place.” They will not fall back and then rout. They will stay in their current position until and if given orders.  

> commands that lose half of their original strength are considered broken and will immediately flee the field (i.e., be removed from the table) regardless of their circumstances or situation. 

> victorious commands or groups responsible for the breaking of an enemy command must roll a d6 to determine how they react

result of 1-2 / 1 turn immobile (rest and reorganize)

result of 3-4 / 2 turns immobile (rest and reorganize)

result of 5-6 / 3 turns immobile (rest and reorganize)

How It Played

As has apparently become my practice, the following series of maps or simple diagrams should provide sufficient and perhaps even satisfactory narrative with regard to how the battle began, progressed, and concluded or was determined to have run its course. 

Commentary & Critique

On review, it appears that my intention with this project was two-fold. First, I wanted to see if I could manage an unusually large battle using the selected rules. Second, I wanted to test the recently released official amendments as well as try out a few of my own. 

Broadly speaking, I think that I was able to manage a rather large battle. If I were to grade the effort however, and not referring to any draft or established rubric, I think I would give myself a B-minus or an 81, maybe an 82 on a 100-point scale. (Of course, readers of this post may disagree. That is their prerogative.) As far as I could tell, the official amendments seemed to work very well. Having had some experience with the turtle-like pace of the Bow Levy units in previous scenarios, the increase in movement rate to 3 MU versus 2 MU did add up over the course of several turns. Then again, the Roman Artillery stands did cost more command pips as well as slow down the advance of the Roman infantry lines. Shifting to an assessment of my rough draft ‘house rules’ regarding demoralization, well, I think this tinkering worked well enough. However, there is always room for improvement, is there not? At the risk of extending this final section, my concern or “issue” with demoralization is that it seems to allow commands that have ‘had the stuffing knocked out of them’ to hang around until such a point as there are just a few dozen or hundred men left. While morale rules in a sense, in the recently completed scenario, the Roman contingent appeared to be completely unaffected by the sudden appearance of a large hole to its right. Granted, the Gepids were not able to exploit this advantage and the Huns were too far away, but on an actual ancient battlefield, I think this would be a significant development. 

Changing gears, I fully admit that this latest solo project would not qualify as a pretty wargame. That was not its intention. To merit that adjective and subjective opinion, I think that well-painted and based 15mm or 25mm figures would be required. Ideally, unit bases would have had a universal frontage of either 50mm or 60mm. This increase in dimension would, of course, made a much larger tabletop necessary. And this more expansive tabletop would have needed a few pieces at least, of well-modeled terrain features to add to the level of prettiness. Along this same line of consideration, the recently completed scenario was not a social event. It is not too difficult to imagine the 15mm or 25mm figures and formations being ‘commanded’ by eight player-generals, who are, in turn, supported by an experienced umpire and his knowledgeable assistant. Does a pretty as opposed to a functional wargame, and one that is more social with regard to participating individuals, make for a better wargame or experience? Here again, opinions will vary. More context is needed to provide a better answer. (There is that word again.) Off the top of my gray-haired head, I can think of two instances where this might not be the case. First, imagine that you have been designated as a commander of a flank or sector and then, through no fault of your own, you do not have or wind up not having a whole heck of a lot to do during the scenario except watch the other players move their traditional units and engage in battle on some pretty good-looking terrain. Two, you are again assigned to a command or commands, and then, by sheer chance, find yourself situated next to a fellow player-general who is rather overweight and who could also use a reminder tutorial on the basics of good personal hygiene and or manners. 

Shifting from hypotheticals and the subjective to something more measurable, I should like to use this paragraph to examine the losses suffered by each side during the engagement. As described in the captions, the Roman alliance witnessed the collapse and rout of four of its original nine commands. Half of the Visigoth contingent was forced off the field, and one of the Roman commands was eliminated from the battle. The entire Burgundi contingent was broken after a hard fight with the Gepids. In terms of points, these losses added up to 179, which represented 41 percent of the starting Roman strength. In addition to these casualties, there were nine units worth 27 points lost by the Franks; 2 units worth 8 points lost by the Romans, and 2 units lost by the Visigoths worth 8 points. This damage added 43 points to the Roman roster, bringing their total to 222 points. If my math is correct, this represented 51 percent of the Roman original numbers, so, technically, it appears that the Romans were defeated. Turning to the other alliance or coalition, the Huns experienced the complete loss of one command, which was equal to 48 points. No other commands/groups were routed, but a few were rather beaten up in the engagement. Another ‘division’ of Hun Horse Bow lot five stands or 20 points. The Gepid contingent (demoralized), had suffered the loss of six units of Bow Levy, three units of Knights, and five units of Warriors. These casualties added up to 39 points. The Ostrogoths lost four Knight stands and a Skirmisher stand for a total of 19 points. (Their command of Knights was demoralized.) The Alemanni suffered 38 points of losses in the form of seven units of Bow Levy, three units of Light Foot, and five units of Warriors. To reiterate, one of the Alemanni commands was demoralized. If my additional math is correct, then the Hun alliance suffered 164 points of combined losses. This amounts or amounted to around 35 percent of their original strength. Based on this figuring, it appears that I should amend my judgment of a draw to a minor and somewhat costly Hun victory. 

In the report provided by Adam Hayes in the July/August 2013 issue of Slingshot [see, if you are able to, ‘Chalons 451 AD - With Piquet Archon 2: It’s all in the Planning (?)’], the esteemed gentleman explained: “All too often, every available unit in both armies meets up for a huge barney in the centre of the map. This can be ungainly and tedious to fight on the tabletop.” On the one hand, I could not help but be reminded of this as I played 11 turns of my latest solo and rather or purposefully large wargame. In terms of points, I believe that this contest qualifies as a “huge barney,” and may be, at least unofficially (who keeps track of these categories anyway?), one of the largest TRIUMPH! wargames ever staged on a tabletop. Admittedly, the functional and simple units could be described as “fiddly,” and so, proved challenging to handle at times. But as this was a solo project, I did not have to worry about disappointing other player-generals or upsetting the sense and sensibilities of the participants. Admittedly, there were instances of “tedium,” as resolving a large number of melees can become repetitive and again, require some delicate handling with units that are objectively small, flimsy, and lacking in aesthetic appeal. Then again, I think one could remark or perhaps even argue that these situations can be found in and or experienced when playing in sizable traditional wargames. 

Anyway, in brief review, I think the terrain was sufficient and the opposing armies were satisfactory. As a learning module, this fictional battle proved itself valuable. For future ‘mega-games’ with these rules, I think a unit frontage of 40mm should be the smallest employed. Then again, I might experiment with methods involving 50mm units, which would allow for missile and movement ranges to be measured in inches instead of some other odd increment. I could also see if staging three or four separate but integrated battles would allow for a subjectively better wargaming experience. 

Over the past couple of years, I estimate that I have completed between 20 and 30 TRIUMPH! wargames. The majority of these were completed in a ‘World Cup’ format of 15 contests played in 2023. To be certain, I make no claim to be expert with these rules. However, I think that I do have a respectable level of experience. This has been gained through solo play, submitting questions to the WGC Forum, watching the various You Tube videos, and being at table side (as an observer only) when Rod C. presented and umpired a historical battle at a Little Wars Convention. In the recently completed contest, I found very few instances where I had to stop and check the rules or consult some exchange that had been copied and pasted into a reference page from the WGC Forum. There were more instances of being surprised when Bow Levy were able to repulse multiple attacks or even, on some occasions, score a local victory when doubling a better and more expensive enemy unit. Even though I had prepared a ‘cheat sheet,’ and was especially curious or eager to see how my Roman infantry with bow support might fare in the struggle, these legionary and auxiliary formations never got the chance. In fact, it struck me as rather odd that units armed with integrated archers were restricted in their target selection. The numerous units of Huns were also restricted, at least in my mind or perhaps it is simply bias formed from using other rule sets and reading other wargame reports, as these could not loose arrow volleys at their enemies. So, I found myself struggling to figure out the best way to fight with Horse Bow against Knights. Instead of sweeping away the Visigoths, either by volume of archery or by ‘feigned flight’ tactics, my figurative Huns were hard pressed to make any progress against the Visigoths. As reported in the map captions, they were eventually able to force the infantry off the field, but a fairly steep price was paid. 

Capture the Carroccio!

The following diagrams (in serious need of revision by a professional graphic artist with, ideally, an interest in or knowledge of military history) are offered as an extension of the categorical briefing posted to the ‘battle reports’ sub forums of The Society of Ancients and The Washington Grand Company. [Please see https://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?board=5.0 and or https://forum.wgcwar.com/viewforum.php?f=5&sid=66dcdcf6f9e12be9b0d7dc2e0a173f6b.] On reflection, I imagine that absent any other materials, these very basic maps and captions could provide sufficient narrative of a recent solo scenario played on my tabletop. 

The originating premise or question was as follows: If one were to transfer or translate the battle of Waterloo back to the fifteenth century, what might that look like and how might it play?   

PONTICS vs ROMANS

Revisiting my first published ancients wargame report

Absent the written record, I readily confess that I would be at a complete loss to recall the generalities and especially any details regarding the first ancients wargame I set up, played, typed a report about, and then sent the finished product in for consideration by the editor of a hobby publication. Fortunately, I have the July/August 1996 issue (Number 82) of MWAN, the Midwest Wargamer’s Association Newsletter, wherein Hal Thinglum was kind enough to include my very first and admittedly or embarrassingly amateur effort, which was titled, “SPRINGTIME IN PONTUS: An Ancients Wargame Report.” 

To be certain, the simplest course of action would have been to repeat the battle as described. Well, not as an exercise, but to set up a similar field and armies, and then see how much (or how little) my tabletop generalship had improved over the course of almost three decades. Various other courses of action could have been considered as well. For example, I could refight the scenario using a different set of rules. For another example, I could refight the scenario using larger forces containing various additional troop types, at least according to the rules selected and the respective army lists attached to those rules. Anyway.

The following maps and their captions provide a basic narrative of how this return to the early stage of my ancients wargaming ‘career’ was conducted. Acknowledging that the following introduction is redundant, this fictional but historical scenario was played using the GRAND TRIUMPH! rules. For further context and or to establish a kind of setting, let us say that it is late spring of 96 BC/BCE, and a sizable Roman army has been sent to deal with the problem that is Pontus. 

 REBELS VS ROYALS

A Cousin (albeit twice removed) of Cunaxa

This fictional scenario was the product of some time spent reading, thinking and writing about Cunaxa (401 BC/BCE). It was played solo using Simon Miller’s To The Strongest! rules as amended by Even Stronger V10. The dimensions of the tabletop were 29 squares by 8 squares, with the sides of each square measuring 4 inches. Terrain, deployments, and a description of the sharp, short action are provided on the following maps. Thanks in advance for taking the time. 

Contemplating Cunaxa

If I decided to stage a solo refight of the 401 BC/BCE civil war contest between Cyrus the Younger and King Artaxerxes II with the Armati rules (2nd Edition), then what would, or what should the opposing armies look like? Well, at the risk of providing half of an answer or one that a majority of readers might find - to a greater of lesser degree - problematic or rather vague, it appears that the appearance and composition of the involved armies would rather depend on my interpretation of the existing ancient source material in addition to the modern analyses that I have been able to secure, study, and annotate. In conjunction with that non-academic interpretation, there are also the potential ‘gatekeeper’ issues of which figure scale, which painting process and schemes, which method of flocking bases, and which rules to employ, even though the selection has already been made, at least for this present hypothetical - which may - I admit, ultimately prove premature if not altogether unnecessary. The numerous stipulations made, let me table most of these subjective topics and begin this figurative and hopefully rewarding journey on the right of the rebel line, by focusing on the Greek contingent under the overall command of Clearchus. 

Both ancient narratives and modern analyses are in general agreement about the presence of approximately 1,000 Paphlagonian horsemen, apparently positioned closest to the Euphrates, the river which framed the right flank of Cyrus’ deployment. There were some peltasts present as well, in addition to a fairly large number of heavy infantry or hoplites and mercenaries under the shared command of Proxenus, Menon and the previously identified Clearchus. The following is a ‘work in progress’ order of battle based on the Greek army list found on page E of the Armati rulebook.

Paphlagonian cavalry - 2 units of LC, 3[0]0 +1 / Various [8]

Peltasts - 4 units of LI, 4[1]2 +1 / Javelins [7]

Lacedaemonian Infantry - 4 units of PH (key), 8[1]1 +2 / Spears [14]

Other Hoplites/mercenaries - 6 units of PH (key), 7[1]1 +2 / Spears [12]

Notes:

1. By way of explanation, ‘4[1]2 +1 / Javelins’ informs that the unit has a frontal fighting value of 4, a flank/rear fighting value of 1, and a fighting value of 2 in special circumstances, such as when engaged in rough or difficult terrain. The ‘+1’ is the protection factor against enemy missiles, and the ‘Javelins’ indicates the main weapon with which the unit is armed. In this case, the peltasts or light infantry carry javelins, and these thrown missiles have a tabletop range of 9 inches. With regard to the Paphlagonian light cavalry, the [8] indicates the point value of the unit. In this example, it has been increased from [7] because of the ‘bump’ in frontal fighting value. (Normally, LC are 2[0]0 +1, etc.) 
2. Although there is no official representative unit scale provided in Armati, for this reconstruction of Cunaxa it may be suggested that a unit of light cavalry or indeed any cavalry formation represents 50o men and horses. The same unit scale can be applied to light infantry troop types. With regard to the heavy infantry formations, it seems appropriate to designate each unit or collection of stands as a body of 1,000 men. 
3. Clearchus will command the entire wing, in addition to leading the Lacedaemonians. For purposes of this hypothetical refight, he might be given a +2 melee modifier, a +1 morale modifier to help out fatigued or disordered units, and be valued at 2 key units against the breakpoint of this contingent or wing. Proxenus and Menon will be assigned to the other hoplite formations, with Menon taking charge of the left of this line. These subordinates should have the basic or usual qualities of an Armati general. 
4. The peltasts could be deployed with the light cavalry next to the river bank or very close to it. These light troops could also be divided between the left and right wings of the Greek contingent. The peltasts could be deployed as described in the rules, or they could have double their normal frontage, as provided in the rule variations published on the War Flute site.  
5. With 10 key units under his command and based on the reported historical performance of these troops, it seems reasonable to give the Greek contingent a breakpoint of 6 key units. Clearchus needs to lose 6 hoplite units before his command decides to run away so that they can reform and perhaps fight another day. Then again, if Clearchus finds himself face down in the dirt, the Greeks only have to lose 4 hoplite units before they reach their morale tipping point. 
6. Evidently, the commander of the peltasts was a fellow named Episthenes of Amphipolis, and he was reportedly very capable. I suppose he could be represented on the tabletop, but a further representation of command on the Greek right seems unnecessary. Then again, there is the historical accuracy and realism factor to consider.
7. For this flank or wing, as for the subsequent orders of battle, the determination of divisional control or commands (a key component of Armati wargames) is very much a work in progress. Taking a few minutes to review the Greek contingent, an assignment of 4 Light Divisions and 3 Heavy Divisions seems reasonable. This arrangement would allow the light troops freedom of movement, while ensuring that the hoplites and mercenaries act as single formations.  

Turning my attention to the center of Cyrus’ army, according to one ancient author, the rebel prince had “about 10,000 of the choicest troops, a mix of Persians and barbarians, along with 1,000 cavalry, who were rather well-equipped.” Employing the same thinking (i.e., educated guessing) as outlined above, this contingent of the rebel army could be depicted in the following manner:

Cavalry - 2 units of HC (key), 4[1]0 +1 / Various [10]

Persian Infantry - 3 units of FT (key), 6[1] 1 +1 / Spears/Bows [9]

Barbarians - 7 units of FT, 5[1]0 +1 / Various [7]

Notes:

1. This segment of a ‘working order of battle’ was drafted from the Late Achaemenid army list found on page F of the Armati rulebook. 
2. It would not be unreasonable to designate the cavalry units as veterans, thereby giving them an additional unit breakpoint, so that they could lose 4 melee rounds before being destroyed as opposed to 3 rounds.
3. With just 5 key units in this comparatively small command, it seems safe to suggest a contingent breakpoint of 3. With the loss of a third key unit then, this formation becomes more interested in running away than in staying on the battlefield. 
4. Cyrus is the leader of this contingent as well as the overall commander of the army. It seems appropriate to give him an increased melee and morale modifier, say +2 for each situation. Given his historical importance, it also seems reasonable to value him as the equivalent of 4 key units. If Cyrus is killed, then his center is obviously broken. The loss of 4 army breakpoints will have a fairly significant impact on the army morale as well. (As of this typing however, and at this stage of development, the breakpoint for the army of Cyrus has yet to be determined and supported by evidence or reason.)  

Looking over at the left wing of the rebel army, another ancient author informs, “Ariaeus was in command, and had around 1,000 cavalry as well as the troops from Phrygia and Lydia.” Yet more educated guesswork was done here in order to come up with a plausible but also subject to likely revision order of battle for this sector of Cyrus’ line. The following represents what I am currently thinking and or planning until further information and or arguments are presented:

Cavalry - 2 units of HC (key), 4[0]0 +1 / Various [10]

Phrygians - 6 units of FT (key), 5[1]0 +1 / Various/Bows [8]

Lydians - 6 units of PH (key), 6[1]1 +1 / Spears [9]

Notes:

1. I readily admit that I am on ‘thin ice’ here when trying to formulate an order of battle for this third of the rebel army. That aside, the capabilities of these units were taken as well as slightly modified from the same army list used in preparing the units forming Cyrus’ center. 
2. As of this typing (the last week of April), all the units in this command are ‘key,’ which means that 5 will have to be lost before the morale of this contingent is ruined. 
3. Ariaeus will have the normal or usual abilities of a general under the rules. 
4. Based on the representative unit scale established for the Greek contingent, this wing of Cyrus’ army would have a strength of approximately 1,000 horse and 12,000 foot. 

________________________________

Moving to the other side of this ancient and potential model battlefield, I will now attempt to examine and or offer interpretations regarding the composition of the king’s left, center and right. 

Referencing one ancient historian, I am informed that a fellow by the name of Tissaphernes may have been in command on the king’s left. Then again, this officer may just have been in charge of the small body of cavalry, who were uniformed rather nicely in white cuirasses. The size and strength problem of the various bodies or contingents persists, as there are “troops with wicker shields, Egyptian hoplites with wooden shields,  and then more horsemen and bowmen” positioned on this flank or combining to form the left and center. Evidently, these “national divisions, drawn up in solid squares” were screened by scythed chariots. According to one modern historian, there were 150 of these vehicles present on the field. Presumably, all of these chariots were in front of the left flank, aimed at or intended to disrupt the Greek formations on the rebel army’s right. This interpretation conflicts with one ancient writer who reports that “Artaxerxes stationed before the length of this battle-line scythe-bearing chariots in no small number . . .” Unfortunately, there is no indication of how much space there was between the vehicles, and no reference of measurement provided with respect to the frontage covered by that line of battle. More unfortunately, from what I have been able to determine and or discover, the only description of the king’s deployment ‘informs’ the following: “. . . the wings he put under command of Persians, while he himself took his position in the centre with no less than fifty thousand elite troops.” Working with this limited and problematic information or lack thereof, I drafted the following order of battle for the army of King Artaxerxes:

Left Wing - 

Cavalry - 1 unit of HC (key), 4[0]0 +1 / Spears [7]

Infantry - 12 units of FT (key) - 5[1]1 +1 / Javelins-Bows [8]

Infantry - 12 units of FT [levy] - 3[0]0 +0 / Various [4]

Scythed Chariots - 2 units of SyCh - 5[1]0 +1 / Blades [6]

Leader - Tissaphernes / +1 melee modifier, value of 2 key units

Center - 

Cavalry - 8 units of HC (key), 4[0]0 +1 / Spears [7]

> leader - Artagerses / +1 melee modifier, value of 1 key unit

Infantry - 4 units of FT (key) - 6[1]1 +1 / Javelins-Bows [9]

Infantry - 12 units of FT (key) - 5[1]1 +1 / Javelins-Bows [8] 

Infantry - 16 units of FT - 4[1]0 +0 / Various [6]

Scythed Chariots - 1 units of SyCh - 5[1]0 +1 / Blades [6]

Leader - King Artaxerxes II / +2 melee modifier, +1 morale modifier, value of 5 key units

Right Wing - 

Cavalry - 1 unit of HC (key), 4[0]0 +1 / Spears [7]

Infantry - 15 units of FT (key) - 5[1]1 +1 / Javelins-Bows [8]

Infantry - 15 units of FT [levy] - 3[0]0 +0 / Various [4]

Leader - Unknown / +1 melee modifier, value of 1 key unit

Notes:

1. In an attempt to reflect the superior numbers as well as what would have been the much greater depth of the king’s formations, all infantry units are deployed deep. Furthermore, the second rank of infantry is arranged just behind and in contact with the first line. In other words, the king’s foot formations will consist of three large blocks. On further reflection, it seems that requiring the cavalry of the center to deploy deep might also be historically reasonable.   
2. With regard to sector breakpoints, the current idea or plan is as follows: 4 key units for the Left Wing; 8 key units for the Center, and 5 key units for the Right Wing. 
3. The impact of the loss of King Artaxerxes may be revised so that his death in a melee would break the center and have possible if not likely repercussions for both of the wings. A simple d6 roll would determine if these wings would continue fighting. 

 ________________________________

Based on my current understanding of this historical battle (subject to correction and revision, of course), it appears that the general engagement could be divided into four stages or ‘zones of interest.’ First, there was the contest on the right between the Greek infantry and the Persian formations arrayed against them. The second phase occurred in the center of the  plain and could be said to have revolved around the personal combat between Cyrus and Artaxerxes. The third phase happened on the left of the rebel army. Here, Cyrus’ troops were pushed back and then broken by their counterparts. Essentially, it was very similar to what happened with the Greeks on the other side of the field. The fourth stage happened some time after the initial battle had been fought and Cyrus had been killed. The Greek contingent turned around and marched back to engage what men remained of King Artaxerxes’ center and left. This second battle was over rather quickly, as it was basically a repeat of the Greeks’ performance against the king’s original left wing.  

From this broad summary (perhaps the more appropriate term is over-simplification?) of the events on that fateful day in 401 BC/BCE, it seems that one could suggest at least half a dozen ways to refight Cunaxa on a tabletop. Moving down a figurative list from larger to smaller, there is: 1) the entire battle, 2) Cyrus’s right and center vs the king’s left and center, 3) Cyrus’ center and left vs the king’s center and right, 4) the Greeks vs the king’s left, 5) the respective centers vs each other, and 6) Cyrus’s left vs the king’s right. I suppose that one could also add a seventh option. This would see the Greeks returning to the original field of battle to face the king’s victorious army - what was left of it anyway. 

Returning to the Armati hypothetical and keeping in my mind the number of ways in which a refight of this historical battle might be set up and wargamed, I think this is a good a time as any to reference pages 10 and 11 in Donald Featherstone’s 1974 text, Battle Notes for Wargamers. This primary mover and greatly respected figure of the hobby offered some advice on how to “refight historical battles realistically.” He explained that, “the most obvious manner was to conduct an historical exercise.” This would not be a wargame, but more of a demonstration game, wherein the ancient and accepted sources are used to show the general public what happened. The second method would see the participating player-generals “follow the original course of events reasonably well, but allow some leeway, without too much imaginative stretch, for a reversed result.” In the case presently ‘under my admittedly amateur microscope’ then, a refight of Cunaxa might see the Greek contingent decimated by effective arrow volleys or taken in the flank and rear by the king’s strong cavalry command of approximately 6,000. On the other hand, a refight might also witness the destruction of the king’s right flank, or even see King Artaxerxes cut down from his horse. I suppose Cyrus might also lose his life, but only much later in the refight, while pursuing the enemy and or mopping up pockets of resistance. Anyway, this ‘founding father’ warned against “the taking of too many liberties, lest the refight becomes a wargame played for its own sake, and lacks any precision.” 

The previous paragraph serves as an awkward transition to a consideration of some scenario rules that may or may not be drafted and employed in a tabletop refight of Cunaxa. To be certain, I make no claim of originality here. And again, based on my current understanding of the course of the historical battle, I think that there are at least three areas or episodes where one might want to apply rules specifically drafted for this refight. These three episodes are: the role of the king’s scythed chariots; the attack and pursuit by the Greek hoplites, and the cavalry contest in the approximate center of the field. 

According to one ancient author, the noise made by the Greek infantry frightened some of the horse teams pulling the scythed chariots. As a result, some of these vehicles careened into their own lines, while others - without a driver - passed harmlessly through the Greek lines, as the hoplites were able to step to the side and avoid the various wicked blades. If actual units or models of scythed chariots are deployed on the tabletop, then it seems reasonable to allow for the chance that Greek hoplites banging their spears on their shields might panic the horse teams. Perhaps a d6 roll of 1 or maybe 1-2 will indicate success, and cause the affected scythed chariot stand to roll another d6 or 2d6 to see in which direction it moves unintentionally. To provide for the chance that a certain number of Greek hoplites may be too slow or otherwise occupied to get out of the way, perhaps another d6 roll might answer this question. A result of 1 means that the scythed chariots have managed to make contact, and the impacted unit will likely suffer as a result. Then again, as the ancient sources do not say a whole lot about the scythed chariots, it may be argued or decided by some wargamers to not represent these vehicles on the tabletop at all. This approach would certainly solve a potential problem, but it would also remove an opportunity for a bit of color if not excitement on the Greek right and perhaps against Cyrus’ center as well. 

Turning to a ‘study’ of the sweeping advance and attack made by the hoplites under Clearchus, the same ancient historian reports that there was some running, some shouting or reminders to keep together and not run after the fleeing enemy, and that the enemy formations “broke before an arrow was able to reach the hoplites.” Another ancient writer reports that the two opposing sides in this sector did make physical contact, but due to the “superior skill, experience, and splendour of their arms,” the barbarians facing the Greeks were quickly routed. Estimating the weight of the arms and armor of the hoplites to be around 40 pounds and likely even more, I cannot imagine that these men could maintain any kind of cohesive formation while running. I do not think they would have started to run when they were three stadia (approximately 600 yards) from the enemy. A ‘quick-time’ advance of just 100 yards would seem to be rather tiring as well as resulting in a degree of disorder in a phalanx. Should there be then, some rule or rules allowing for the chance of hoplite units to become disorganized and or somewhat fatigued if they elect to charge into the mass of Persians and other nationalities occupying this sector? Further, as foot units with bows have a range of 24 inches in the Armati rules and heavy foot units can move just 6 inches per turn, this allows for potentially devastating arrow volleys to be inflicted on a targeted unit of units. Perhaps a ‘restriction’ that would permit the Persians to loose arrows only after the Greeks had moved to within 9 inches of their position? Given the apparent panic that the Greek advance caused, perhaps any missile fire should be negatively modified. Then again, the protection factor of the hoplites could be increased to +3 in this limited situation. 

The rapid dissolution of the king’s left wing impresses me as not very enjoyable wargaming, for either player-general, really. While the proposed composition of the king’s left wing seems to guarantee its eventual defeat by the advancing Greeks, I wonder if a scenario rule is needed that would further affect these less experienced and less skillful troops? A negative melee modifier might work. Then again, it might also tip the situation into that ‘one-sided terrain’ where neither player experiences a satisfying level of engagement or excitement. As I have not yet refought Cunaxa, and I have not taken the time to set up and experiment with the limited contest involving the Greeks and their Persian enemies, I cannot say for certain how the action in this sector might play out. It appears that there is a chance that the Greeks, or at least some of them, will become fatigued by slaughtering those enemy units they are able to catch and engage. These fatigued units might be at risk then, from free Persian cavalry or foot units in the center of the tabletop. 

 

Setting aside the alignment of the respective centers and the reported orientation of the king’s large body of cavalry, the personal combat between Cyrus and the king’s attendants, and then versus the king himself, makes for dramatic reading. This back and forth, this similar in some ways to a description found in a medieval tale or of a tournament, fairly demands some sort of skirmish-level treatment in 28mm or even 54mm when Battle Day 2026 is held. Trying to stay focused on the Armati reconstruction, it is a matter of choice when to attach or commit a general to a unit that is fighting a melee or is moving into contact with the enemy. This decision might be slightly problematic in the proposed refight, given the comparatively high key unit value assigned to each personality. A contest between the Rebel Prince and the King Artaxerxes II might also be difficult to facilitate if they remain safely behind their respective center formations. Given the reported and much debated positioning of these centers, a tabletop meeting of the opposing generals might also prove problematic. The loss of either figure/model would be significant in a refight, as it was on the historical field. Given their importance, a cautious or unlucky player-general might hesitate to put his representative army general in danger. At the risk of further anticipating an event that is, as of this typing, approximately 11 months in the future, it will be interesting to find out how many times Cyrus the Younger and King Artaxerxes II perished or were wounded during Battle Day 2026. 

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Although the ‘work’ done for a potential Armati refight of Cunaxa still needs quite a bit of revision and tinkering, it seems reasonable to remark that this rough outline of a plan provides a foundation for building additional refights with other sets of rules. In fact, for a short period of time early one evening (between 10 and 30 minutes, but no more than 45), I considered the feasibility of a long-term project wherein I would refight the 401 BC/BCE civil war contest between Cyrus the Younger and King Artaxerxes II seven times. I would employ a different set of rules for each solo wargame played on my non-traditional tabletop. The pros and cons of adopting one interpretation of the historical battle and then comparing and contrasting how each set of rules was able to handle the ‘miniature’ model were weighed against the positives and problems of using one rulebook to handle one interpretation of part of the engagement and then another rulebook to address another part of the action. For example, it would be possible to employ the IMPETVS rules (2008 Edition) to reconstruct just the fight on Cyrus’ right flank (the one wherein the Greek hoplites routed the formations arranged against them), and then use the Triumph! rules in a reconstruction of the fight on Cyrus’ left flank. If I allowed myself the generous time window of a full month to complete each refight - whatever form these wargames finally took - and then draft in addition to revise at least several times, a summary report, then without any break, this seven refights of Cunaxa project could be completed in as many months. An early May start would see me finish by late November, which might be a rather nice as well as early Christmas present to myself and perhaps to others who would decide to read the finished post or submission to a traditional publication. This admittedly fantastic consideration led me to wonder about what might actually transpire at Battle Day 2026. 

How will Battle Day 2026 compare to Battle Day 2025? Only time will tell. Will there be more, fewer, or about the same number of refights of the 401 BC/BCE civil war contest between the reportedly sizable armies of Cyrus the Younger and King Artaxerxes II than there were between the substantially smaller armies of Anglo-Saxons and Vikings at Maldon? Will figure scales be evenly divided between 10mm, 15mm, and 25mm, or will one figure scale prove more popular? Will the number of rulesets employed be as varied as the number of refights, or will the DBA ‘family’ (which includes the ‘cousins’ of DBM and DBMM) dominate the reconstructions? Who will win the ‘Best Terrain’ prize, and which individuals will be voted the best Clearchus, Cyrus, and King Artaxerxes of the day? How soon will reports or summaries start to appear? Will most of these be posted to blogs, or will the majority be prepared and submitted to the editor of Slingshot for inclusion in a dedicated issue? Will there even come a time when someone is able to take pictures or video of a Battle Day, and post it online like Simon Miller and Big Lee have done when sharing their high-level as well as  standard-setting wargaming activities and projects?   

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While my focus on an Armati refight of Cunaxa has proved educational and engaging, I can see another point of view, which argues that there is something to be said for taking an easier or simpler approach. For example, there is an excellent scenario here: https://caliban-somewhen.blogspot.com/p/scenarios-500-250-bce.html. 

All the preparation work has been done for the interested ancients wargamer. This individual or perhaps small group simply has to repeat the ‘experiment.’ If another set of rules is preferred, I imagine that it would not be too difficult to translate the interpretation provided by this scenario into the language and mechanics of other rules sets. In my own small collection, I have: Hail Caesar (2011 Edition), IMPETVS (2008 Edition), L’Art de la Guerre (2014 Edition), To The Strongest! (Version 1.1), and Triumph! (2019 Edition).  

Another option, one that would require a bit more of an investment however, would be the purchase of the Command & Colors Ancients boxed set along with some of the expansions. This decision would afford me the opportunity to refight Cunaxa many times, once I learned the rules of course, as well as give me the chance to refight a number of other well known historical engagements. Preparation and space would not be a concern at all, as I could set up the game or scenario on a suitable table in a spare room and complete turns at my leisure.  

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Summary (well . . . kind of), Sources and Remarks

This post went through a number of iterations. Evidently, starting and then discarding a draft, then beginning another, and then another, and then another until a certain threshold is reached, constitutes the frustrating yet fundamental part of what might be generously called my ‘writing about wargaming matters process.’ As Battle Day Cunaxa is approximately a year from taking place, it seems a little premature (some readers may think it more than a little premature) to be wrestling with how to refight the engagement using the Armati rules, to be considering which part of the contest to reconstruct, and to be thinking about what scenario rules might be necessary in order to provide for a better tabletop experience. As I proceeded with the editing and revising of this post, I wondered what impact it might have when finally published. I also wondered how often I would refer to it as the weeks and months went by. Would July or August find me deleting the post and replacing it with an apology and some kind of  explanation? Would September or October find me producing more false starts as I attempted to revisit the idea of refighting Cunaxa in one form or another? To reiterate the four-word statement regarding the possible outcomes of Battle Day 2026: Only time will tell. 

In no particular order, here is a bullet-point list of the sources I consulted while researching, drafting, and editing this post. I have also included some remarks that may or may not prove useful to the appreciated reader.  

> Battle Notes for Wargamers, by Donald Featherstone - 

This little 1974 book is perhaps one of the more valuable reads in my quite small wargaming library. I have often (perhaps too often) referred to his common sense guidelines for “refighting historical battles realistically” on the bottom of page 10. With regard to Cunaxa, it appears that modeling the terrain will be quite simple. I would not be all that surprised to find that some participants at Battle Day 2026 (and even those attending remotely or a week or three before the scheduled date) simply designated one short table edge as the bank of the Euphrates. I would not be surprised to eventually find out that Mark Craddock won another award for ‘Best Terrain.’ (I confess that I am already looking forward to reading the report(s) prepared by Mark Fry and his experienced as well as merry band of Armati colleagues.) Given the lack of vetted information about the size of the armies present, it is not possible to “accurately represent the original forces,” which means, in the strictest sense I suppose, that a “realistic refight of Cunaxa is not achievable.”   

> LOST BATTLES - Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World, by Professor Philip Sabin - 

His review and analysis of the contest and supporting ancient narratives is provided on pages 107-110. Although oriented towards reconstructing the battle with his rules, this brief summary makes for very interesting reading. Courtesy of this accomplished academic, I was directed to the ancient authors. Through a footnote, I thought seriously about securing a copy of J.M. Bigwood’s 1983 paper on the battle. (I have plenty of time, though I do not want to tempt Fate, to read and annotate this 42-year-old article.) 

> Links to the ancient narratives referenced in Professor Sabin’s work - 

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Xen.%20Anab.%201.8&lang=original

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Artaxerxes*.html

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/14B*.html

In a word, each of these narratives is invaluable, though I would agree that the account provided by Xenophon is the most wargamer-friendly. At the same time, as others have commented, these versions can sometimes lead to confusion or pointed questions about the sequence of events and the numbers that were present and or involved, etc. 

> THE ROMAN ARMY AT WAR 100 BC—AD 200, by Adrian Goldsworthy -
Admittedly, the subject(s) of this excellent book do not concern themselves with the battle of Cunaxa or the general period of Greek and Persian history. However, Chapter 4, ‘The General’s Battle,’ and Chapter 5, ‘The Unit’s Battle,’ do provide interesting reading as well as a wealth of information. Pages 192-209, wherein he describes in detail the probable four stages of close-order infantry engaging with close-order infantry might help a great deal when attempting to understand the psychological variables that apply to combat, whether occurring in 401 BC/BCE, in 750 AD/CE, or in 1942.

> During the course of this research, I found or stumbled upon a few papers in the massive academia.edu library.

> https://www.academia.edu/12538735/Two_Notes_on_the_Battle_of_Cunaxa?sm-b

Quite interesting reading, if rather focused on the Egyptian infantry at the battle and their shields. The Egyptians also figure in the discussion of the “Royal Tactics” at the engagement. I confess that I found this part of the paper more engaging and more applicable to an attempt at refighting Cunaxa on a tabletop. Ideally, I should like to obtain all of the articles and papers listed in Footnote 49. I will have to figure out how to get English translations of the German papers however.

>https://www.academia.edu/82495851/Micha%C5%82_Podrazik_2022_Some_Remarks_on_the_Battle_ofCunaxa_401_BC_?sm-b

These remarks go into quite a bit of detail about the composition and armaments of the king’s army at the battle of Cunaxa. While there is no Marsden-like map or detailed order of battle provided (this was the primary reference used for the First Battle Day, wherein Gaugamela was refought more than several times), there is a wealth of information extracted from the ancient sources which could be very helpful to the average ancients wargamer interested in staging a refight of this contest. 

> https://www.academia.edu/30406583/Anabasis_the_march_to_Cunaxa

This is a Power Point presentation and analysis of the historical battle. Google Earth is used to place the campaign in a larger context, and then captioned diagrams are provided for the various stages of the engagement. I estimate that 8 or 9 of the 39 slides will be useful to the individual or club interested in staging a refight of Cunaxa. 

> The May/June 2019 issue of Slingshot (Number 324) - 

By fortunate accident, I happened upon several color pictures of a DBA refight of Cunaxa in progress. (The figures are 25/28mm, I think, and the playing surface appears to measure about 3 or 4 feet on each side. Anyway, these photos were included in “DBA 3 - Improving the Simulation,” an educational piece written Joe Collins. There was a comment or two about refighting Cunaxa with DBA and the modifications the author was advancing. Having no actual experience with these popular rules other than reading reports of DBA wargames and tournaments, the representation of Cunaxa with 12 elements per side would take some getting used to. It seems to me that Cunaxa would be an ideal candidate for Big Battle DBA. 

 

An informal search of the internet for “wargaming Cunaxa” or “Cunaxa wargame” returned a few results. In no particular order, I present the following blog post links: 

> https://wargaming4grownups.blogspot.com/2022/05/bank-holiday-cunaxa.html

This refight was based on Professor Sabin’s analysis, but the rules employed were Neil Thomas’ AMW. The photo of the initial set up shows a large tabletop. The numerical superiority of the king’s formations is evident, as their right wing faces open ground. 

> https://bucellarii.blogspot.com/2020/04/battle-of-cunaxa-401-bc-command-and.html

This was a miniaturized version of the Command & Colors Ancients scenario. The tabletop was much smaller compared to the one used in the former blog post. This refight, however, appeared to be more entertaining and (spoiler alert!) witnessed the death of both Cyrus and Artaxerxes.

> https://shaun-wargaming-minis.blogspot.com/2013/06/battle-of-cunaxa-401bc-using-ancient.html

This refight goes back over a decade and features opposing armies and a model battlefield comparable to if not smaller than the forces and tabletop pictured in the aforementioned issue of Slingshot. 

> https://caliban-somewhen.blogspot.com/p/scenarios-500-250-bce.html
Shaun was kind enough to include this link in his post. Dr. Paul Innes provides a ready-made scenario of Cunaxa for either the Tactica or Tactica II rules. It occurs to me that this excellent template for scenario design could be modified so that a larger game might be played. One could also transfer or translate the orders of battle and scenario notes to another set of rules, as I mentioned in a previous section of this post.

> The ‘Battle Day 2026’ discussion thread within The Society of Ancients Forum provided quite a lot of food for thought. In addition to various ideas and opinions from those members participating - one can only hope that the ‘conversation’ will continue up to Battle Day 2026, individuals were directed to the late Patrick Waterson’s analysis and commentary regarding Cunaxa that this gentleman possessed of encyclopedic knowledge and formidable debating skills posted in March of 2015.